Investigation of potential land value tax policy - options for Scotland by Hughes, Cathy et al.
  
 
Investigation of Potential Land Value Tax Policy 
Options for Scotland 
 
Final Report 
Dr Cathy Hughes  
Dr William McCluskey  
Professor Sarah Sayce  
Dr Edward Shepherd  
Professor Pete Wyatt 
 
 








List of abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ 5 
Executive summary ................................................................................................................................. 6 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 6 
Research aims ..................................................................................................................................... 6 
Research method ................................................................................................................................ 6 
Current land and property taxation in Scotland ................................................................................. 7 
What is land value tax? ....................................................................................................................... 8 
Land value tax: key issues ................................................................................................................... 8 
Political issues ................................................................................................................................. 8 
Land registration ............................................................................................................................. 9 
The planning system ....................................................................................................................... 9 
Valuation of land ............................................................................................................................. 9 
Land value tax around the world ...................................................................................................... 10 
Policy issues and options for further consideration by the Scottish Land Commission ................... 11 
Option 1: Extend existing land and property taxes....................................................................... 11 
Option 2: Reform existing land and property taxes ...................................................................... 12 
Option 3: Introduce a LVT alongside existing LPTs ....................................................................... 12 
Option 4: Introduce a single LVT that replaces existing LPTs ....................................................... 12 
Further variants ............................................................................................................................. 12 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 13 
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 14 
2 Background to the research .......................................................................................................... 15 
2.1 Research methodology ......................................................................................................... 15 
3 Policy and political context for the research ................................................................................ 17 
4 Land and property taxation overview ........................................................................................... 19 
4.1 What is land and property taxation? .................................................................................... 19 
4.2 Land and property taxation in Scotland ................................................................................ 21 
4.2.1 Council tax ..................................................................................................................... 21 
4.2.2 Non-domestic rates (business rates) ............................................................................ 22 
5 Land value taxation ....................................................................................................................... 24 
5.1 What is land value taxation? ................................................................................................. 24 
5.2 The economic rationale for land value taxation ................................................................... 25 
5.3 Implementing and administering a land value tax ............................................................... 27 
5.3.1 Political issues ............................................................................................................... 27 
Investigation of Potential Land Value Tax Policy Options for Scotland – Final Report 
3 
 
5.3.2 Practical issues .............................................................................................................. 29 
5.4 Land value taxation – administration issues ......................................................................... 34 
5.4.1 Who pays? ..................................................................................................................... 34 
5.4.2 Extent of tax base .......................................................................................................... 34 
5.4.3 Tax rate ......................................................................................................................... 35 
5.4.4 Revaluations .................................................................................................................. 35 
5.4.5 Public understanding and appeals ................................................................................ 35 
5.4.6 Responsibilities ............................................................................................................. 35 
5.4.7 Initial rollout of LVT ....................................................................................................... 36 
5.4.8 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 36 
6 International experience of land value tax ................................................................................... 38 
6.1.1 Queensland, Australia ................................................................................................... 38 
6.1.2 Estonia ........................................................................................................................... 44 
6.1.3 New Zealand ................................................................................................................. 47 
6.1.4 Denmark ........................................................................................................................ 52 
6.1.5 South Africa ................................................................................................................... 60 
6.1.6 Land tax in Namibia ....................................................................................................... 64 
6.1.7 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 67 
7 Consultation interviews ................................................................................................................ 71 
8 Policy issues and options .............................................................................................................. 74 
8.1 Cross-cutting issues ............................................................................................................... 75 
8.1.1 Strategic cross-cutting issues ........................................................................................ 76 
8.1.2 Technical valuation cross-cutting issues ....................................................................... 81 
8.2 Policy options for further analysis ........................................................................................ 85 
8.2.1 Option 1: Extend existing LPTs ...................................................................................... 87 
8.2.2 Option 2: Reform existing LPTs ..................................................................................... 88 
8.2.3 Option 3: Introduce a LVT alongside existing LPTs ....................................................... 91 
8.2.4 Option 4: Introduce a single LVT that replaces existing LPTs ....................................... 95 
8.3 Further variants ..................................................................................................................... 98 
8.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 98 
Appendix I: Relevant policy and legislative events in Scotland 2014 - 2018 ...................................... 100 
Appendix II: Land value capture or betterment taxes ........................................................................ 102 
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 102 
National land value capture ............................................................................................................ 102 
Local land value capture ................................................................................................................. 103 
Appendix III: Basic principles of land economy .................................................................................. 105 
Investigation of Potential Land Value Tax Policy Options for Scotland – Final Report 
4 
 
Land economy – some key concepts .............................................................................................. 105 
The inelasticity of supply of land ................................................................................................ 105 
Sources of land value .................................................................................................................. 105 
Economic rent ............................................................................................................................. 106 
Appendix IV: Summary of land value tax and land and property tax around the world .................... 107 
Appendix V: Queensland state land tax rates as at 2018 ................................................................... 110 
Rates for individuals ........................................................................................................................ 110 
Rates for companies, trustees and absentees ................................................................................ 110 
Glossary ............................................................................................................................................... 111 
References .......................................................................................................................................... 114 
 
 
The research team is grateful to the country experts who provided information on systems of land 
value taxation.  
The research team is also grateful to participants in the expert panel, to the Commissioners of the 
Scottish Land Commission and to Shona Glenn of the Scottish Land Commission for their 
constructive comments on work produced as part of this research project. 
The authors are responsible for any errors of fact or judgement. 
  
Investigation of Potential Land Value Tax Policy Options for Scotland – Final Report 
5 
 
List of abbreviations 
ATM – automatic telling machine 
AVM – automatic valuation model 
GDP – gross domestic product 
HABU – highest and best use 
LPT – land and property tax 
LRPG – Land Reform Policy Group 
LVC – land value capture 
LVT – land value tax 
MPRA – Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 (South Africa) 
NZLT – New Zealand land tax 
RSA – Republic of South Africa (now South Africa) 
SARS – South Africa Revenue Service 
SLC – Scottish Land Commission 
TLA – territorial local authority (New Zealand) 
UAGC – uniform annual general charges 
VAT – value added tax 
  





The University of Reading has been appointed by the Scottish Land Commission (SLC) to conduct 
research to assess, with reference to international experience, the potential of land value taxation to 
contribute to a more productive, accountable and diverse pattern of land ownership and use in 
Scotland and to identify a set of potential policy options that merit further consideration by the SLC. 
The current research is part of a broader agenda to reform the system of land ownership and the 
functioning of the land market in Scotland, and to reshape the role of the public sector in taking a 
more proactive stance in delivering development in the public interest. Adjustments in the 
mechanisms for land and property taxation will be an essential piece of the puzzle in delivering this 
vision. 
Research aims 
The key aims of the research are to: 
 Discuss the economic rationale for a land value tax and to identify key issues in relation to 
its implementation. 
 Identify and analyse examples of how land value tax has been used around the world. 
 Propose a range of policy options in relation to land and property tax reform, including the 
possible introduction of a form of land value tax for further consideration and analysis by 
the SLC. 
In formulating these options, the Research Team has considered the SLC’s strategic objectives in 
relation to land reform, which are: 
 productivity – so as to increase the economic, social and cultural value of Scotland’s land; 
 diversity – so as to encourage a more diverse pattern of land ownership that spreads the 
benefits of land more inclusively; and 
 accountability – so as to ensure that decision-making takes account of those affected and 
that responsibilities in relation to land are met. 
Research method 
The research project comprised three stages: 
1. Review of literature and consultation interviews with key stakeholders in Scotland. 
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2. Case study analysis of land value taxation in six jurisdictions (Queensland, New Zealand, 
Estonia, Denmark, South Africa and Namibia). 
3. Policy option formulation – comprising four broad policy options for further investigation by 
the SLC. These are based on work conducted in stages one and two, and triangulated 
through a workshop with Commissioners and staff from the SLC and an expert panel on land 
value tax. 
Current land and property taxation in Scotland 
Land and property taxes (LPT) can be classified as recurrent (usually annual) or event-based taxes. In 
terms of event-based LPTs, Scotland has Land and Buildings Transfer Tax, capital gains tax, 
inheritance tax, and ‘section 75 agreements’ (i.e. planning obligations). Scotland also has two forms 
of recurrent LPT that both tax improved land (i.e. the value of the land as well as the value of any 
improvements to that land such as structures). These are council tax, levied on domestic properties, 
and non-domestic rates (business rates), levied on non-domestic property. The taxable entity for 
both of these taxes is the occupier in the first instance, although landowners become liable if the 
land and property is unoccupied. 
Council tax is based on capital values of houses. It is regressive in two ways: first, because it uses 
outdated property values, the effective tax rate is lower for dwellings in higher value bands. Second, 
because house prices tend to be positively correlated with income, council tax is regressive with 
respect to income as well as house values.   
Business rates are based on rental values and revalued regularly. Business rates raise more revenue 
than council tax despite a far smaller tax base. Consequently, non-domestic properties are taxed 
much more heavily relative to dwellings. There are a range of reliefs and exemptions for business 
rates in Scotland. Premises which are exempt include agricultural land and buildings and fish farms, 
among other uses. Should a form of land value tax be introduced in Scotland, it could potentially sit 
alongside an adjusted form of these existing LPTs, or replace them entirely. 
In summary, the current property tax situation is that much of the land area in Scotland is not valued 
for tax and / or the occupier is exempted or subject to relief.  It follows that currently the tax falls 
heavily, and for domestic properties regressively, on a relatively small percentage of the land and its 
owners/occupiers. Existing recurrent LPTs in Scotland could therefore be regarded as acting as a 
disincentive to bring land forward for development. 
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What is land value tax? 
Land value tax (LVT) is a recurrent tax on landowners based on unimproved land value, usually levied 
as a percentage of the unimproved capital value of the site. Normally there is an assumption that the 
unimproved land has the right to be developed in accordance with its ‘highest and best use’. LVT is 
implemented in many countries, though several have moved away from it in part or in whole (e.g. 
South Africa and New Zealand).   
According to economic theory, land value is the price of monopoly: the scarcer and less substitutable 
a parcel of land is, and the more attractive the location in relation to the market (consumers) and 
factors of production (labour, raw materials), the more valuable the land. Because land is a ‘gift of 
nature’ and does not cost anything to produce, this value net of the value of any improvements may 
be taxed without harm to economic efficiency and production. Further, it is argued that where land 
values rise, such as on the grant of planning consent, this is due to the actions of the community, not 
the landowner or occupier. 
In addition to the obvious purpose of raising revenue for government, economic theory suggests 
that LVT has a range of benefits:  
 it can encourage highest and best use of land;  
 it can capture the uplift in private wealth that arises due to public investment; 
 it may encourage denser development and therefore limit urban sprawl; and 
 it may stabilise the price of real estate by reducing and stabilising underlying land prices.   
There is, however, little firm evidence that these theoretical benefits have been achieved in the 
countries that have implemented LVT. 
Land value tax: key issues 
There are a number of issues which would need to be carefully considered by policy makers should a 
form of LVT be introduced in Scotland. 
Political issues 
Politically, LVT can be challenging to implement.  Political arguments against LVT centre on the 
windfall loss incurred by landowners, the difficulty in dismantling centuries of land ownership rights, 
the impact on other taxes and the potential that a LVT would tax individuals with property wealth 
but who are cash poor and may not have the ability to pay. 




LVT requires up to date information on all land ownership, land use and land prices.  The register of 
land ownership must include (legally) identifiable boundaries.  A land use map must record 
permitted land use rights for all sites. Currently, Scotland does not have an up to date and accurate 
cadastral system of property registration. 
The planning system 
For a successful LVT, the planning system must be able to specify a permitted land use for each 
parcel and confirm any development rights in order to value the land.  Scotland has a plan-led 
discretionary system, which is different from zoning systems that delineate permitted uses on an 
area-by-area basis, conveying development rights to landowners without the need for detailed 
approval. In a zoning system the assessment of permitted use is more straightforward than a plan-
led discretionary system. Such zoning systems are common where LVT has proved to be most 
sustainable. 
Valuation of land 
The valuation of land for the purposes of LVT presents the following technical issues. 
Revaluations 
Regular revaluations of land values are required in order to cope with market volatility and changing 
real values.  There can be high political costs associated with infrequent revaluations and associated, 
potentially sharp, tax increases. Banding values can simplify administration especially when evidence 
is scarce, but there may be contention regarding the boundaries of the bands. It should be noted 
that this is not an LVT-specific issue, but applies to all forms of recurrent LPT. 
Valuation method and transactional evidence 
The comparison method should ideally be used to value land for the purposes of LVT. This would be 
achieved by reviewing comparable transactional evidence of land sales. However, given that 
economic theory suggests that LVT should be levied on unimproved land, and given that there may 
be sparse evidence of land sales of unimproved land in Scotland, particularly within urban areas, this 
may be challenging, although not insurmountable. 
Highest and best use and the planning system 
In order to achieve the objectives of incentivising the optimal use of land and/or diversifying land 
ownership as part of a LVT system, the land would need to be valued based on its highest and best 
use (HABU). Therefore, where land is not currently in its HABU, there would be an incentive to 
develop it to its HABU in order to realise the value upon which LVT liability is calculated. However, 
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this brings with it challenges associated with how a valuer would go about determining the HABU of 
the land. This is because it is a matter of judgement and therefore open to challenge. 
Unimproved land 
In the absence of robust evidence of prices for unimproved land, valuers may need to rely on 
evidence of prices of improved land and property, and then make adjustments to arrive at a 
hypothetical unimproved land value.  This again is a matter of judgement and open to challenge.  
Furthermore, there may be difficulties arising from any adopted definition of ‘unimproved land’. For 
example, economic theory suggests that it should be land in its ‘original unimproved state’ i.e. 
‘prairie’ or ‘wild’ land which has had no human labour mixed with it at all. However, it may in 
practice be very difficult to differentiate between land as it would have existed in its ‘original 
unimproved state’, and land which has been subject to improvements over many years such that 
those improvements may have merged with the land over time, such as levelling for example. This 
could be a particular issue in rural Scotland, parts of which have been managed for centuries. 
Land value tax around the world 
The research has investigated examples of LVT in Australia (Queensland), Estonia, New Zealand, 
Denmark, South Africa and Namibia in order to inform the proposed policy options.  Australia, 
Estonia, Denmark and Namibia all currently levy a LVT either at local level, national level or both. 
New Zealand and South Africa have moved away from LVT after a long period of adoption. 
The following key points can be drawn out from the case studies: 
 While a uniform tax rate is simple and, on the face of it, equitable, differential tax rates are 
common.  Different rates are usually assigned on the basis of land use. 
 Where a LVT exists it does so in combination with other land and property taxes.  These 
might be taxes administered at different levels of government (state and municipality for 
example) or they might be other forms of tax such as stamp duty or capital gains tax (New 
Zealand was the only case study where these other forms of tax were not present). 
 Regular revaluations are regarded as important, especially for urban land and property 
where values are high, more variable and more volatile.  But revaluations are not always 
evident, particularly in rural areas.  This is because valuations comprise a significant 
proportion of the administrative cost and they are politically sensitive. 
 Exemptions are widespread but it is not a foregone conclusion that agricultural land is 
exempt; some jurisdictions do tax agricultural land. 
 There was little evidence that LVT has any perceptible redistributive effect, helps with 
breaking up large estates, or with bringing under-utilised land in to beneficial use, although 
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it was claimed that in Estonia it had encouraged owners to dispose of land not in productive 
use.  
 However, the introduction of LVT on commercial agricultural farms in Namibia is regarded as 
a success due to the extent of popular and political support and the amount of revenue it 
has raised to fund the acquisition of land for land reform purposes. 
 When the tax is established as a service tax (as opposed to a wealth tax), it is important for 
tax payers to see the relationship between the tax and services provided. 
 Where jurisdictions have moved away from ‘pure’ LVT (i.e. South Africa and New Zealand), 
the reasons seem to be both political and technical – a tax on the combined value of land 
and improvements is easier to administer, understand and communicate to the taxpayer. 
 The technical difficulty of how to value unimproved land, while not insurmountable, is 
considerable and prone to generating confusion and a lack of transparency. 
 Political consensus is essential, as is the public’s understanding of the tax itself. 
Policy issues and options for further consideration by the Scottish Land Commission 
The literature review and case study analysis conducted as part of this research has not produced 
evidence sufficient to provide an assurance that a LVT would deliver the SLC’s objectives in Scotland, 
despite the considerable potential benefits suggested by economic theory.  However, it should be 
emphasised that this commissioned research required a desk-top review of the literature based on a 
small number of case studies. It is possible that focused empirical work could provide firmer 
information as to the likelihood of the effectiveness of LVT to deliver the SLC’s objectives. 
Nevertheless, it has been possible to identify four options which could be developed by the SLC 
should it choose to further explore the potential of a LVT in Scotland.  
Option 1: Extend existing land and property taxes 
Option 1 targets rural properties which are currently excluded from the non-domestic rates tax base, 
potentially including land which is part of larger estates. The land would be taxed based on its 
annual rental value assuming existing use, including improvements, with the liability falling on the 
occupier in the first instance. Currently excluded rural properties brought in to the tax base would be 
valued and taxed based on the combined rental value of the land and the business properties built 
on that land. In instances where there are no properties, the land would still be taxed based on its 
annual rental value. This option could be delivered through adjustments to the existing taxation 
system for non-domestic rates. 
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Option 2: Reform existing land and property taxes 
Option 2 builds on option 1 but is primarily aimed at making the existing LPT system more 
progressive through reforming existing council tax and non-domestic rates. Council tax could be 
reformed so as to update the valuations and capture wealth increases since 1991, to conduct regular 
revaluations, to reform council tax banding to tax higher value properties more progressively and to 
review reliefs and exemptions. Non-domestic rates could be reformed so as to conduct more regular 
revaluations, revise relief provisions and exemptions so as to include currently excluded land such as 
agricultural uses. In this option, the taxable entity would be the occupier in the first instance. 
Option 3: Introduce a LVT alongside existing LPTs 
The main objective of this option is to introduce a form of LVT which seeks to achieve many of the 
objectives of a single LVT, but without requiring total replacement of the existing LPT system. All 
rural land (including land currently exempt from non-domestic rates), non-residential land and 
residential land (including vacant, under-used and derelict land) would be taxed based on the capital 
value in its unimproved state assuming HABU with the liability falling on the landowner only. This 
would in effect represent the introduction of a LVT, with the theoretical incentive for landowners to 
develop or sell under-utilised land where the HABU value is higher than the existing use value. In 
terms of the meaning of HABU, it is suggested that it should be defined as ‘most profitable 
permissible development’. Under this option, existing taxes could be reformed as in Option 2, but 
would be levied based on the value of the buildings only. 
Option 4: Introduce a single LVT that replaces existing LPTs 
Option 4 represents the most radical intervention as it would replace all existing LPTs with a single 
LVT on all land.  The tax would be based on the capital value of the land in its HABU excluding 
improvements, with the landowner as the taxable entity. This would mean that the tenants of 
domestic and non-domestic properties would not pay the tax. Therefore, a proportion of the 
revenue generated by this option would have to be retained by or provided to local authorities in 
order to fund local services and infrastructure. In terms of the meaning of HABU, it is suggested that 
it should be defined as ‘most profitable permissible development’. 
Further variants 
It would be possible to ‘mix and match’ elements of the various options to produce further variants. 
Such variants could include: 
 Reform of the existing non-domestic rates reliefs as part of option 1. 
 Reform the council tax and non-domestic rates systems so that the primary taxable entity is 
the owner, rather than the occupier. This could, for example, be included as a variant of 
option 2. 
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 Include a form of LVT specifically targeting owners of undeveloped residential property, 
based on capital value of the unimproved land in its HABU. This could, for example, be 
included as a variant of option 2. 
 Include a form of LVT specifically targeting owners of vacant and derelict land with 
development value, based on capital value of the unimproved land in its HABU. This could, 
for example, be included as a variant of option 2. 
Conclusion 
Whatever the SLC and the Scottish Government choose to do, there is ample opportunity to reform 
Scotland’s existing system of LPT in order to introduce a more progressive and equitable system 
which has the potential to deliver land reform objectives. However, the key would be to work 








The University of Reading has been appointed by the Scottish Land Commission (SLC) to conduct 
research to assess, with reference to international experience, the potential of land value taxation to 
contribute to a more productive, accountable and diverse pattern of land ownership and use in 
Scotland and to identify a set of potential policy options that merit further consideration by the SLC. 
This report is structured as follows: 
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2 Background to the research 
The SLC was established under the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 on 1st April 2017. The SLC’s 
purpose is to provide direction, leadership and strategic thought regarding land reform in Scotland. 
Its strategic vision is of a fair, inclusive and productive system of ownership, management and use of 
land that delivers greater benefit for all the people of Scotland. The SLC therefore has three strategic 
objectives: 
 productivity – so as to increase the economic, social and cultural value of Scotland’s land; 
 diversity – so as to encourage a more diverse pattern of land ownership that spreads the 
benefits of land more inclusively; and 
 accountability – so as to ensure that decision-making takes account of those affected and 
that responsibilities in relation to land are met. 
Pursuant to this, the Scottish Government has asked the SLC to conduct research into the potential 
for a land value tax (LVT) in Scotland. As a starting point for this the SLC has appointed the University 
of Reading to undertake some initial work to investigate potential options. 
2.1 Research methodology 
The research project has comprised three stages: 
1. Review of literature and consultation interviews: This comprised three elements: 
a. A desk-top analysis of existing information relating to the economic rationale for and 
key challenges associated with land value taxation.  
b. A desk-top review to identify those countries which have introduced a system of LVT 
whether currently or historically. 
c. A series of interviews with key stakeholders in Scotland with a view to finding out 
more about the level of awareness regarding LVT in Scotland, and identifying any 
concerns or aspirations. 
2. Case study analysis: The Research Team agreed a number of case studies with the SLC, the 
purpose of which was to develop a deeper understanding of the rationale for the 
introduction of LVT in the case study countries, the desired policy objectives, and the specific 
policy instruments employed. The technical issue of the approach to the valuation of land in 
the adopted regimes was also a focus.  
3. Policy option formulation: Following the case study analysis, the Research Team identified 
policy options which would merit further investigation by the SLC. These are based on the 
case study research and interviews, and were triangulated through the use of a workshop 
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with Commissioners and staff from the SLC. The Research Team also arranged a panel with a 
number of experts on land value tax in order to ensure that the right potential policy options 
were identified, and their implications fully taken account of. The expert panel comprised 
the following: 
a. Tony Crook – University of Sheffield 
b. Riel Franzsen – University of South Africa 
c. Richard Grover – Oxford Brookes University 
d. Paul Sanderson – International Property Tax Institute 
e. Christine Whitehead – London School of Economics 
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3 Policy and political context for the research 
The Scottish National Party announced support for the potential introduction of a LVT at its 2017 
conference.  In its 2016 manifesto, the Scottish Green Party said that it would work to replace non-
domestic rating with a LVT. The current research is therefore part of a wider policy agenda on land 
and property tax reform. 
It also forms part of a policy debate in Scotland regarding the rights and responsibilities of land 
ownership. This debate is taking place in a context of increasing land values, growing development 
pressure and a consolidating land ownership pattern.  Indeed, there is a growing, unearned land 
value uplift that is delivering very significant windfall gains to landowners - this is borne out by 
estimates of residual land values for residential development in Scotland as shown in figure 1. There 
is a need, therefore, for Scottish policy makers to gather further information on the way in which 
LVT policies might be introduced.    
Figure 1: Residual land values for residential development – Scotland 1995 – 20151 
 
The recent history of Scottish land reform began with the establishment of the Scottish Office’s Land 
Reform Policy Group (LRPG) in 1997. The LRPG published its report of recommendations for land 
reform measures in 1999 and these were adopted by the Scottish Executive.  
The Land Reform Review Group recommended the establishment of a single body with responsibility 
for understanding and monitoring the system governing the ownership and management of 
                                                          
1 This graph is based on an annual residual valuation model using ONS house price data for new dwellings in 
Scotland, build cost information from the BCIS, average dwellings size data from the Scottish House Condition 
Survey 2013 and standard assumptions regarding other inputs such as developer’s profit, finance rate and 
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Scotland's land, and recommending changes in the public interest, where required. This resulted in 
the creation of the SLC which became operational on 1 April 2017.  
The SLC’s strategic plan sets out a vision for land reform in Scotland which is situated within a 
‘cultural shift in understanding of land ownership, its rights and responsibilities’ with a ‘better 
balance between public and private interests and an increasingly diverse pattern of land ownership 
and tenure which properly reflects national and local aspirations and human rights’ (Scottish Land 
Commission, 2017, p.8). 
Land, urban renewal and the delivery of housing are ‘essential components of the current land 
reform agenda’ in Scotland, with ‘the question of who captures the benefit from rising land values, 
and how this is used’ lying at the heart of these issues (Land Reform Review Group, 2014, p.119). 
This is why one of the SLC’s strategic priorities for 2018-21 is to reform the way in which land 
markets determine the pattern and quality of development so as to address social and economic 
needs. This will include ‘reviewing ownership constraints to the delivery of housing including land 
banking’ and seeking to improve the quality and accountability of decision making relating to land 
use (Scottish Land Commission, 2017, p.12).  
The current research must therefore be seen as being part of this broader agenda to reform the 
system of land ownership and the functioning of the land market in Scotland, reform the Scottish 
planning system, reform the land and property taxation system in Scotland, and to reshape the role 
of the public sector in taking a more proactive stance in delivering development in the public 
interest, including good places and housing at affordable levels. Adjustments to the mechanisms for 
land and property taxation will be an essential piece of the puzzle in delivering this vision 
(Wadsworth, 2018). Indeed, a report recently commissioned by the SLC investigating historical 
attempts to capture land value uplift in the UK concluded there could be a case for considering the 
use of recurrent land value taxation complementary to any form of event-based land value capture 
mechanisms (Jones et al, 2018).  
Recent relevant policy and legislative events in Scotland are listed in Appendix I. 
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4 Land and property taxation overview 
4.1 What is land and property taxation? 
Land and property taxes (LPTs) can be classified in different ways. Figure 2 categorises them as 
recurrent (usually annual) taxes and event-based taxes. 
Figure 2 – Land and property taxes 
 
The recurrent taxes are usually assessed with reference to value (market capital value, market rental 
value or cadastral value based on parameters such as land use, location or size) of land and/or 
improvements to the land, and are often referred to as ad valorem taxes. Event-based taxes include: 
 Transfer taxes: usually assessed as a percentage (sometimes stepped with thresholds) of 
price agreed on transfer of ownership. 
 Wealth taxes: capital gains tax which accrues to property asset(s) whose value has 
appreciated over time, and inheritance tax which is charged on the value of property owned 
at death. 
 Betterment taxes (or land value capture): levied on any increase in value attributable to the 
granting of different land use rights. 
Table 1 summarises the key attributes of each of these taxes. 
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Table 1 – Key attributes of land and property taxes 
Type of tax Description Recurrence Liability Incidence 
Recurrent 
tax 






Transfer tax % price agreed on transfer of ownership On transfer Owners Transfer 
Betterment 
tax 
On increase in value attributable to 
granting of land use rights 









Accruing to property asset(s) whose 
value has appreciated over time 







On the value of property owned at 
death 
On death Owners Wealth, 
Transfer 
 
Despite their distortionary effect on market activity (acting as a brake on mobility and reducing 
market liquidity), most countries levy transfer taxes. For example, the Land and Buildings 
Transaction Tax is levied in in Scotland.  Many countries, especially those with developed or rapidly 
developing urban areas, also levy betterment taxes. The UK has experimented with this form of 
taxation in the past but does not currently levy a betterment tax, although there are mechanisms to 
extract development ‘contributions’ towards local communities. Appendix II provides some 
discussion on betterment taxation from a UK perspective, and further detail can be found in a report 
for the SLC by Jones et al (2018).  The relative advantages and disadvantages of recurrent and event-
based LPTs are summarised in the quotation from the UN in the box below. 
UN 2011 (pp. 41-42): 
Whether the tax is the result of changes in possession (transfer taxes, capital gains taxes, inheritance taxes are 
examples) or changes in land use (betterment levies and development fees), such changes may occur only 
rarely for any given parcel of land, and it may be decades between such transactions. In good economic times, 
when many properties are being developed and property trades occur frequently, these one-time levies can be 
very important sources of local revenue. But governments that rely too heavily on such revenues to fund on-
going operations often encounter severe fiscal challenges when economic conditions slow as they have in 
many countries in recent years.  The annual LPT offers the advantage of a more predictable ongoing source of 
revenue. In addition, the tax rate can generally be much lower than rates associated with one-time levies 
because the annual LPT is most commonly applied to a much broader base (all properties rather than just 
those being transferred or developed). On the other hand, including all properties in the base creates both 
political and administrative challenges. 
  
The focus of the present research is recurrent taxes and LVT in particular. 
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4.2 Land and property taxation in Scotland 
In addition to the event-based Land and Buildings Transfer Tax, capital gains tax, inheritance tax, and 
‘section 75 agreements’ (i.e. planning obligations), Scotland currently has two forms of recurrent LPT 
that both tax improved land: council tax, which is levied on domestic properties, and non-domestic 
rates (business rates), which are levied on non-domestic business premises. 
4.2.1 Council tax 
Each local authority in Scotland currently sets its own council tax rate, administers and collects the 
tax, and decides how tax revenue is spent. The taxable entity is the occupier of a residential 
property, although owners are liable when they are owner-occupiers. The liability also falls on the 
owner when the property is vacant. 
There are eight council tax bands, from A (lowest), to H (highest). These bands are based on 
estimations of the market value of residential properties as at 1 April 1991. Councils currently set the 
band D tax rate, with the charges for properties in other bands being a fixed proportion of that band 
D charge. There are a range of reliefs and exemptions available for council tax, including for lower 
income households, people under the age of 26 leaving care, students, second homes and 
unoccupied properties. Some of these reliefs are at the discretion of the local authority. 
Reforms were introduced in April 2017 to address the problem of lower-banded properties paying 
more council tax as a proportion of property value than households in the higher valuation bands. 
These reforms included changing the way tax on the 25% of properties in the four highest valuation 
bands is calculated, as well as introducing reliefs for low to middle income households in properties 
affected by the reforms. 
In 2016-17 £2.1bn* was billed and £2.1bn (95.8%) was collected by the end of the year (*Before 
Council Tax Reduction this would have been £2.5bn).  According to Policy Exchange (2013) the 
primary advantages of council tax are that: it is an established system; it is one of the few local 
revenue-raising options for local government; it allows a limited amount of local accountability; it 
encourages efficiency as surplus spend over the grant requires higher tax rises; and is relatively 
cheap to operate and provides stability for households.  
The drawbacks are twofold.  First, it is regressive in that the tax rate falls as the house price rises.  As 
house prices tend to be positively correlated with income, council tax is also generally regressive 
with respect to income as well as house prices. The Lyons Inquiry into Local Government found ‘a 
positive and statistically significant correlation between income and property value’ (Lyons, 2007, 
p.229).  However, Lyons also noted ‘a small but significant minority of low-income households are in 
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bands F, G and H, of which over half are pensioner households.’ (Lyons, 2007, p.230)  Second, it uses 
outdated property values. However, revaluations are politically difficult; it was only political 
consensus that allowed Wales’ revaluation to proceed in the mid-2000s.   
4.2.2 Non-domestic rates (business rates) 
Non-domestic rates (business rates) are charged on most non-domestic properties in Scotland to 
help pay for the local services used by businesses. The taxable entity is therefore the occupier of a 
property, although the liability falls on the owner where the property is vacant/unoccupied. The tax 
is levied based on a property’s ‘rateable value’ which is generally based on its estimated open 
market annual rental value. Rateable values are regularly reviewed through revaluations, the most 
recent of which took effect on 1 April 2017 based on values as at 1 April 2015. The next revaluation 
will take place in 2022, and every three years thereafter.  
Business rates are worked out using the rateable value set by the Scottish Assessors and the tax rate 
set by the Scottish Government. Individual local authorities administer and collect the tax. Local 
authorities retain the money collected from rates in the council area to fund local services, including 
those to businesses. 
There are a range of exemptions for business rates in Scotland. Premises which are exempt include: 
 agricultural land and buildings; 
 fish farms; 
 public parks; 
 rural premises with Automatic Telling Machines (ATMs); 
 oil and gas pipelines; and 
 overseas armed forces premises in the UK. 
In 2013 the Scottish Government decided that the exemptions for agricultural land and woodland 
should be retained whereas the Land Reform Review Group thought that the agricultural land 
exemption should be withdrawn (in phases).  Although formerly exempt, Scottish farms and estates 
with shoots and deer forests have been reintroduced into the valuation roll as part of the Land 
Reform Act 2016.  In cases where shooting rights could be exercised, but no shoot actually occurs, 
such land will still be entered on the valuation roll thereby having a similar function as a land tax. 
There are numerous reliefs available through the non-domestic rates system, which include: 
 small businesses; 
 empty/unoccupied property; 
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 rural (relief for properties that provide key services in designated rural settlements). 
In 2016-17 the tax base in Scotland was £2.8bn from 230,000 properties.  There was £600m of relief 
granted including for empty properties.  Business rates raise more revenue than council tax despite a 
far smaller tax base. Consequently, non-domestic properties are taxed much more heavily relative to 
dwellings.  It is no longer a locally administered tax; after World War Two rates provided 
approximately 50% of local government funding; it is now around 10%.  Following the Barclay 
Review of non-domestic rates in Scotland, the Government plans to retain the tax (Barclay Review, 
2017).   
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5 Land value taxation 
5.1 What is land value taxation? 
Land value tax (LVT) is a recurrent tax on landowners based on unimproved land value, usually levied 
as a percentage of the unimproved capital value of the site2.  In addition to the obvious purpose of 
raising revenue for government, LVT is widely regarded as having the following benefits: 
 it is an efficient tax, it does not distort choices as to how much to invest in improvements 
(Dye and England, 2010); 
 it can encourage the highest and best use of land (Commission on Local Tax Reform, 2015 
Vol 3, p.26-7); 
 it can capture betterment; the uplift in private wealth that arises due to public investment 
(IPPR, 2005); 
 it can promote reuse of land that may be unused, derelict or vacant (assuming such land is 
taxable) (Lyons Inquiry into Local Government, 2005, p.76); 
 by raising the holding cost of land, it may discourage land banking and speculation and 
encourage development; 
 it may encourage denser development3 (subject to planning) and therefore limit urban 
sprawl; and 
 it may stabilise the price of real estate by reducing and stabilising underlying land prices.  
Arguably landowners would face a windfall loss when an LVT is introduced, but the tax 
should not create any disincentives to buy, develop or use the land in question (Mirrlees, 
2011). 
                                                          
2 Appendix III contains a summary of some key principles of land economy which may be helpful for the reader 
to review before continuing. 
3 There has been some research into whether LVT encourages development activity (Dye and England, 2010).  
Four studies looked at the effect of introducing a split-rate LPT (where land is taxed at a higher rate than 
improvements) to replace the single-rate LPT in Pennsylvania.  Mathis and Zech (1983) found no evidence of a 
relationship between the new tax and building activity in Pennsylvania municipalities.  Bourassa (1990) found 
significant impact on residential building activity in three cities.  Oates and Schwab (1997) found a significant 
impact on building activity but not conclusive due to economic development program that was underway at 
the time, and Plassmann and Tideman (2000) found a 3-4% increase in residential construction.  There was 
also a study in Melbourne (Lusht, 1992) that found increase in development after introduction of LVT but 
Anderson (2009) notes selection bias in the municipalities studied. So the empirical evidence for this benefit is 
not particularly strong. 
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5.2 The economic rationale for land value taxation 
The theoretical case for LVT is strong.  Classical and neo-classical economists such as Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall demonstrated that the economic rent (and its 
capitalised equivalent, value) which land is able to earn over and above the return generated after 
optimally employing labour and capital is determined by its scarcity and its location, neither of which 
are derived from any productive activity on the part of the landowner.  Land value is, therefore, the 
price of monopoly: the scarcer and less substitutable a parcel of land is, and the more attractive the 
location in relation to the market (consumers) and factors of production (labour, raw materials), the 
more valuable the land. 
Land use planning and regulation, which also are not the result of landowner action, create further 
scarcity and generate demand, thus increasing the value of land in specific locations.  At the land 
parcel level, the grant of permission to develop land (including changing its use) can generate 
substantial increases in land value.  In societies where governments provide infrastructure, services 
and amenities, landowners may also benefit from value uplift as a direct result of this publicly 
funded investment.  Land value is argued to be, therefore, the creation of the community and 
expresses – in financial terms – the right a community has in land held by an individual. 
Who receives economic rent depends on who owns the land and the mechanisms in place to collect 
it.  Debate over entitlement to these legal rights over land (including the right to use, exclude others, 
reap economic benefit, transfer, inherit, etc.) has a recorded history of at least four centuries: 
whether such rights should be privately owned and state protected (Locke, Bentham) or publicly 
owned (Rousseau, Marx).  As the global population grows and the rate of urbanisation increases, 
pressure on land resources grows, and the philosophical debate over land rights is intensified by 
growing socioeconomic concerns over, firstly, access to land for basic human needs and, secondly, 
access to, inequality and redistribution of wealth (de Soto, 2000). 
In countries where property rights are held privately, the combination of private property rights and 
monopoly land value creates two problems: unearned land value (or wealth) and unequal 
distribution of that wealth. One means of recovering unearned land value is a tax4.  Adam Smith 
argued that a tax on land value would not harm economic activity and would not increase land rents. 
The idea of a recurrent tax on land value has been propounded ever since with 19th century liberal 
                                                          
4 A wealth tax, which contrasts with Locke’s ‘service’ tax. 
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economist Henry George making the most well-known case for a single tax5 on land value, arguing 
that it would: 
 capture unearned land value and help redistribute land-related wealth; 
 pay for the provision of infrastructure services and amenities; 
 help mitigate negative externalities and motivate productive use of land; and 
 reduce land prices6 (and land speculation) whilst having no detrimental economic impact on 
buying, selling, developing or using land. 
A single tax on land to replace all other taxes has never been introduced.  A wealth tax on such a 
scale could dramatically reduce land values (and hence property prices) depending on the tax rate.  
Instead, the idea of a LVT as a single LPT has been advocated, but these are usually at low rates and 
would capture only a tiny fraction of value.  They are, therefore, a small vestige of George’s original 
idea. 
In economic terms, land rent is entirely economic rent because land is not a produced input. Its 
supply is fixed and cannot be affected by a tax. With the same amount of land available, people 
would not be willing to pay any more for it than before, so the present value of a LVT should be 
reflected one-for-one in a reduction in land price – an example of ‘tax capitalisation’ (Mirrlees et al, 
2011). 
The value of land is the price of monopoly. It is the relative, not the absolute, capability of land that 
determines its value. The value of land always measures the difference between it and the best land 
that may be had for free. Linking back to the earlier discussion on ownership of land and property 
rights, one might accept private land ownership if rent is collected for the benefit of the community.  
This provides the economic rationale for taxing land but there are legitimate reasons for taxing 
improvements too.  Occupiers of properties (i.e. improvements to land) consume local services and 
benefit from local amenities, so this consumption should be taxed.  Also, the improvements are 
valuable assets and increases in value represent a form of investment which should be taxed too. 
                                                          
5 Henry George’s central argument was nationalisation of land ownership with leases granted to the highest 
bidder under conditions that guaranteed rights to improvements. This is quite a task but has been 
implemented in some (developing) economies. But, for pragmatic reasons, he advocated a single 100% tax on 
‘location’ (i.e. land) instead. The land tax would replace taxes on wages and goods. The tax would not be levied 
on improvements made to land unless they had ‘blended in’ with the land over time. George argued that those 
who had legitimately acquired land rights should not be compensated for their loss when a land tax is 
introduced. 
6 Demand for land determines its value. If a tax takes all that value, anyone holding it without using it would 
have to pay nearly what it would be worth to anyone else who wanted to use it. 
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Mirrlees et al (2011) suggest that land and improvements should be thought of as distinct bases for 
taxation, although in most countries taxes are levied on their combined value.  They argue that: 
 Land, whether used for business or residential property, should be taxed at an arbitrarily high 
rate on economic efficiency grounds. 
 Housing, whether owner-occupied or rented should be taxed as a consumption good and as an 
investment, the difference being that, for owner-occupied housing, the owner pays both taxes 
whereas for rented housing the owner pays the investment tax and the renter pays the 
consumption tax. 
 Business property is an input into the production process and, on efficiency grounds, should not 
be taxed. 
For practical and political reasons, Mirrlees et al (2011) do not propose a land tax for residential land 
use.  Instead, they suggest two taxes.  First, a Housing Services Tax as a flat rate percentage of rental 
value (whether actual or imputed).  Although the tax would be progressive, they admit that there 
would be many gainers and losers across the income distribution.  For example, the elderly on low 
incomes living in expensive homes would be losers.  They suggest that the introduction of such a tax 
should be phased.   
Second, Mirrlees et al (2011) propose a wealth tax on supernormal returns to savings.  A normal rate 
of return on the purchase price would be tax-free but if (imputed) rent rose about this return then 
tax is paid on the excess.  If the house is sold at a price greater than the purchase price, tax is paid on 
the capital gain.  
5.3 Implementing and administering a land value tax  
5.3.1 Political issues 
Politically, LVT can be challenging to implement.  The political arguments against LVT centre on the 
windfall loss incurred by landowners, the difficulty in dismantling centuries of land ownership rights 
and the impact on other taxes.  In July 2004 the Select Committee scrutinising the UK Government’s 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister published a report on local government finance in which it 
considered the case for LVT (House of Commons, 2004). It concluded that the potential impact on 
householders was too great.  
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The principal drawback7 was perceived to be the penalty on asset-rich / cash-poor householders, 
particularly as house prices have grown significantly faster than income levels (House of Commons 
Library, 2014).  The tax may not necessarily be related to ability to pay and a mechanism might be 
required for taxpayers to defer payment until disposal of land.  Otherwise poorer households may 
be pushed out of high value inner city land particularly if areas are regenerated, resulting in 
problems for the original communities in the area and raising concerns regarding social cohesion 
(Commission on Local Tax Reform, 2015 Vol 3, p.28). However, by deferring the tax it reduces the 
probability of securing land use efficiency in a timely manner. 
Mirrlees (2011) argued that moving from a property-based tax to a land-based tax would create 
numerous gainers and losers.  Having said that, a council tax revaluation would also create winners 
and losers, which is perhaps why it has not been attempted in Scotland or England yet.  The Lyons 
Inquiry into Local Government (2005, p.75) noted that ‘Replacing council tax and business rates 
entirely would lead to significant changes in household and business tax liabilities. It might have 
disadvantages as a local tax, since it is linked to the value of the land under the property, not to the 
number of households using local services.’  More generally, the Commission on Local Tax Reform in 
Scotland suggested that the tax may be difficult to explain and for people to understand (2015 Vol 3, 
p.28). 
The main losers when switching from an occupation tax such as business rates to a LVT would be 
land-extensive businesses (IPPR, 2005).  Taxing land will raise costs disproportionately on businesses 
that use relatively more land as a factor input. This explains to some degree the fact that many 
countries that have a land tax apply special reliefs to agriculture, through full or partial exemptions, 
or lower tax rates (Norregaard, 2013).  Indeed, the 2015 Commission on Local Tax Reform in 
Scotland stated that an LVT may impact on the sustainability of some land based businesses, 
particularly farmers (with concerns that farmers are already experiencing difficulties in a challenging 
economic climate) (Vol 3, p.28). 
A LVT is usually levied on owners of land.  This can cause confusion over the purpose of the tax.  
Local taxation is often regarded as a benefit tax, or service tax, to pay for the provision of local 
infrastructure, services and amenities.  Therefore occupiers of land (and improvements to the land) 
would be the appropriate taxable entities.  However, if the tax is also in part a wealth tax designed 
to capture uplift in value resulting from the provision of local infrastructure, services and amenities, 
then the landowner would be the appropriate taxable entity.  In reality, LVT is a hybrid benefit tax 
and wealth tax.  The confusion stems from the argument that it is an occupation tax that is assessed 
                                                          
7 It should be noted that this issue pertains to LPT as well as LVT. 
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by reference to values. Is the tax based on values to capture greater taxes from those with higher 
value properties or is it based on values because those living in higher value properties will use 
infrastructure, services and amenities more? 
5.3.2 Practical issues 
5.3.2.1 Compiling and maintaining a parcel-level register of land ownership, land use and land prices 
LVT requires up to date information on all land ownership, land use and land prices.  The register of 
land ownership must include (legally) identifiable boundaries8.  The land use map must record 
permitted land use rights for all sites.  All taxable land uses need to be identified and classified 
together with any supporting information that may assist in their valuation.  The land price 
information would be compiled from market transaction information and would include prices, 
rents, dates and other relevant details. 
5.3.2.2 Revision of the planning system 
The planning system must specify a permitted land use for each parcel and confers this development 
right to an applicant upon grant of planning permission. Wightman (2013a) notes that British 
planning is a plan-led system, which sets the context for site-specific development decisions.  Whilst 
plans may show areas where it is agreed that certain developments will be permitted, it is only when 
a planning application is submitted that any development can be approved.  This is in contrast to 
zoning systems that delineate permitted uses on an area-by-area basis, conveying development 
rights to landowners without the need for detailed approval. In a zoning system the assessment of 
permitted use is more straightforward. 
Because the tax is higher in urban areas (where land values are higher) this will encourage denser 
urban development. Policy mechanisms might be introduced to counter densification, including a 
'green space' allowance or minimum densities so that low density occupiers are not unduly taxed.  In 
addition, according to Dunne (2005), LVT needs to account for specific use restrictions such as 
historic buildings where no redevelopment is allowed, as well as for land over which occupants 
(tenants) have security of tenure. 
Wightman (2013a) notes that, under British planning law, anyone can apply for planning permission 
for a change of use over any land. Under a system of LVT, local authorities might submit planning 
applications for land they believe has a higher value use in order to obtain increased tax revenue.   
                                                          
8 According to the Report of the Land Reform Review Group (2014, p.27), there has been slow progress in 
developing a map-based register of land ownership in Scotland. 
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5.3.2.3 Valuing each parcel of land 
All land parcels must be valued and this presents several challenges. 
5.3.2.3.1 Valuation method 
Land needs to be valued. This should ideally be undertaken using the comparison approach i.e. by 
analysing market evidence of comparable land sales. However, evidence of undeveloped land may 
be scarce.  The alternative is to use an approach whereby evidence of the value of land and buildings 
sold or rented as an ‘entity’ is analysed to extract the value of the land.  Undertaking this can be 
problematic as the ‘residual’ method, whereby build costs and other adjustments are subtracted 
from the total value of the development to arrive at a ‘residual’ land value, can produce confounding 
results.   
For example, take two dwellings side-by-side.  One is three-storey and developed to highest and best 
use (market value = £1m, build and other costs = £0.5m, so land value = £0.5m), the other is two-
storey (market value = £0.7m, build and other costs = £0.3m, so land value = £0.4m).  The land value 
(and therefore the LVT) of the first property is higher.  The relationship between property value and 
build cost is penalising the development of land to highest and best use, which is counterintuitive as 
far as a land value tax is concerned. 
5.3.2.3.2 Highest and best use 
However, this problem could potentially be addressed by valuing the land on which the two-storey 
property is constructed, based on its highest and best use (i.e. on the assumption that it is 
developed to three-storeys). This would theoretically result in the same land tax for both 
neighbouring properties thereby removing the penalisation of the development of land to its highest 
and best use, and creating an incentive for the more intensive development of the under-utilised 
land. However, there are further valuation issues associated with valuing land based on its highest 
and best use (HABU).  
For example, how might the valuer determine HABU? One approach might be to make reference to 
the planning policy context for each plot of land and make a judgement as to whether the land is 
developed to its maximum reasonable capacity. However, this would be a matter of fact and degree 
and would be open to challenge. It would also be labour intensive and costly. This notwithstanding, 
it is an approach that has been adopted in some countries, but normally where there is a ‘zoning’ 
approach to land use planning.  
For a zoning approach, zones are identified and the highest and best use is established for each 
zone, within which property of different types would be taxed based on corresponding tax rates. 
This approach would need to be designed so as to acknowledge that not all land within such zones 
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would be permitted to be developed to the zoned HABU by the planning system e.g. land within the 
setting of a sensitive heritage asset, or land which is used as public open space.  Therefore with a 
zoned approach some method is required to allow for adjustment at the individual parcel level. If 
accuracy is to be achieved, the use of GIS modelling and automated valuation approaches might be 
used.9 
5.3.2.3.3 Unimproved land 
Whatever the approach to determining HABU, should the tax be based on the unimproved value of 
land, a HABU valuation may require the valuer to value the land based on hypothetical 
improvements, the hypothetical value of which would then have to be stripped out to arrive at a 
hypothetical land value. The problem would be made more complicated if the land were deemed to 
be in mixed use. Whilst undoubtedly challenging the increased use of automated valuation models 
(AVMs) and digital mapping as mentioned above may help to address the issues. 
The technical issues associated with assessing the value of land based on its unimproved state and 
assuming HABU may be illuminated by considering how one might tax the unimproved value of the 
land on which Edinburgh Castle is situated. How might a valuer determine the HABU of this 
‘unimproved’ land? What transactional evidence might the valuer turn to in order to help arrive at a 
value? It is acknowledged that this is perhaps an extreme example as in most jurisdictions where an 
LVT is used, there are exemptions for major heritage and protected properties. In reality the 
problem presents challenges, but the extent to which the end figures would be challenged would be 
likely to be as much a function of the level of tax imposed as the accuracy and validity of valuation 
approach.  
Perhaps a more fundamental issue is the difficulty in establishing what the ‘original unimproved 
state’ of any land is. Economic theory suggests that land in its ‘original unimproved state’ should be 
‘prairie’ or ‘wild’ land which has had no human labour mixed with it at all. However, it may in 
practice be very difficult to differentiate between land as it would have existed in its ‘original 
unimproved state’, and land which has been subject to improvements over many years such that 
those which may have merged with the land over time, such as levelling for example. This could be a 
particular issue in rural Scotland, parts of which have been managed for centuries. 
5.3.2.3.4 Transactional evidence 
There are relatively few transactions in unimproved land, particularly in urban areas.  Land markets 
are much thinner than property markets (IPPR, 2005).  Most market transactions are for plots of land 
together with buildings (House of Commons Library, 2014).  Grover et al (2017) note that the 
                                                          
9 Such as undertaken in Denmark who have adopted such an approach for many years (see section 8). 
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credibility of valuations depends on the accuracy of land transaction data. There needs to be a 
functioning and transparent property market for all classes of property and all locations, not just 
major urban areas, and media through which buyers and sellers can be informed about market 
conditions.  This is rarely the case for unimproved land.   
If transactions in improved land are to be used, how would the value of the land be separated from 
the value of improvements? This can be challenging in a developed, urbanised property market that 
is concerned with capital and rental values for improved land.  Land in mixed use would need 
apportionment if the uses are taxed at different rates and this would mean collecting information on 
floor areas.  The impact of value influences (changing transport infrastructure, new development, 
etc.) would have to be apportioned between the unimproved land and property elements of the real 
estate interest – not something that is regularly undertaken by valuers. Should LVT be introduced, 
there would therefore be potential implications for training and education of valuers to 
accommodate these challenges.  
5.3.2.3.5 Basis of value 
The basis of value must be determined.  In order to base a tax on either unimproved or improved 
land, it is necessary to assess differences in utility. Utility can be measured by assessing how much 
someone would be willing to pay for an interest in a particular land parcel; a process known as 
valuation. Thus tax can be based on (usually a proportion of) market value10 of the (un)improved 
land. The advantages of using market value as a basis for assessment is that it encourages people to 
recognise the value of their assets, it relates revenue to economic performance, and market 
transaction evidence provides an evidence base. 
Market values are capital values but tax assessments can also be based on market rental values. 
Arguably for recurrent (i.e. annual tax) a market rental value is preferable, as it avoids the impact of 
movements in the investment markets which can skew capital values11; however comparable rental 
data for unimproved land may be more scarce that for capital transactions.  
Rental values relate to market conditions but normally reflect existing use rather than how the 
property might be used if sold on the open market. 
Basing the tax on capital market value means that valuations will include ‘hope value’.  This is the 
value that purchasers of land pay in excess of the value for the permitted use.  It reflects – in 
financial terms – speculation that there might be a change of permitted use that would increase the 
                                                          
10 There are other bases of assessment: soil quality for agricultural land; and replacement cost valuations for 
buildings, but these are usually employed when market transaction evidence is not available. 
11 As evidence of this, London’s residential capital market experienced  pressure which impacted on prices due 
to an influx of money from Russia and China and was unconnected with underlying ‘utility’ value.  
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value of the land.  Thus if a purchaser acquires land at a price that incorporates hope value, he or 
she will be exposing themselves to an LVT levy based upon that value.  This point is illustrated in the 
text box below. 
UN 2011 (p.43): 
Agricultural land at a city’s edge is often more valuable for its development potential than for its agricultural 
production. If the land is taxed at its ‘market value’, meaning its value as developable land, farmers may not be 
able to continue farming because of high taxes. While many countries simply exclude agricultural land from 
the LPT base, many others design a system which taxes agricultural land at its agricultural value rather than full 
market value. Thailand, for example, has established a panel of agricultural experts that assesses the level of 
agricultural potential for land in different sections of the country. Agricultural land in each area is then taxed 
based on its estimated agricultural potential rather than full market value. 
  
This could open the way for numerous appeals because an assessment of the existence and extent 
of any hope value is a matter of judgement.  It might therefore be preferable to value the 
unimproved value of the land based on its highest and best use as could reasonably be assumed to 
be permitted under existing local planning policy, rather than highest and best use including a 
proportion of value which is assumed to derive from the potential to gain a planning permission for 
a different and more valuable use in the future should planning policy change. 
For example, if the valuer were to value a site for LVT purposes where the existing use is light 
industrial, he or she could only value based on the highest and best industrial use which could 
reasonably be assumed to be granted by the local planning authority. There could be no element of 
hope value for change of use to, say, residential if this use is not currently supported by policy. 
Similarly, if the valuer were to value a site where the existing use is residential, the valuer would be 
able to value based on the highest and best residential use which could be reasonably assumed to be 
granted by the local planning authority.  
In these examples, although there would be an element of hope value because redevelopment of 
the sites to a more profitable use would require planning permission which could in theory be 
refused (e.g. for a higher density development), the assumptions underpinning these assessments of 
hope value would be less controversial than assumptions underpinning assessments of hope value 
deriving from a change of use to a use which is not currently explicitly supported in local planning 
policy. Of course, should a planning permission be granted for a change of use (from, say, light 
industrial to residential), then this could potentially be a trigger event for a new valuation and a new 
tax liability on the landowner. 
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If a ‘zoned use’ approach to planning is taken, this simplifies the issue, but does give rise to the need 
for ‘parcel adjustments’ which, for example, a particular site is compromised due to natural 
contamination or other factors. 
5.4 Land value taxation – administration issues 
UN 2011 (p.31): 
Revenue collected is a function of two policy variables: the value of the legally defined tax base and the tax 
rate.  And three administrative factors: the proportion of all land that should be taxed that appear on the tax 
list (coverage), the proportion of taxable value that is identified by the valuation process (valuation), the 
proportion of the tax levied that is actually collected.  Total revenue collected will be the product of all these 
factors, i.e. Base x Rate x Coverage x Valuation x Collection. 
5.4.1 Who pays? 
Policy makers must decide whether it is the occupier or the owner of land and property which is 
liable for LPT. In cases where property registration is not complete or where other types of 
ownership are recognised, it is often the case that occupiers or users of property can be more 
readily identified. In such cases it may be more practical to assign the tax to those who actually use 
the land. In some instances, LPTs are levied on both owners and occupiers.   
A further consideration is that of charities and public bodies.  The exemption from or reduced 
payment of recurrent property taxes by charities or/and public bodies is common across many 
jurisdictions.  However, by granting special status to charities the tax base is reduced, and an 
incentive is created to place land within charitable trusts.  
5.4.2 Extent of tax base 
Economic theory which supports a LVT suggests that all land should be included in the tax base.  
Land for which there is no current demand – perhaps vacant and derelict land – may have negligible 
rental value but should still be included in a LVT.  Then, depending on policy requirements, the tax 
rate can be adjusted to stimulate its redevelopment. 
Land use may be classified as residential, commercial, etc. often with the intent of applying different 
tax rates to different classes of property, but a large number of land use categories can lead to 
difficulties. When does land cease to be agricultural and become recreational – a high ropes 
adventure course for example? Also some recreational uses are highly profitable and could bear a 
tax – others are not.  Similarly with residential property: land used for affordable housing is not the 
same as that for open market use. 
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A broader, more inclusive tax base means that tax rates for everyone can be lower but the UN 
(2011) notes that taxation of agricultural land or forest land can be politically sensitive.  
Consequently farmland is often either excluded altogether or taxed at a much lower rate than other 
property. 
Some property may be exempt from the obligation to pay the tax. With each exemption, the tax 
base is narrowed and the rate necessary to reach the same revenue target will be higher for those 
who remain subject to the tax.  It should be remembered that exempt property still creates a 
demand for local services.  An alternative to outright exemption is to exempt a specific amount of 
value from the tax. 
5.4.3 Tax rate 
According to the UN (2011) setting the tax rate at the national or regional level assures uniformity 
and avoids tax competition. Allowing local governments to set the rate empowers local officials and 
fosters local autonomy. In some cases national or provincial government establishes a range for the 
rate, and local governments determine the final rate within that range.  If both land and 
improvements are taxed, it is possible to have a split-rate LPT with a different (usually higher) rate 
for land than for improvements. Doing this can make it clear what the purpose of each part of the 
tax is:  to tax wealth or to fund local services. 
5.4.4 Revaluations 
Regular revaluations of land values are required (Connellan, 2004) to cope with market volatility and 
changing real values.  There can be high political costs associated with infrequent revaluations and 
associated, potentially sharp, tax increases. Banding values can simplify administration especially 
when evidence is scarce, but there may be contention regarding the boundaries of the bands. 
5.4.5 Public understanding and appeals 
The lack of market information in relation to land transaction can hinder the appeals process 
because taxpayers find it difficult to understand land values in the same way that they understand 
property values.  With a tax that is based on improved land values, the taxpayer is generally able to 
compare personal knowledge of the market value of the property with the tax assessor’s valuation. 
But if the valuation is of unimproved land, the taxpayer may be unable to judge the accuracy or 
fairness of the tax (UN, 2011). 
5.4.6 Responsibilities 
Administrative responsibilities are usually distributed between different levels and parts of 
government.  Central government usually has overall responsibility for tax collection and 
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distribution. Assessment may be undertaken by a combination of central and local government and 
even sub-contracting to private sector. Collection may be undertaken by local government, central 
government on behalf of local government or the private sector, and is usually on an annual basis. 
It is regarded as good practice to separate assessment of the tax base (i.e. valuing individual land 
and property interests) from the setting of the tax rate. The former would be undertaken by 
professional, trained valuers, made transparent and be open to appeal. The latter would be set by 
elected politicians possibly within limits set by central government. The rate would then change 
annually (perhaps indexed to general inflation or to changes in real prices of property). 
There needs to be timely and seamless sharing of information between government departments 
and between central and local government, particularly if custodianship of land ownership, use and 
valuation information is the responsibility of separate departments or agencies.  It is usual for local 
government (planning and building control) to monitor land use change. It is also important that the 
process is transparent and that tax payers understand the distinction between the base and the rate 
of tax. 
5.4.7 Initial rollout of LVT 
In their review of international literature, Gibb and Christie (2015) note that there is a risk that 
introducing LVT may initially lead to significant land value falls as a result of the capitalisation of 
future tax liabilities into the value of land.  This could have significant implications for the economy, 
particularly in the case of residential land given that residential property values have assumed 
integral importance to the UK economy due to the ‘assetisation’ of home ownership since the 1980s. 
A transitional arrangement might be appropriate, perhaps phasing it in or offering compensation to 
those initially affected.  It may also be advisable to pilot any new tax prior to national rollout. 
5.4.8 Summary 
To summarise the administrative requirements, any government considering implementing a LVT 
would need to: 
 develop and maintain a register of taxable land, including boundary extents from which 
areas can be calculated; 
 identify relevant taxpayers; 
 determine the taxable value of all land parcels; 
 determine the tax rate that applies to each property and calculate the tax due; 
 prepare and deliver tax bills; 
 appropriately respond to enquiries, concerns and appeals from taxpayers; and 
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 collect revenue and appropriately follow through and resolve tax payment delinquencies. 
According to the UN (2011, p.46) ‘The best LPT design will be based on the specific local context 
created by the combination of current property rights, land registration systems, property markets 
and administrative capacities. In many instances the theoretically preferable may need to give way 
to the administratively practical.’  As Grover et al (2017, p.94) note: 
‘The countries that have successfully introduced value-based recurrent property taxes have had to 
overcome two main types of barriers. First, there are technical obstacles concerned with how to levy an 
efficient value-based property tax. These include the comprehensiveness of property registration, the 
quality and availability of transaction price data, whether internationally recognised valuation standards 
are followed and the quality of tax collection systems. Second, there are political or governance barriers 
which stand in the way of satisfactory technical solutions being implemented. Property taxes are widely 
seen as being unpopular, and work has to be undertaken to convince the public that they are fair and 
necessary. They require different skills from other taxes levied. Their roles in reducing intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers and in countering the impact of globalisation on revenue yields are not widely 
understood.’ 
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6 International experience of land value tax 
There are many international examples of LVT, where LVT may be implemented as the sole 
mechanism for taxing real estate or used in combination with a tax on improvements or a tax on 
betterment.  For example, for a sample of 61 countries the table at Appendix IV records whether 
each country has a LVT and/or an ad valorem LPT. From this, it is apparent that in this sample 
countries mainly employ LVT in combination with other taxes on property. 
To help inform the policy options, the Research Team originally conducted more detailed case 
studies in five jurisdictions; Australia (Queensland), Estonia, New Zealand, Denmark and South 
Africa.  The jurisdictions were selected based on their comparability with specific aspects of the 
Scottish context, including: 
 concentration of land ownership; 
 political, social and economic history of land reform; 
 the combination of developed urban areas and relatively un-developed rural areas; 
 the combination of relatively high-land value areas and low land value areas; and 
 the potential combination of LVT with other forms of land and property tax. 
The case studies include examples of jurisdictions where there has been long-term use of LVT at 
state and local government level (Denmark, Queensland and New Zealand), as well as more recent 
introduction of LVT (Estonia). The case studies also include examples where jurisdictions have moved 
away from LVT (South Africa and New Zealand).  In addition to these full case studies, the 
introduction of a land tax on commercial farmland in Namibia has also been introduced as a sixth, 
outline, case study, given the potential synergies with the SLC’s strategic objectives. The following 
sub-sections summarise the LVT situation in each jurisdiction. 
6.1.1 Queensland, Australia 
6.1.1.1 Context 
Australia has a long history of LVT levied at both state and local government level.  It therefore 
provides a useful insight into the challenges associated with administering such a tax at more than 
one tier of government. 
Australia’s experience with taxing land extends from the late 19th century, with the first land tax 
being introduced in South Australia in 1884 on the unimproved capital value of land. This followed 
the proliferation of ‘single-tax leagues’ in Australia as a result of the impact of Henry George’s 
writings (Forster, 2000). A federal tax on the value of land in Australia was later introduced in 1910 
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with the objective of breaking up large estates and large tracts of under-utilised land, and of 
financing a nationwide old-age pension plan (Forster, 2000; Smith, 2005).  
The first $5,000 of unimproved value was exempt under the federal land tax and the rates were kept 
low except for very large estates. However, the owners of large estates often escaped the tax by 
nominally subdividing the land among family relations (Forster, 2000). The federal land tax was later 
abolished in 1952 because it was not achieving the objective of breaking up large estates and had 
high administrative costs, among other reasons (Franszen, 2009). In the meantime, the Australian 
states had introduced their own land taxes, the last of which was Queensland, which introduced its 
state land tax in 1915 (Forster, 2000). 
6.1.1.2 How the LVT system functions 
Queensland today has two tiers of LVT: the state level and local government level (council rates), 
with the latter spent on local services and infrastructure.  The taxes are levied on the owners of 
freehold land. All rateable land is valued on an annual basis by the Valuer General, Department for 
Natural Resources, Mines and Energy. The valuations reflect the market as at 1 October of the year 
prior to the valuation becoming effective on 30 June each year (McCluskey, 2005). The Valuer 
General issues the annual valuations, which are then used to calculate council rates and the state 
land tax. Council rates are calculated by local councils, and state land tax is calculated by the Office 
of State Revenue.  
Currently, landowners are liable to pay state land tax when the total taxable value of their land is 
$350,000 or more for companies, trustees or absentees and $600,000 or more for individuals. Most 
Queensland landowners therefore do not pay state land tax because the value of their land is not 
sufficiently high. Current exemptions from state land tax include: 
 Home exemption on land or the part of land used as a home, available to individuals and 
trustees in some circumstances. 
 Transitional home exemption, available on homes not yet occupied as a primary residence in 
some circumstances. 
 Primary production exemption, available on land used solely for agriculture, pasture or dairy 
farming in some circumstances. 
 Moveable dwelling (caravan) parks exemption, available in some circumstances. 
 Charitable institutions exemption, available on land used for some charitable exempt 
purposes, including as a religious or educational activity, elderly care and ‘promoting the 
public good’. 
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In terms of council rates, each council decides the rates and charges for each financial year. Councils 
must choose between levying a general or a differential general rate on all rateable land. A general 
rate would be levied equally on the value of all rateable land within the council area. A differential 
rate would be levied where it is considered that a general rate would result in inequitable outcomes. 
In this instance, a council could ‘determine different categories of rateable land based on land use, 
access or consumption of council services’ with the council able to ‘levy a different rate in the dollar 
for each category’ (Department of Local Government, Racing and Multicultural Affairs, 2015). 
Exemptions from council rates in Queensland include land occupied by the state or a government 
entity (other than non-exempt government-owned corporations), land in a state forest or timber 
reserve, Aboriginal land, land used to facilitate specific transport infrastructure, local government 
land, and land used for religious, charitable, educational or public purposes.  
Prior to 2010, Queensland levied local and state land tax on the basis of its unimproved capital value, 
meaning the value of the land without any improvements of any kind (but with all existing 
amenities). There are difficulties, however, associated with this definition of land. For example, 
improvements such as levelling, clearing and filling carried out many years previously become 
virtually impossible to identify. The Land Valuation Act 2010 introduced the related (yet different) 
concept of ‘site value’ as the basis of value for non-rural land for both state and local land taxes.  Site 
value includes the value of improvements that have merged with the land over time because they 
have become permanent, require no maintenance and for all practical purposes have become 
invisible. Unimproved value remains the basis of value for land zoned as rural.  
Valuations are conducted annually. This was introduced in order to avoid large variations in 
valuation which can occur with more infrequent valuations, particularly in highly developed urban 
areas. However, according to McCluskey (2005), it is questionable whether frequent annual 
valuations are necessary in more rural areas with more stable land values, particularly when the cost 
is taken in to account. This view is supported by a survey of Australian valuers conducted by 
Mangioni (2013). According to Mangioni (2016, p.322), valuations account for over 40% of the cost 
of administering state land tax across Australia. In other states in Australia, frequency of revaluation 
varies from annual to five yearly. 
The importance of property taxation as a proportion of total tax revenue is very low at federal level. 
This is because property taxation at this level only comprises government borrowing guarantee 
levies.  Property taxation is much more significant at state level, where it has averaged 38% of total 
state taxation revenue in the period 2007–2017 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Property 
taxation revenue comprises land tax as well municipal rates, transfer duties and other taxes. 
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Queensland is in line with this trend, with an average of 37% of its taxation revenue coming from 
property taxation over the same period. Property tax is the sole source of taxation revenue for local 
councils. 
Across all states in Australia, between 2007 and 2017, land tax comprised an average of 26% of total 
property taxation, and 10% of total tax revenue at state level. Queensland is in line with this trend, 
with land tax comprising 25% and 8% of total property taxation and total tax revenue respectively 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). The contribution made by land tax to state tax revenue is 
therefore important, but does not make up a significant proportion.  In Australia as a whole, tax on 
property amounted to 3.02% of GDP in 2015, up from 2.67% of GDP in 2000. This is above the 
average for OECD countries. 
6.1.1.3 Relationship of LVT with other property taxes 
The federal government levies and collects all income tax from individuals and enterprises. The state 
government revenue base consists of property taxes, employers’ payroll and the provision of goods 
and services. The sole source of taxation revenue for local governments is taxes on property 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). The federal government and the state of Queensland collects 
the following key property-related taxes in additional to the state land tax and council rates: 
 Transfer Duty – Queensland. 
 Additional foreign acquirer duty (payable when foreign persons acquire residential land) – 
Queensland. 
 Landholder duty (payable by landholders when they make ‘relevant acquisitions; a 
landholder is corporation or listed unit trust that has land-holdings in Queensland with an 
unencumbered value of $2 million or more) – Queensland. 
 Capital gains tax – Federal government. 
6.1.1.4 Valuation of land 
Rural land is valued based on ‘unimproved value’ and non-rural land is valued based on ‘site value’. 
Unimproved value ‘reflects the value of the land in its natural, undisturbed condition’ and it is ‘the 
amount for which rural land could be expected to sell for without physical improvements such as 
houses, fences, clearing, levelling and earthworks’ (Queensland Government, 2014a). Site value 
‘reflects what the land would be expected to sell for in its current condition’ and ‘includes any work 
undertaken, or materials used, to improve the physical nature of the land to prepare it for 
development’, but excludes structural improvements to the land, such as buildings and landscaping 
(Queensland Government, 2014b). Ideally valuations based on site value and unimproved value 
would be based on comparable land sales of ‘vacant or lightly improved land’, but where these are 
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not available, improved land sales may be used as comparable evidence, adjusted so as to exclude 
the value of the improvements. 
The provisions of the Land Valuation Act 2010 allow land to be ‘hypothetically developed to its 
maximum potential and stripped back to produce a land value’ thus allowing ‘land to be valued 
based on its highest and best use in cases where the existing improvements do not represent this 
use’ (Mangioni, 2016, p.69).  
According to Mangioni (2016, p.73), there is an increasing lack of vacant land sales which has 
prompted greater reliance on improved land sales when conducting annual valuations of land for tax 
purposes. This requirement that valuers deduce land value from improved land values has led to a 
lack of transparency and inconsistency of approaches in the valuation of land, which in turn has led 
to ‘questions as to whether or not land remains the most suitable base on which to assess land tax in 
highly urbanised locations’. The practice of deducting the value of improvements to arrive at a land 
value has also raised concerns regarding its impact on the economic efficiency, simplicity and 
transparency of the land tax. Land tax in Australia has ‘constantly been challenged and is one of the 
more disliked, visual and least understood taxes imposed by governments’ (Mangioni, 2016, pp.73-
74). 
The above notwithstanding, as it is considered impractical to carry out individual inspections of each 
property each year, market trends in unimproved values are estimated based on property 
transactions in each land use category. Sales information is therefore analysed in each local 
government area, and by comparing the analysed unimproved values with existing unimproved 
values, the market movement in overall land values can be calculated. A percentage factor is then 
applied to the current value of the properties, which can result in an increase or decrease in value.  
Landowners have the right to object to a valuation. An objection to a valuation must be lodged 
within 60 days of receipt of the annual valuation notice. Landowners who do not agree with the 
objection decision may appeal to the Land Court within 60 days of the date of issue of the objection 
decision. Decisions made by the Land Court can be appealed to the Land Appeal Court. Further 
recourse is available through the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The objection rate is low as a 
percentage of total valuations, with the average rate of objection across the state being 0.09%, 
0.07% and 0.37% for 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively (Queensland Government, 2014c, 2015, 
2016). 
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6.1.1.5 Evaluation of LVT 
Despite problems, Australia has retained LVT since it was first introduced at the federal level in the 
19th century. Although there is no longer a federal land tax, land tax remains a source of tax revenue 
for state governments and is the sole source of tax revenue for local governments. 
Despite its longstanding role in the Australian taxation system, according to Mangioni (2016), there 
remains a significant degree of confusion regarding what state land tax and council rates actually are 
and what they are for. For Mangioni (2016, p.309) this ‘void of understanding paves the way for the 
tax to be more clearly defined in Australia, which is a unique position from which to reform this tax.’ 
There is also confusion among the general public regarding the basis of value (i.e. site value or 
unimproved value), how this is calculated, and how it affects their tax liability. According to 
Mangioni (2016, p.321): ‘A basis of value which is understood by the taxpayer will be more accepted, 
as it removes one layer of valuation mechanics, that is, the stripping back of improved sales in highly 
urbanised locations, where most of the states’ land tax and local government rates are raised.’ 
6.1.1.6 Relationship with SLC’s strategic objectives 
LVT was introduced in Australia in accordance with a Georgist agenda, with the federal land tax 
being specifically targeted at breaking up the large estates, which directly links with the SLC’s 
strategic objective of encouraging a more diverse pattern of land ownership and its desired long-
term outcome of a fall in the concentration of land ownership. However, the federal land tax did not 
achieve this objective and it was partly because of this that it was abolished in 1952.  
Land tax in Australia today is levied at state and local government level, and appears to be primarily 
targeted at raising revenue, particularly for local authorities who rely entirely on land and property 
tax for their tax revenue. The literature therefore suggests that it is important for taxpayers in 
Australia to properly understand the relationship between the land tax and the services and 
infrastructure they receive in return.  
This kind of clarity of connection between the responsibilities of land ownership and any tax on land 
ownership is essential in ensuring that the accountability of landowners to the rest of society and 
the legitimacy of any associated tax is properly recognised and understood. This would be an 
important consideration should the Scottish government choose to introduce a form of LVT, and 
would also be important in the context of the SLC’s strategic objectives relating to enhancing the 
accountability of land ownership. 





Estonia was selected as a case study because it introduced LVT relatively recently. Having declared 
independence from the USSR in 1991 and reintroduced democratic rule, the new government 
undertook land and fiscal reforms, moving quickly to restore land to private ownership that had 
been appropriated by the state during the Soviet era.  As a mechanism for privatising state-owned 
land, where land was not claimed, it was auctioned. 
The present land tax was introduced in 1993 as part of these reforms. The aims of the tax were to 
stimulate more productive uses of restored and privatised land and to provide a source of local 
government revenue (Malme and Tiits, 2001).  As Estonia developed its market economy, the land 
tax was also seen as a way of stimulating the real estate market and increasing awareness of land 
values (Tiits, 2008).  The aim of encouraging privatisation of land drove the decision to tax 
government-owned land (Malme and Tiits, 2001).  It was also hoped that the land tax project would 
be instrumental in speeding up the development of new land and sales registries and updating 
cadastral maps and land records (Malme and Tiits, 2001; Tiits, 2008).   
The government’s decision to tax only land rather than including property was based on familiar 
economic arguments regarding the taxation of improvements.  However there were some reasons 
related to the emergence from the Soviet era: there were concerns that residents would become 
property owners but would not have the ability to pay; there was a practical barrier too as records of 
land and buildings had been held separately (Malme and Tiits, 2001). In 2000 the government 
considered including buildings in the tax. 
6.1.2.2 How the LVT system functions 
All land is classified into zones based on uses such as residential or commercial.  A value per square 
metre or hectare is set for each zone.   The tax rates applied to each zone is decided annually by 
local councils within limits set by national legislation.  Currently the tax rate must be between 0.1% 
and 2.5% of the value of the land apart from agricultural land i.e. that zoned as area under 
cultivation or natural grasslands which must be taxed at between 0.1% to 2.0% of the value.  Since 
1993 the bands of permitted tax rates have broadened.  The concession for agriculture was intended 
to be temporary but, while it has reduced it is no longer seen as a temporary reduction.  While 
municipalities can set different rates for differing land uses, most just set one for the non-
agricultural uses and one for agriculture.  Most municipalities set rates near the top of the two 
bands.   
The valuation is based on market value of the land only (i.e. exclusive of improvements) and the 
National Land Board is responsible for all aspects of valuation.  Initially the valuations were based on 
Investigation of Potential Land Value Tax Policy Options for Scotland – Final Report 
45 
 
expert opinion and judgement, but transaction information became central as markets developed 
(Almy, 2001). There is no revaluation cycle fixed in law, it is for the government to decide when one 
should be done. The last revaluation was done in 2000 and there is currently no plan for a 
revaluation. 
Although the tax is all distributed to local municipalities, it is a state tax and the National Tax Board is 
responsible for collection. The contribution to revenue made by the land tax remains relatively 
modest, and, as the country has grown more prosperous, it has decreased as a percentage of total 
tax raised and of GDP. In the late 1990s the land tax represented 1.0% to 1.2% of all tax revenues 
and approximately 0.4% of GDP whereas in 2016 it represented 0.7% of all taxes and 0.3% of GDP.  
However, Franzen (2009) notes that the revenue from land tax varies substantially between 
municipalities, and particularly between cities and rural areas and smaller towns.  For the largest 
cities the tax represented less than 5% of their revenue whilst in some rural municipalities the figure 
could be 30%.  As land values have increased, evident in the 2000 revaluation, it has been suggested 
that the revenue could be higher (Tiits 2008), but that is a political decision.  
Land underneath occupied houses and associated yards is exempt, but this is limited to 0.15 
hectares in cities and 2 hectares in rural areas.  There are very few other exemptions, and largely 
these are quite narrowly defined.  Examples include nature reserves, land under churches, public 
water bodies and land adjacent to buildings of diplomatic missions. Relief of 50% is given to 
conservation and similar land. 
The collection efficiency of the land tax has always been very high.  In 1998 it was 98% (Almy, 2001). 
6.1.2.3 Relationship of LVT with other property taxes 
Estonia doesn’t have specific property taxes other than land value tax.  Capital gains are taxed, but 
as part of income and at normal income tax rates, with exemptions for primary residences.  There is 
a small state fee payable on transfers of property.  
6.1.2.4 Valuation of land 
In the early days of the land tax, the market economy was not yet developed and the country had 
neither the legal framework nor the land and price information necessary for valuation (Malme and 
Tiits, 2001). The National Land Board was given the tasks of developing a valuation method, 
valuation standards and procedures, as well as the supervision and training of valuers. Not 
surprisingly, they drew on the expertise of other countries (Malme and Tiits, 2001) 
Valuation of urban land was undertaken using the judgement of valuers on market criteria of 
location, quality and use (Malme and Tiits 2001). This created relative price zones among and within 
each urban area. The same method was used for rural land, with additional criteria for the soil 
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productivity. As reliable price information has become available in the newly established National 
Transaction Register, the valuation has been increasingly based on market transaction data.  
Land zoning has still not fully developed and there are often multiple uses on land making it hard to 
establish the highest and best use value. Therefore values are generally based on the prevailing use 
(Malme and Tiits, 2001). 
The appeal rate is low and can only be made on the grounds that regulations were not followed or if 
there is an error of more than 20%.  
6.1.2.5 Evaluation of LVT 
The introduction of the land tax has been instrumental in speeding up the development of new land 
and sales registries and updating cadastral maps and land records (Malme and Tiits, 2001).  
According to Tomson (2000), despite the amounts of tax collected being small, it is reported that 
property owners keeping land idle under the restitution provisions have been encouraged to 
develop or sell their land.    
As a source of revenue for local government it is not particularly significant and has become a lower 
percentage of total tax revenue over time.  But, as Tomson (2000) notes, this is not a problem with 
land tax, it is simply because the rates are low. 
Estonia had always intended to move to a system where buildings were included in the tax base.  Its 
Baltic neighbours of Lithuania and Latvia have both moved in this direction.  This was to happen in 
Estonia once the property market had become established and the necessary infrastructure was in 
place to enable such valuations (Franzen, 2009).  Malme and Tiits (2001) reported that a move to 
including buildings in the tax base was being considered and that the Ministry of Finance had 
produced a report which listed the following advantages and disadvantages of such a change: 
Advantages: 
 increased tax base and tax revenues (estimated as three to five times the current revenues); 
 greater equity due to a closer correlation between the property value and ability to pay; and 
 potential for revenue growth without raising the tax rate. 
Disadvantages: 
 tax base expansion highly concentrated in Tallinn, where property values are also the 
highest; 
 potential to discourage new construction and building renovation; and 
 disproportionately greater administrative costs.  
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According to Malme and (Tiits, 2001) the Ministry of Finance report noted that there would need to 
be administrative reorganisation as the land cadastre and buildings register are not integrated, and 
the buildings register would need to be updated. 
However, this change hasn’t happened and Estonia continues to levy a LVT.  Youngman (2008) and 
Tiits (2008) attribute this to political and social resistance to such a change.  
6.1.2.6 Relationship with SLC’s strategic objectives 
The Estonian experience shows that LVT can be used as a tool for reform, even with relatively low 
tax rates. Whilst the objective was to move land from state to private ownership, nevertheless this is 
a use of LVT with the objective of stimulating a reduction in the concentration of land ownership, 
one of the SLC’s key objectives.  
The Estonian government was concerned to ensure that the poorest members of society were able 
to become landowners, and this partly drove the decision to use LVT rather than including buildings 
in a combined land and property tax. This resonates with the priority of the SLC to make land use 
available to a wide cross-section of society.  
As with many LVT systems, agricultural land is treated favourably in terms of tax rate.  Concern for 
the diversity and availability of agricultural land is clearly a priority for the SLC.  The Estonian system 
shows that agriculture can be favourably treated; it also provides for a nuanced approach to tax 
rates, differentiating between types of agricultural use, although this has not hitherto been used in 
Estonia.   
There is anecdotal evidence that the land tax, even though low, has encouraged some property 
owners to dispose of land which is not in productive use; this is relevant to the SLC’s objective of 
reducing vacant and derelict land. 
6.1.3 New Zealand 
6.1.3.1 Context 
New Zealand was selected as a case study because, like Scotland, it has a productive rural economy 
as well as strong service-based economy centred on a small number of major urban regions.  Both 
Scotland and New Zealand are highly developed economies with similar governance structures and 
population demographics.  More specifically in terms of property taxation, New Zealand has a long 
history of LVT, dating back to the late nineteenth century.  Yet in recent years there has been a move 
away from this form of assessment, and this makes New Zealand particularly interesting as a case 
study. 
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Following liberal thinkers of the time such as Henry George and John Stuart Mill, the New Zealand 
Government introduced a land tax (NZLT) in 1878, believing that wealthy landowners had greater 
taxable ability but low tax burden compared to the working classes who were generating the bulk of 
government revenue through tariffs (Gupta, 2016).  The nationwide NZLT was the first ever direct 
tax imposed on New Zealanders.  A year later, when land values began to fall and landowners argued 
that it was unfair to tax a group who received no special benefits, the NZLT was repealed in favour of 
a tax based on capital (improved) values, but it was then reinstated in 1894. 
When first enacted the rate was 1p in the £ (0.4%) but a massive £500 minimum threshold applied, 
exempting most people.  Nevertheless, the NZLT was initially a major source of revenue.  In 1895 it 
represented 76% of the total land and income tax revenue received by the government (Barratt and 
Veal, 2012).  It was also claimed that the tax induced the breaking up of large land holdings.  But by 
1910 the tax raised only 10% of government revenue and by 1967 the figure was 0.5% (Barratt and 
Veal, 2012).  In 1967 the report of the Ross Committee noted that the tax was no longer effective as 
a means of breaking up large land holdings and recommended its abolition, although this was not 
acted upon at that time. 
There are several reasons for the decline in the significance of NZLT.  The introduction of other taxes 
(and mainly income tax), the introduction of an exemption for agriculture and a minimum value 
threshold for residential properties, all of which reduced the tax base.  Principal residences were 
removed from the tax base by the Land Tax Act 1976 so the tax essentially became a business land 
tax.  The tax was also prone to avoidance, evasion and costly appeals. 
By 1982 only 5% of total land value was taxed and the nationwide NZLT was thought to be 
duplicative due to their similarity to local authority general rate levies (Bush, 2003).  The McCaw task 
force of 1985 noted that the nationwide NZLT had no perceptible redistributive effect and was not 
an adequate indicator of the taxable capacity provided by wealth (Barratt and Veal, 2012). Then, in 
the late 1980s, commercial land values in Auckland and Wellington rose and then fell sharply, with 
tax valuations taking place at the peak.  This, according to Keall (2000), caused hardship, for 
example, where a site was undeveloped (partly due to low NZLT hitherto). 
Politically, there was an unwillingness to tax capital and a philosophical policy shift away from 
taxation of unearned increment to the taxation of income (Barratt and Veal, 2012), goods and sales.  
Even before the fall in commercial land values, the Labour Party planned to reduce the threshold for 
paying the tax and the Conservatives promised to abolish it.  Labour pre-empted the Conservatives’ 
promise and, under an agenda to shift tax away from LVs and towards goods, services and users, the 
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nationwide NZLT was abolished in 1992.  Hopton (2017) suggests the following reasons for the 
decline and eventual abandonment of the nationwide NZLT: 
 privatisation of land; 
 power and influence of wealthy landowners, capitalist in nature and naturally resistant to 
NZLT; 
 rising value of land in general and in developing (urbanising) areas in particular; 
 introduction of income tax; 
 political see-sawing between right and left; 
 fluctuation in revenue linked to market movement of LVs; and 
 difficulty in valuing land, especially in urban areas where transactions in land and buildings 
(as opposed to unimproved land) are more prevalent. 
6.1.3.2 How the LVT system functions 
From 1912 New Zealand had a system of local property taxation (or rates) that ran alongside the 
nationwide NZLT, and these rates could be assessed on the basis of land value too.  Since the 
abolition of the nationwide NZLT in 1992, land tax only exists at the local level in New Zealand. 
Each territorial local authority (TLA)12 in New Zealand can levy a property tax.  They can do this in 
several ways: general rates, targeted rates and Uniform Annual General Charges (UAGC).  Targeted 
rates are for services identified in a TLA’s funding impact statement and for water supply.  UAGC are 
not related to property value.  The aggregate of UAGC and targeted rates must be 30% or less of a 
TLA’s total rates revenue. 
By 2011, rates provided 60% of local government income13, the remainder comes from a mix of 
investment income, fees and charges and central government funding.  In total, rates yielded 
revenue of around 2% GDP (2008) which is in line with the OECD average, but the yield as a 
percentage of aggregate housing value decreased from 2.2% in 1980 to 0.65% in 2008.  Moreover, 
between 1991 and 2002 aggregate land value increased at 4.8% per annum on average while GDP 
per capita grew at around 2% per annum over the same period (Barratt and Veal, 2012). 
6.1.3.3 Relationship of LVT with other property taxes 
There is no property transfer tax (or stamp duty) in New Zealand – this was abolished in 1999.  There 
is very limited application of capital gains tax and there is no inheritance tax. 
                                                          
12 There are two levels of government in New Zealand: regional councils (11) and territorial authorities 
(districts (54) and city (12)) plus Auckland Council.  One city council, four district councils and Auckland are 
unitary authorities and have powers of regional councils. 
13 Local Government in New Zealand (www.localcouncils.govt.nz). 
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In 2010 the Government Tax Working Group proposed a nationwide land tax at a rate of 1%, which 
was forecast to raise NZ$4.6bn of revenue and cause a 16.7% reduction in land values.  This was at a 
time that followed a big drop in LVs due to the financial crisis in 2008 so the policy was not adopted.  
Instead the goods and sales tax was increased from 2.5% to 15%, the top personal income tax rate 
was reduced from 38% to 33% and the corporate income tax rate was reduced from 30% to 28%. 
In the six years following 2010 the value of the taxable land base increased by at least 45%.  Also, 
bank lending has been made more rigorous, interest rates have fallen, immigration has increased 
and there has been a housebuilding shortfall.  In 2016 it was estimated that a 1% land tax would 
raise NZ$6.7bn.  Despite this, in 2017, none of the political parties proposed a nationwide land tax. 
6.1.3.4 Valuation of land 
General rates can be assessed on the basis of unimproved land value, improved capital value or 
improved annual rental value of each taxable unit.  In the early days of local taxation, annual rental 
value was widely used because the leasing of Crown land provided evidence for their assessment 
but, as (unimproved and improved) land began to be traded for capital sums, TLAs could, by 
resolution, switch to improved capital value as a basis for assessment. Then, at the end of the 19th 
century, unimproved land value was permitted as a basis if a poll of taxpayers voted for it (Keall, 
2000).  The proportion of TLAs using unimproved land values rose to 64% in 1956 and 76% in 1966 
and by 1982 90% of councils had adopted it as a basis for assessing rates, yielding approximately 
80% of local government revenue.  However, since 1985 there has been a move away from 
unimproved land value in favour of improved capital value, and this move has been more prevalent 
in the larger urban areas (McCluskey et al, 2006). 
In 1987 the Labour Government let it be known that it favoured improved capital value and a series 
of politically controversial measures were undertaken by councils to switch from land values to 
capital values or at least to run capital values alongside land values.  There was also greater use of 
differential rates depending on land use – residential, rural or commercial, together with increasing 
use of UAGCs (Keall, 2000).  Differential rates are often used to prevent over-burdening of any 
particular group and to reflect different levels of service provision.  They reflect ‘…an acceptance 
that pure land value alone may not be an equitable or efficient way to distribute the rating burden’ 
(McCluskey et al, 2006, p.386). 
The result is that the use of unimproved land value as a basis for rating assessment is now in decline.  
By 1999, 69% of TLAs used land value as a basis for rates, yielding 40% of local government revenue.  
By 2002 it was 66% (McCluskey et al, 2006).  TLAs in wealthier areas are tending to adopt capital 
value.  The shift away from land value continued in the new millennium and its significance as a basis 
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of assessment is now much reduced due to exemptions, thresholds and the growing use of charging 
direct taxes for particular services (Hopton, 2017).  When Auckland Council was created by merging 
seven TLAs in 2002, it elected to assess rates on the basis of capital value.  Prior to that, five used 
land values, one used capital value and one (Auckland City Council) used annual rental value. 
In a study of this shift, Kerr et al (2004) showed that there is a statistically significant negative 
correlation between income level and value of improvements, i.e. land value as a proportion of 
capital value increases as income increases.  They claim that, at a range of scales and across all TLAs 
and years studied, their results ‘…strongly suggest that a land tax is more progressive than a capital 
value tax.  For a fixed amount of total revenue to be raised, richer people will pay more tax in a land 
system because although their land alone is worth less than their land and house, the value of their 
land is a greater share of the total land value in the TLA’ (p.28).  This claim relies on a correlation 
between land value and wealth.  If those with larger buildings use more public services then the case 
for taxes based on capital value is stronger on the grounds of a service tax rather than a wealth tax. 
By 2006/7, capital value had become the assessment basis for the majority of TLAs.  Four major 
cities (Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Hamilton) all base rates assessment on capital values, 
while the majority of regional authorities still use land values (Gupta, 2016). 
From 1896 until recent years the government’s valuation department assessed land values, capital 
values and annual rental values but in 1999 the role of the department (now a government agency) 
was reduced to monitoring valuations undertaken by private values under contract to local 
authorities and to competing with private valuers for such contracts (Keall, 2000).  Therefore, local 
authorities are responsible for rating valuations, and they are commissioned from registered valuers.  
Revaluations are undertaken at least every three years. 
The Valuer-General regulates the rating valuations industry, administers the Valuers Registration 
Board and ensure the valuation rolls are maintained to minimum standards.  Rate payers have a 
right to object to a rating valuation.  The objection triggers a review of the valuation by the 
registered valuer.  Further recourse is then possible by referring the valuation to the Land Valuation 
Tribunal and then to the courts. 
6.1.3.5 Evaluation of LVT 
While the tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has remained relatively constant over several decades 
(approximately 2% of GDP), since the removal of the nationwide NZLT in New Zealand in 1992, local 
rates represent the only remaining recurrent property tax, providing approximately 60% of local 
government revenue. 
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The rates are assessed in two ways; unimproved land values and improved property values, both in 
capital (as opposed to annual) amounts.  Land value is declining in popularity as a basis for 
assessment, particularly in urban areas.  Yet whereas the nationwide NZLT declined slowly due to a 
combination of competing taxes, exemptions and reliefs, for local rates assessed by reference to 
land values it was more abrupt, from 1985 onwards (Hopton, 2017).  Politics seems to have been the 
main reason for this:  ‘On the one hand, LVTs are theoretically attractive, particularly from an 
economic efficiency perspective, but, on the other hand, they are politically unattractive’ (Barratt 
and Veal, 2012, p.588). 
6.1.3.6 Relationship with SLC’s strategic objectives 
The primary objective of the nationwide NZLT was to raise tax revenue from a sector of society that 
had hitherto not paid a significant amount of tax, namely wealthy landowners.  It was a tax on their 
store of wealth – land – at a time that predated income and capital gains taxation in New Zealand. 
Consequently, in its early days towards the end of the nineteenth century, the national NZLT was a 
major source of tax revenue. 
It was also claimed that the national NZLT encouraged the breaking up of large land holdings.  This 
aligns with one of the SLC’s long term outcomes for land reform – to reduce concentration of land 
ownership in Scotland.  By the 1960s, however, the national NZLT was raising only a small fraction of 
total tax revenue and it was no longer regarded as an effective means of breaking up large land 
holdings.  This is likely due to two reasons in particular.  First, the low revenue share compared to 
income and sales taxes, which had been introduced subsequent to the NZLT.  Essentially, because 
the national NZLT was no longer a significant burden on landowners, its ability to influence 
landowner behaviour was diminished.  Second, the exemptions from national NZLT for agricultural 
land and principal residences meant that it had become little more than a business land tax and 
most businesses tend not to be large owners or holders of land.  
Following the abolition of the national NZLT in the 1990s, local LVTs remain as part of a range of 
revenue raising options for local authorities.  It was not possible, though, to find evidence to suggest 
that these local LVTs were introduced as a means of instigating land reform along the lines of the 
SLCs long term outcomes.  Indeed, the evidence shows that there is a shift away from local taxation 




Denmark has a long established LVT and the country has many similarities with Scotland.  Denmark 
is smaller in size but the populations are very similar.  Both countries have highly developed 
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economies.   Denmark is a very open economy and, according to Jacobsen et al. (2013, p.792), has 
one of the ‘most compressed income distributions in the world’ and, as the country is not rich in 
natural resources, its wealth is determined largely by human capital.  The rate of homeownership at 
62.4% is comparable to the UK but the majority of properties in Denmark are privately owned and 
since 1967 freehold ownership of flats has been allowed, which was one factor that led to an 
increase in owner-occupation.  A peculiarity of Danish residential property is that many Danes, in 
addition to their main residence, own a summerhouse.  Unlike the UK, tax arrangements have been 
put in place to facilitate this second home arrangement, not penalise it.  
In terms of taxation, Denmark has a very high level of personal tax with a top rate of income tax 
rates standing at  55.8%; corporation tax at 22% and sales tax at 25%. Social security taxes however 
are low (0% for employers and 8% for employees).   More specifically in terms of property taxation, 
Denmark charges both a recurrent tax and tax on transfer by sale or inheritance and gifts though 
with a wide range of exemptions.  
To understand the context of current land taxes in Denmark it is important to briefly explain both 
the history of LVT in Denmark and to record some of the administration and tax reforms that have 
taken place in recent years to simplify what had become a complex situation and which provide a 
backdrop to tax reforms.  
Lefmann and Larsen (2001) claim that Denmark was the first country in Europe to put into practical 
operation the taxation of land values; they claim that the very notion of a land tax can be traced 
back to the 12th Century, when it was known as the Hartkorn Tax. The Hartkorn Tax fell into disuse 
but not before a system for registering land had been introduced which has led to Denmark having a 
full cadastral system.  The Hartkorn Tax was reintroduced in the 19th century and only finally 
abandoned in 1902 when a land tax was introduced.  This newer land tax, known as Grundskyld, 
owes its form and origins to the introduction of Georgist thinking in the beginning of the 20th century 
(Vickers, 2009).  To Silagi and Faulkner (1994), the impact of Georgism in Denmark is unique, as the 
principles were already so embedded in popular thinking.    Throughout their detailed history of land 
taxes in Denmark, Lefmann and Larsen trace the close inter-action between political opinion and the 
success (or otherwise) of tax reforms.    They claim that Denmark  was ‘the first country in the world 
that had a political party of national influence whose chief aim was to make land value the principal 
and, if possible, the only source of tax revenue in the country’ (Lefmann and Larsen, 2001, p.185).   
Although LVT had the backing of all major political parties throughout the 20th century, based on 
economic grounds and social propensity, it had fallen back in terms of ambition by the beginning of 
the 21st century.  This was the result of a tax shift towards land and property usage rather than 
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ownership, although land tax still remains an integral part of the tax base and property tax continues 
to fall on the owner, not the occupier. Andelson (2000, p.xxxvii) argues the reduction in influence of 
land tax may be related to a lack of education ‘technical or moral’ among the administration, not for 
economic or social reasons or because tax was deemed a failure.  However the overall shift towards 
indirect and service based taxes was also a driver and saw the introduction of other property taxes 
notably the Daekningafgift for commercial property and the (Ejendomsvaerdiskat) for domestic. 
These are discussed below. 
In terms of administration, in the past Denmark had a three tier system, with central government, 24 
counties and a plethora of small municipalities.  Reforms took place in 1970 to reduce the number of 
municipalities from almost 1,400 to 275 and the number of counties was halved from 24 to 12.  In 
2007, counties were replaced by five regions and the number of municipalities was reduced to 98.  
Importantly for consideration of taxes, only the central government and municipalities have tax 
raising powers; the regions are primarily funded by grants.  One of the aims of these reforms was to 
provide for an increase of power and funding for the municipal level and to re-distribute tasks and 
tax raising powers accordingly (Mangioni, 2016).  It was only after these territorial administrative 
and finance reforms that reform of property taxes began and is still proceeding (Lindegaard, 2018b).  
The sequence of these reforms was, according to Mangioni (2016, p.290) ‘exemplary’ as it provided 
a firm platform for ‘meaningful’ land tax reform. 
Another aim of the review was to assist in making Denmark’s economy to be more competitive, for, 
as Jacobsen et al (2013, p.792) argue, it ‘is under fierce competitive pressure from the rest of the 
world, not least its European neighbors’. Denmark is noted for having a high level of income 
taxation, which, though reduced, continues to be high in comparison with other OECD countries. It is 
estimated to be the 16th highest in the OECD, representing 2% of GDP and 4% of revenues 
(Lindegaard, 2018a); a figure which Ganghof (2007) estimate exceeds that of the United States. 
Denmark is also characterised by high charges on services (through Value Added Tax) but 
traditionally has lower rates of tax on property (Mangioni, 2016).  Reducing the tax base – or rather 
rebasing from revenue to capital based taxes – has been seen as a way to improve economic 
efficiency and competitiveness.   
In terms of the contribution to government revenues, Milan et al. (2016) in their evaluation of 
contributions across Europe of land taxes, Denmark represents the best practice. According to 
Muller (in correspondence with the authors), revenue from the ‘true’ property taxes in 2015 was 
1.4% of GDP, 3% of total tax take and 11% of local taxation on average, with the land tax being the 
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largest contributor. This supports the notion that land and property taxes are low in Denmark 
compared to income and indirect tax (VAT). 
6.1.4.2 How the LVT system functions 
The land tax (Grundskyld) was introduced in its current form in 1926 (Almy, 2014) but the 
assessment process is currently under review, both in terms of how land values are assessed and 
potentially, as part of a wider review of tax measures.  It is therefore important to consider the 
information below as likely to change.  
In the past revaluations were undertaken every four years, but are currently every two years, with 
domestic properties are valued one year and commercial and mixed use the next.  The tax has not 
been without criticism. A report by Rigsvision in 201314 concluded that SKAT15 had not paid sufficient 
attention to certain aspects of valuations, or in some cases skipping parts entirely.  Further it 
concluded that estimates were wrong in three out of four assessments, leading to uncertainty for 
home owners. Whilst this was directed towards residential property the result has been a delay 
placed on the revaluation process whilst a review has been undertaken (Lindegaard, 2018a).  By 
2017 this review had resulted in legislation to establish better data capture systems using an 
automated valuation system (Lindegaard, 2018a).  In 2018 data for residential units is being 
collected and analysed and other property (forestry, agricultural, commercial and recreational) will 
follow in 2019. 
Under the new system, which is intended to be revenue neutral, residential valuations are 
undertaken on a site by site basis but making use of a range of data points, as set out below.  The 
valuations are undertaken by a team of case officers from SKAT and tax is collected by 
municipalities.  
Under the current system, Land Tax is charged on all land and buildings, including agricultural 
property and assets owned by central or local government, but with some exemptions and reliefs 
(Muller, 2005). The exemptions are because: 
 The property does not fall to be valued; these include churches, cemeteries, roads and parks; 
lighthouses, port installations and similar structures.   
 The property must be exempted; these include castles and royal residences, embassies and 
consulates, preserved buildings and community centres. 
                                                          
14 http://cphpost.dk/news/politics/inaccurate-property-evaluations-may-have-cost-homeowners-millions.html 
15 The Danish National Auditors’ Office. 
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 The property may be exempted at the discretion of the municipality; these include schools, 
hospitals, sports facilities, libraries, district heating plants and properties used for charitable 
purposes.   
Agricultural  and forestry land and public buildings pay a reduced rate of Land Tax  and people over 
the age of 65 may defer the Land Tax on one owner-occupied dwelling and summer house until sale 
or death.  Such deferment is registered as a first charge on the land.  
Critical to any consideration of Land Value Tax is the planning system.  Denmark uses land value 
maps and operates a strict land use planning regime and utilises land use zoning to a very local level 
(Vickers; 2009; Lindegaard, 2018a).  This means that the highest and best use of land can be taken 
from the permitted use registers.  For historical reasons dating back to the Hartkorn Tax, Denmark 
has detailed records of land use, and to this a permitted use system has been added over the 20th 
century.  Denmark also has full cadastral system. 
6.1.4.3 Relationship of LVT with other property taxes 
According to Almy (2014) in addition to the Land Tax, Denmark has two other property taxes: a 
(1961) commercial building tax (Daekningafgift) (1961) and a residential real property tax 
(Ejendomsvaerdiskat) (2000), as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Land and property taxes in Denmark 
 Land Tax Service Tax Property Value Tax 
Name  Grundskyld Daekingsafgift Ejendomsvaerdiskat 
Introduced  1926 1961 2000 
Coverage All land with some 








Basis of Tax Capital Value of the land  Capital value of the 
buildings only  
Capital value of the 
property  
Taxpayer Owner Owner  Owner 
Tax beneficiary Municipalities and 
Counties (via grant) 
Municipalities and 
Counties (via grant 
Municipalities and 
Counties (via grant 
Source: adapted from Mangioni (2016) 
This table shows how the role of the Land tax has been eroded over time from being the single 
property tax to one of three, albeit that the tax take from the Grundskyld is still above that from the 
other taxes.  The Property Value Tax, according to Lindegaard (2018b) ‘is regarded as an investment 
tax, to make sure that investment income on properties are not better than financial yields, which 
are taxed’.  Originally this was collected centrally through a withholding tax (Almy, 2001) but this is 
no longer the case. 
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In addition to the payment of the three property-related recurrent taxes, property gains and transfer 
are also charged.   Further, when land or property is gifted or passed through inheritance, tax is 
charged, based on the recipient beneficiary’s self-declaration, as long as that is within a set 
percentage of the recorded assessed value.  And when land is sold Stamp Duty is payable based on 
the higher of the assessed value or the transaction price.  Any capital gain to the vendor is charged 
through the income tax system. A re-zoning tax (frigørelesafgift) is payable when rural land is re-
zoned as urban. In effect this is a development tax, but payable at the point of change of permitted 
use – not the point of development.  
6.1.4.4 Valuation of land 
All Denmark’s property taxes, including the Land Tax, are based on capital values (Almy, 2014).  The 
capital value is a cadastral or assessed value that is also used for purposes additional to land tax, 
such as mortgage applications.  Responsibility for undertaking valuations lies with the Ministry of 
Finance through their agency, SKAT. 
Data is usually obtained via self-reporting for use within its computerised mass appraisal system, 
regarded as one of the most modern in the world and the most transparent in terms of public access 
to data (Almy, 2014).  However, although Denmark has been regarded by some as a ‘frontrunner’ in 
terms of its data systems, or possibly because, Denmark is working towards a new system for 
collection and assessment of data (Lindegaard, 2018a).  However the basic principle is unchanged; 
the Land Tax is based on the market value of the land without any buildings but with any connected 
services.  Market value is defined by Muller (2005) as an average cash payment a sensible buyer 
would pay. This does not quite equate to the international definition of Market Value as it is an 
average – not best price – but it is obtained by use of market evidence, though augmented through 
use of computerised techniques.   It also assumes that land is put to its best economic use.  
Denmark was an early adopter of computerisation for its land value records, having commenced the 
process in 1960 (Muller, 2005) and computer-assisted mass appraisal has been used for many years.  
A key element in establishing value is the Property Use Code.  This is an allocated use (out of 
approximately 40 different uses) and may not necessarily accord to the actual use of the property, 
which is shown by a Building Use Code.  But for the purposes of taxation it is the Property Use Code 
that is important and ensures that the highest economic use of the asset forms the base line for tax.  
Under the newly developed system for residential property there is a four-step process: 
 Step 1: collect and index six years of market transaction data. Data is collected is from 
cadastral records, GIS data (which will be made available to the public), building and site 
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data (including size, shape, slope proximity to facilities and amenities such as coast and open 
space). 
 Step 2: find neighbours and calculate an average neighbourhood price based on local sales 
and own-sales. 
 Step 3: correct for property-specific features including age, size and construction. 
 Step 4: value individual land plots. 
This technical approach is aimed at providing a transparent result.  It is recognised that there are still 
issues regarding the quality of some data.  
There is an appeal system against valuations but since the introduction of regular re-valuations the 
number of appeals has fallen significantly. All appeals much be lodged within three months of the 
assessment. 
6.1.4.5 Evaluation of LVT 
Denmark has often been regarded as an exemplar in terms of LVT.  It is longstanding having been 
consistently in place since 1926 and with forerunners dating back to the middle ages.  It has thus 
been argued to be deeply embedded in the structure of Denmark’s tax system (Silagi and Faulkner, 
1994).  Three factors, other than the historical context, arguably have helped to ensure the longevity 
of LVT in Denmark. These are: good property records and a strong cadastral system which has 
provided a firm basis of knowledge both of property details and of ownerships; a tradition of high 
taxation (but compared with income taxes and indirect taxes such as VAT, the level of tax on land 
ownership is comparatively low); and the political landscape has been benign towards it.  
However, as Mangioni (2016) argues, LVT has been eroded in this century by the imposition of other 
property taxes.  Other factors too have put LVT under pressure.  The desire to improve international 
economic competitiveness is resulting in a desire to reduce income tax.  In turn this makes property 
taxes in general more burdensome by comparison and draws attention to the tax.  This may have 
been part of the reason behind the decision to examine the efficacy of property taxes in 2013: a 
review which was damning towards SKAT and the accuracy of their work, resulting in a far ranging 
review of the methodology behind property tax assessments.  
This review of method is expensive in terms of manpower for data collection analysis and 
interpretation, but the development of more sophisticated IT platforms points to high level 
commitment to remain at the forefront of property value assessment.  Yet it remains to be seen 
whether the approach of starting with property values and separating out land value for a land tax 
will be maintained.  The key may well lie in the political will to ensure that sufficient trained resource 
is devoted to ensuring the robustness and currency of the assessments. 
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6.1.4.6 Relationship with SLC’s strategic objectives 
The longevity of Denmark’s land tax lies in political will, good cadastral systems and, possibly, their 
pro-activity in adopting mass appraisal valuation techniques.  These underscore that, should such a 
tax be introduced in Scotland, investment will be required to ensure that the administrative and 
valuation issues can be addressed. Furthermore, the planning system in Denmark, based on zoning, 
lends itself to less contentious planning assumptions. In terms of whether Denmark provides 
evidence that LVT would help achieve the SLC’s objectives, it is hard to say given that it has been in 
existence for so long. However, some of the characteristics of desired objectives of the SLC are  
discernible within Denmark’s housing supply and land tenure patterns .     
Research on comparative tax for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Oxley and Haffner, 2010) 
concluded that the land tax in Denmark does contribute positively to lower house price volatility and 
greater housing market stability than in some other countries, notably the UK, and could therefore 
be argued to contribute to the objective of stable housing land supply.  However, as they point out, 
the presence of other taxes and subsidies makes it hard to isolate the specific impact of land tax. 
Further the tax ‘freeze’ that has been in place for some years and which reduced the effective rate 
of land tax has weakened the housing market stabilising impact of the land tax (Pedersen and 
Isaksen, 2015), perhaps providing further evidence that an effective land tax does indeed aid 
stability. 
In terms of reducing the quantum of vacant and derelict land, the presence of a cadastral system 
aligned to the land tax system does ensure that there is transparent picture of land ownership which 
arguably enhances the potential of effectively taxing vacant land with the intention of reducing the 
amount of it, although there is no firm evidence from Denmark that the land tax has had this effect. 
Finally, in relation to changes in the concentration of land ownership, the examination of land tax 
does not shed much light on the current position, as it has been a factor in the Danish system for so 
long. Perhaps of greater importance is the Danish experience in respect of agrarian reforms. 
According to Jespersen (2011), a single set of reforms in the 1780s saw a shift from ownership of 
agricultural land concentrated in only a few hundred people to a position some 25 years later in 
which over 60,000 tenant farmers had become land owners. Such reforms were not a result of 
taxation change, for a land tax was already in place, but political will. Even today, there is a 
continuing programme to help agricultural tenants become landowners through a system of 
subsidies and tax benefits to enable land purchase by tenants which has resulted in Denmark having 
one of the lowest percentages of leased farmland in the EU- estimated at 27% against an EU average 
of 53% and UK of 43% (Haerling, 2016 quoting Swinnen and Knops, 2013).   
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In conclusion, the tax system in general in Denmark has acted as a tool to enable the more widely 
dispersed ownership of agricultural land, but it has also taken political will and a long cultural 
tradition.  
6.1.5 South Africa 
6.1.5.1 Context 
South Africa has a long history of recurrent property taxation. Property tax was first introduced in 
the Cape of Good Hope colony in 1836 (Franzsen, 1996).  After the establishment of the Union of 
South Africa in 1910, ratings were charged and collected by local municipalities and this remains the 
case today.  
Most municipal ratings were based on improved capital value. However, in 1914 the Labour Party 
took control of the Province of Transvaal and passed the Transvaal Ordinance No. 1 of 1916 which 
allowed for ‘site rating’ (i.e. rating based on the value of land without improvements). This 
Ordinance acted as the model for the rest of the country.  By 1955, 20 of the 60 major municipalities 
in Transvaal had adopted site rating, increasing to 100% of the major municipalities by 1979. The use 
of site rating spread across the rest of then-Republic of South Africa (RSA), so that by 1984 60 of the 
125 largest municipalities had adopted it, accounting for 70% of the total value of rating in the 
Republic (Dunkley, 2000). 
However, site value has been just one of three possible approaches to rating available to 
municipalities. Up until the introduction of the provisions of the Local Government: Municipal 
Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 (MPRA), property taxes in South Africa were levied and collected under 
the terms of four provincial ordinances from the previous constitution, under which municipalities 
generally had the option to select one of three rating systems: 
 a site rating system (i.e. taxing only the land, excluding improvements – a ‘pure’ land value 
tax); 
 a flat rating system (i.e. taxing the improved value of the land); or 
 a composite rating system (i.e. taxing both the land and the improvements, but at separate 
tax rates). 
After 1994 a programme of local government reform was introduced. By this time, the use of the 
three rating systems had become generally evenly spread amongst municipalities throughout the 
country. However, the new constitutional and institutional dispensation necessitated an overhaul of 
the various former provincial property tax systems (Franzsen, 1996; Franzsen and McCluskey, 2000; 
McCluskey and Franzsen, 2004). A government White Paper (1998) proposed changes to the manner 
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in which local government was to be financed, citing certain features of the property rates 
dispensation that required reform. 
An important policy decision flowing from this was to abolish the three rating options and to 
introduce a single uniform system of property tax for the whole country.  Property tax in South 
Africa is now levied on owners of immovable property based on the market value of land and 
buildings, i.e. improved capital value. South Africa, therefore, no longer has a LVT. 
The rating of property is also no longer confined to property in urban areas, as was the case under 
the ‘three rating system’. The law now extends to taxation of properties in formerly untaxed rural 
areas that now form part of local municipalities. This means that commercial farms and, in principle, 
subsistence farms and residential properties in informal settlements in rural areas, are taxable. 
According to Dunkley (2000, p.308), this caused farming communities great upset as most of them 
had never paid rates and believed that they would receive ‘little of value in return’. 
6.1.5.2 How the LVT system functioned 
Prior to the MPRA and the subsequent abolition of ‘site rating’, in the mid-1990s the use of the three 
rating systems was fairly evenly spread across the country, with approximately 34% of pre-1994 
municipalities having adopted site rating, 27% flat rating and 39% composite rating (Bell and 
Bowman, 2002). By 2004, the precise numbers of the three systems was not known, but they were 
all used in ‘meaningful numbers’ (Franzsen, 2005, p.156).   
Legislation ensured that municipal valuers valued the land, improvements and the total value of 
each rateable property separately, and then the municipal council chose a method of assessment for 
rating purposes. The choice was, therefore, a political decision rather than a technical valuer’s 
decision. Only valuers registered with the South African Council for the Property Valuers Profession 
could be appointed as municipal valuers, which remains the case today. 
Provincial laws in South Africa had previously sought to ensure that each rateable property had to be 
physically inspected by the valuer. However, thanks to a change in the legislation introduced in 
2000, physical inspection of the property is now optional, and it is it is now possible to utilise 
computer assisted mass appraisal systems and techniques.  
Under the MPRA, revaluations are currently undertaken on one to five year cycles depending on 
whether the municipality is urban or non-urban (Franzsen, 2017).  Valuation cycles under the pre-
MPRA system varied. 
There was marked growth in the total amount raised through the property tax in the years leading 
up to the introduction of the MPRA. For the six metropolitan municipalities the R8.9 billion in 
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property tax represented 22.4% of the total operating income. At R12.5 billion, or 19.4% of total 
operating income, for all 284 municipalities, property tax was an important source of own revenue 
for municipalities (Franzsen, 2005).  
The MPRA extended rating to communal land and agricultural properties but has carried forward 
many of the exemptions from the previous tax base. Current exemptions include: 
 At least the first ZAR 15,000 of the market value of a residential property. 
 Full exemption for certain types of public service infrastructure and a discount for taxable 
public service infrastructure. 
 Coastline and offshore islands. 
 Mineral rights. 
 Property used primarily as a place of public worship.  
 Parts of national parks, nature reserves, and botanical gardens. 
Also, relief is granted by municipalities on the basis of age or disability and the taxpayer’s income 
(Franzsen, 2017). According to Franzsen (2017, p. 392), under the MPRA system collection levels are 
generally over 90%, although ‘across all municipalities, arrears are increasing at an alarming rate’.  
6.1.5.3 Relationship with other property taxes 
In addition to the municipal property tax, there are currently the following main property-related 
taxes which are administered by the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (SARS): 
 Donations Tax; 
 Capital Gains Tax; 
 Transfer Duty; 
 Estate Duty. 
Income tax is the main source of the government’s income and is levied on the taxable income of 
persons such as companies, trusts and natural persons (South African Revenue Service, 2017). 
6.1.5.4 Valuation of land 
The basis of valuation for rating purposes in South Africa is market value. Municipal valuers can 
choose between a number of accepted valuation methodologies, the choice of which largely 
depends on the quality and quantity of comparable transaction evidence available (Franzsen, 2005). 
The methods used under the ‘three-rating’ system were: comparison method; income capitalisation 
method; rentals; and residual method.   
The comparison method was generally preferred, with the alternatives used when there was 
insufficient evidence of comparable transactions on which to base a valuation. In the past, when 
Investigation of Potential Land Value Tax Policy Options for Scotland – Final Report 
63 
 
sites were being valued in their unimproved state, valuations were unproblematic when there was 
an ample supply of comparable un-developed land transactions in the local market. However, in 
highly developed inner city areas, evidence of sales of land without improvements was in short 
supply which made valuing based in ‘site value’ challenging. In such circumstances, valuers would 
resort to using sales evidence from adjacent neighbourhoods. 
6.1.5.5 Evaluation of LVT 
The South African government removed the ‘three rating system’ through the provisions of the 
MPRA. This resulted in the abolition of a ‘pure’ land value tax in the country (i.e. the ‘site rating’ 
system). The South African government wished to introduce a single, standardised approach to 
property taxation to be used by all municipalities, based on the principles of certainty, uniformity, 
equity and simplicity (Franzsen, 2017). At the same time, the government adjusted municipal 
boundaries (and, therefore, the tax base) to include formerly untaxed rural land.  
The objective appears to have been to bring more land in to the tax base, and to ensure that all 
municipalities adopted a standardised approach to taxing land. Although the taxation of land 
without improvements (‘site rating’) had been widely used by municipalities prior to the MPRA, it 
was dropped in favour of adopting capital improved value as the single uniform rating system in the 
country.  
The literature is not entirely clear regarding why the South African government opted to abolish site 
rating as the system had been functioning well in the country and had been widely used. A range of 
options had been considered during the preparation of the MPRA, including retaining site rating as 
the single uniform property tax. However, the South African Institute of Valuers, representing the 
profession in South Africa, officially supported capital improved values as the preferred rating 
approach at the time of the MPRA reforms, citing lack of public understanding of a land value 
system, as well as the lack of vacant sales within urban areas as primary reasons. 
Further reasons cited in a non-statistically representative survey of South African valuers conducted 
by McCluskey and Franzsen (2004) include that with capital improved values the valuation roll 
provides useful data on all improvements and other new developments, capital values provide a 
more buoyant revenue base than land only and can achieve a better distribution of the tax burden. 
In addition, it was argued that capital improved value reflected ability to pay rates more 
appropriately. Furthermore, the advantage of a tax based on capital improved value is that it allows 
for lower nominal tax rates in comparison with a tax based on land without improvements, thus 
making it more politically palatable (Mcluskey and Franzsen, 2005). 
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Dunkley (2000, p.310) reflected that rating based on land without improvements had many 
beneficiaries in South Africa, but few of them ‘understand or are even aware of it’ and were 
therefore not in a position to oppose its abolition. However, McCluskey and Franzsen (2004, p.41) 
also report that at the time of the MPRA reforms, ‘certain interest groups argue[d] against the 
taxation of improvements, claiming that it would stifle development or even result in the demolition 
of existing improvements (e.g. farm labourer dwellings)’. They therefore concluded that ‘South 
Africa’s property tax reforms are not primarily driven by valuation considerations, but rather by 
socio-political considerations’ (McCluskey and Franzsen, 2004, p.41).  
6.1.5.6 Relationship with SLC’s strategic objectives 
Despite having had some form of ‘pure’ land taxation in place since 1916, the South African 
government opted to abolish taxation of the value of unimproved land in 2004.  South Africa now no 
longer has a ‘pure’ land tax, with the taxation of land being on ‘market value’, comprising land and 
buildings as one composite value. The reasons for the South African government’s decision not to 
continue with the option of a ‘pure’ land tax are not entirely clear, but issues relating to the 
technical difficulty of valuing land without improvements in the context of scarce comparable 
transactions evidence are considered to have been a factor, as well as the lack of public 
understanding of a land value system.  
This points to the essential importance of ensuring that there is a comprehensive programme of 
public education should a form of LVT be introduced in Scotland (or, indeed, should there be any 
changes to the existing LPT regime) so that it is clear to the taxpayer why the changes are being 
introduced, and what the desired outcomes will be. This links to the necessity of being clear with the 
taxpayer whether any change to the LPT regime (including any introduction of LVT) is primarily 
aimed at raising revenue for local services, or is aimed at taxing wealth, or indeed is aimed at 
delivering one or more of the SLC’s strategic objectives and/or long-term outcomes. 
The South Africa case study is also a salient reminder that the valuation difficulties which can arise 
from a ‘pure’ LVT are very real and may even have the potential to sow the seeds for a later 
rejection of LVT on the basis of a lack of transparency around how land is valued and, therefore, 
taxed. However, as other case studies have shown, these problems are not insurmountable, 
particularly where there are good levels of popular understanding regarding what LVT is and what it 
is supposed to achieve. 
6.1.6 Land tax in Namibia 
Although not covered as a full case study, the introduction of a land tax on commercial farmland in 
Namibia is worth summarising given its potential synergies with the SLC’s strategic objectives. This 
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tax was introduced in 2004 as part of the post-independence land reform agenda, given the 
preponderance of white-ownership of commercial agricultural land. Namibia had been a German 
colony and was administered by South Africa from 1917 – 1990 and gained its independence in 1990 
after a protracted military campaign.  
After independence, the government sought to create the policy, legal and institutional frameworks 
necessary to deliver land reform. As part of this, a government Ministry was established which had 
responsibility for land acquisition and resettlement and the acquisition and redistribution of 
agricultural land to previously disadvantaged Namibians. As part of this agenda, a tax on commercial 
agricultural land was introduced in 2004 under the provisions of Agricultural (Commercial) Land 
Reform Second Amendment Act No. 2 of 2001, with the objectives of equitable land distribution, 
enhancement of productivity of commercial agricultural land, curbing speculative holding of land 
and revenue generation for land acquisition to be spent through the Land Acquisition Development 
Fund. 
The land tax is levied on commercial agricultural land based on its unimproved site value. The 
revenue which is raised from this tax is allocated to land reform objectives. According to Franzsen 
and McCluskey (2017) the valuer must consider the carrying capacity of the land (as supplied by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water, and Forestry at the date of valuation), and must disregard the 
following: 
 the value of the improvements on such land;  
 any depreciation in the value of such land caused by excessive grazing, bush encroachment, 
and other bad farming practices on, or poor management of, such land;  
 any mortgage or other judicial encumbrance on such land;  
 any appreciation of the land value attributed to proximity to a town; 
 any appreciation of the land value attributed to tourism or mining potential; and  
 any depreciation or appreciation of the land value resulting from a public road or railway 
line crossing through the land. 
The tax rate has been designed so as to seek to discourage ownership of multiple farms. It therefore 
increases based on the number of properties owned. A Namibian national owning a single farm is 
taxed at a tax rate of 0.75% (1.75% for foreign nationals). The rate increases by 0.25% for each 
additional farm owned. The property with the highest value is listed first and taxed at the lowest 
applicable rate (e.g. 0.75%). The second highest valued property is listed second and is taxed at the 
next rate (1.0%), and so on for all properties (UN, 2011). 
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The valuation roll is valid for five years. As at 2015 there had been three rounds of revaluations. The 
200216 and 2007 valuation rolls had objection rates of 2.8% and 1.7% respectively. This increased 
significantly to 21.1% for the 2012 roll. Of the 2,584 objections submitted for the 2012 roll, 1,159 
objections (45%) related to the valuation. According to Franzsen and McCluskey (2017), the main 
driver for this increase in objections was that when the provisional 2012 roll was published, farm 
values had increased significantly since 2007, thereby changing the tax liability for landowners. 
According to Franzsen and McCluskey (2017, p.322), the introduction of the land tax in Namibia ‘can 
generally be described as a success’. This success is partly due to the sensitivity with which the issue 
was handled by the government – the tax was only introduced after extensive consultation with key 
stakeholders, which succeeded in securing their general agreement. The Namibia Agricultural Union 
which represents white farmers ended up supporting the introduction of the land tax. This was 
achieved by the government developing a participatory, consultative and inclusive process through 
organising meetings and developing a public information campaign through print and electronic 
media.  The public information campaign continued throughout the process from data collection to 
the valuation court appeals. Since its inception, the land tax has yielded average annual revenue of 
N$40 million Namibian Dollars and continues to be a significant revenue source to the benefit of the 
government’s Land Acquisition and Development Fund (UN, 2011). 
According to the UN (2011), some key lessons which can be learned through Namibia’s experience of 
introducing the land tax are: 
 introduction and imposition of land tax requires commitment and strong political will; 
 the introduction of a land tax requires inclusive consultation of stakeholders  coupled with a 
dedicated information campaign  in order to create the required support;   
 appropriate policy, legal and institutional frameworks need to be put in place to support the 
technical aspects of a land tax; 
 valuation and land tax administration institutions need to be properly resourced in order to 
provide the appropriate technical leadership; 
 valuation and taxation processes should be transparent and clearly define the destination of 
tax collected;  
 efficient land administration systems (including cadastral, registration and valuation) 
facilitate the updating and production of valuation rolls; 
                                                          
16 The 2004 introduction of the land tax was based on a 2002 valuation roll. 
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 a land tax regime like any other tax in a democratic society, must provide tax payers an 
opportunity to appeal against the valuation in a tribunal that allows parties to represent 
themselves without the exorbitant fees of litigation lawyers; and 
 land taxes can be a reliable source of revenue to support land reform and land 
administration processes. 
6.1.6.1 Relationship with SLC’s strategic objectives 
This case has obvious parallels with the Scottish context and the strategic priorities of the SLC, in 
that a land tax was introduced in the interests of land reform rather than simply to raise tax 
revenue. Interestingly, the revenue from this land tax goes towards funding the acquisition of 
further agricultural land for resettlement, a partial parallel with the Scottish Land Fund, although 
there are of course significant differences in the historical context which has given rise to the land 
reform agenda in Namibia compared with Scotland. For example, there is not the same potent mix 
of colonial history and racial politics at play in Scotland as there has been in Namibia, where these 
factors could arguably have contributed to the development of the degree of public consensus 
necessary to support the introduction of the land tax. 
Nevertheless, the key contribution of this case study is that it firmly points to the essential 
importance of securing political support, and support from all key stakeholders, not least potentially 
powerful parties who stand to have their tax liability increased by such a change. 
6.1.7 Summary 
In summary, the following points can be drawn out from the five case studies: 
 The importance of LVT is dependent on the tax rates levied and the range of exemptions and 
reliefs that are offered: there is no ‘fixed rule’. 
 While a uniform tax rate is simple and, on the face of it, equitable, differential tax rates are 
common.  Different rates are usually assigned on the basis of land use. 
 Where a land tax exists it does so in combination with other land and property taxes.  These 
might be taxes administered at different levels of government (state and municipality for 
example) or they might be other forms of tax such as stamp duty or capital gains tax (New 
Zealand was the only case study where these other forms of tax were not present). 
 The basis of assessment was almost without exception capital value (rather than annual 
rental value). 
 Regular revaluations are regarded as important, especially for urban land and property 
where values are high, more variable and more volatile.  But revaluations are not always 
evident, particularly in rural areas.  This is because valuations comprise a significant 
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proportion of the administrative cost, so the frequency of any valuations needs to be 
carefully considered. 
 Exemptions are widespread but it is not a foregone conclusion that agricultural land is 
exempt from land tax – some jurisdictions do tax agricultural land. 
 There was little evidence from most of the case studies that LVT has any perceptible 
redistributive effect, helps with breaking up large estates, or with bringing under-utilised 
land in to beneficial use, although it was claimed that in Estonia it had encouraged owners to 
dispose of land not in productive use.  
 However, the possible exception to this is the introduction of land tax on commercial 
agricultural farms in Namibia which is regarded as a success due to the extent of popular and 
political support and the amount of revenue it has raised to fund the acquisition of land for 
resettlement. This does point to the potential for a LVT to deliver similar outcomes in 
Scotland. 
 When the tax is established as a service tax (as opposed to a wealth tax), it is important for 
tax payers to see the relationship between the tax and services provided. 
 Where jurisdictions have moved away from ‘pure’ land tax, the reasons seem to be both 
political and technical – a tax on the combined value of land and improvements is easier to 
administer, to understand, and to communicate to the taxpayer. 
 The technical difficulty of how to value unimproved land, while not insurmountable, is 
considerable and prone to generating confusion and a lack of transparency. 
 Political consensus is essential, as is the public’s understanding of the tax itself. 
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Table 3: Summary of the full case study LVT systems 
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17 Figures extracted from OECD statistics 9https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REVDNK)  
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7 Consultation interviews 
As part of the research project, the Research Team undertook a number of consultations with 
stakeholders in Scotland. The list of consultees is detailed in Table 4. One consultee agreed to 
participate on the condition that neither they nor the organisation they represent are named. In 
addition, the Valuation Office Agency and the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy 
were contacted but did not respond. 
Table 4: List of consultation interviewees 
# Consultee 
1 Scottish Land and Estates 
2 Homes for Scotland 
3 Scottish Federation of Housing Associations 
4 Federation of Small Businesses Scotland 
5 Royal Town Planning Institute Scotland 
6 Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 
7 Glasgow City Council 
8 Scottish Government Department 
9 Registers of Scotland 
10 Community Land Scotland 
11 Shelter Scotland 
12 Anonymous consultee 
13 National Farmers’ Union of Scotland  
 
The following key points emerged from the consultations: 
 With some exceptions, there is generally a low level of engagement with the specific issue of 
land value taxation among the consultees, although most of the consultees have been 
involved in land reform / tax reform / land value capture issues in the past. 
 Overall there was recognition that a LVT would require a programme of communication and 
education for it to be accepted.  
 There is considered to be a generally low level of public understanding around land value 
taxation – so this would need to be carefully managed should LVT be introduced. 
 Some consultees expressed the need for further research to be done regarding land value 
taxation and how it may work within the Scottish context. It was therefore difficult for some 
consultees to express firm views given the lack of information regarding these points. 
 Common aspirations expressed by consultees include: 
o the potential for LVT to incentivise land being brought forward for development 
(including dis-incentivising land banking); 
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o the potential for LVT to incentivise vacant and derelict land specifically being 
brought forward for development (this was seen as particularly important in an 
urban context);  
o the potential for LVT to help create a less concentrated and more diverse 
housebuilding industry with more smaller builders and self-builders; 
o the potential for LVT to help reduce land speculation and, therefore, to reduce land 
prices and property prices (including making housing more affordable); 
o the potential for LVT to help reduce barriers to development, particularly of 
affordable housing; 
o the need for LVT to fall across all land categories, including agricultural land; 
o the potential for LVT to help raise revenues to be reinvested in housing stock and 
the delivery of infrastructure. 
 Common concerns expressed by consultees include:  
o technical difficulty in valuing the land without improvements - whilst some did not 
see this as insurmountable there was an identified need to resource this adequately; 
o lack of quality and easily-accessible information regarding who owns land;  
o the potential for LVT to increase the tax liabilities of certain groups (asset rich/cash 
poor, community landowners, small businesses, residential landowners, local 
authorities seeking to deliver affordable housing, housing associations);  
o the potential for LVT to act as a disincentive to invest in Scotland;  
o the potential for LVT to act as a disincentive to purchase land and develop it, 
particularly in the case of long-term development projects where LVT could increase 
the cost of holding land while it is being developed;  
o the potential burden that LVT could place on under resourced planning departments 
who would need to be involved in establishing the highest and best use of land;  
o the potential for LVT to be politically divisive; 
o the risk of unintended consequences of LVT being introduced to try and influence 
behaviours. 
 Some consultees expressed the need for the relationship between the planning system and 
LVT to be carefully thought through. It would be important to be clear about when LVT 
liability is triggered. If it is too early in the planning process (e.g. allocation, in principle 
permission), then this could create an unfair liability on landowners who might still have a 
legitimately long time to wait before development could actually be delivered. 
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 Some consultees suggested an easier approach to land tax reform would be to improve 
existing systems of council tax and non-domestic rates rather than go through the risk, 
expense and uncertainty of introducing an entirely new tax with lots of new valuation issues. 
 It was unclear to some consultees how LVT could help deliver a more diverse pattern of land 
ownership.  
 There was debate as to whether LVT should be a replacement or an additional tax.  There 
was a view that it should be a replacement tax so as not to raise concerns about potentially 
increasing the tax burden and the administration in dealing with yet another tax.  There 
were mixed views as to how far the replacement could spread (i.e. whether to include 
transfer tax for example). 
 There were concerns raised over the extent to which the Scottish Government would have 
the necessary powers under devolution to introduce a land value tax and/or replace other 
taxes with land value tax. This would need further consideration. 
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8 Policy issues and options 
A key purpose of this report is to propose policy options for the SLC should it choose to further 
explore the potential of a LVT in Scotland. We have identified four options, influenced by the 
following factors: 
 the findings from the literature review and case studies; 
 the findings from the consultation interviews with stakeholders; 
 advice from an expert panel held on 21 May 2018; 
 the Scottish Land Commission’s objectives in relation to land reform in Scotland. 
It is worth recapping at this stage the SLC’s three strategic objectives: 
 productivity – so as to increase the economic, social and cultural value of Scotland’s land; 
 diversity – so as to encourage a more diverse pattern of land ownership that spreads the 
benefits of land more inclusively; and 
 accountability – so as to ensure that decision-making takes account of those affected and 
that responsibilities in relation to land are met. 
Furthermore the SLC would like to understand the potential of a LVT to deliver some of its long term 
outcomes. These include: 
 fewer land constraints to place making; 
 fewer constraints to supply of land for housing; 
 fall in the area of vacant and derelict land; 
 fall in concentration of land ownership; 
 increase in community involvement in land management decisions; 
 increase in community control of land; 
 increase in number of lease or joint venture agriculture holdings; 
 improved relations between agricultural landlords and tenants. 
The literature review and case study analysis conducted as part of this research has not produced 
evidence sufficient to provide an assurance that a LVT would deliver the SLC’s objectives in Scotland, 
despite the considerable potential benefits suggested by economic theory.  However, it should be 
emphasised that this commissioned research required a desk-top review of the literature based on a 
small number of case studies. It is possible that focused empirical work could provide firmer 
information as to the likelihood of the effectiveness of LVT to deliver the SLC’s objectives. 
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The four options are best conceived of as clusters of policy decisions that are shaped by cross-cutting 
issues which would need detailed consideration by policy makers. These cross-cutting issues are 
described in the next section before detailing the policy options. 
8.1 Cross-cutting issues 
Cross-cutting issues, which include strategic and technical decisions that would shape any LVT 
options that the SLC or the Scottish Government choose to explore, are summarised in Table 5 and 
discussed in further detail below. 
Table 5: Cross-cutting policy issues 
Strategic Issues 
Land registration 
- Scotland does not have a complete register of land ownership. It is not due to be 
completed until 2024. A strong cadastral system is normally a pre-requisite for a 
successful LVT. 
Relationship with other taxes 
- Policy makers would need to consider how the introduction of a form of LVT could 
relate to or replace existing LPTs, e.g. council tax, non-domestic rates, land and 
buildings transaction tax and inheritance tax, as well as Capital Gains Tax. 
Wealth or service tax? 
- Although LVT is generally considered to be a wealth tax, the case study research shows 
that it can be/is sometimes used as a ‘service’ tax. The taxpayer and government 
would need to be clear on what purpose is being served: wealth distribution or 
payment for community services and/or general funds.  
Tax administration 
- Policy makers would need to decide which tax administration functions should be 
carried out by national and local tiers of government. 
Tax rates 
- Policy makers would need to set appropriate tax rates, depending on whether any new 
tax is an additional or replacement tax. 
- Policy makers would also need to decide whether there should be differential rates. 
Tax base, exemptions, reliefs and thresholds 
- Policy makers would need to decide on these, taking account of the objectives for the 
tax. 
Taxable entity 
- Policy makers would need to decide whether to tax landowners or occupiers – or in the 
case of a ‘split tax’ both; if landowners, policy makers would need to be aware of the 
risk of the liability being passed to occupiers through higher rents. 
Vacant, under- used and derelict land 
- A key objective for the SLC is to encourage the development of vacant and derelict land 
in Scotland (as well as under-used land). However, some land may be vacant, under-
used or derelict because of viability issues – such land may need subsidy not taxation. 
Community and crofting land 
- There an agenda in Scotland to encourage the community ownership of land, and 
crofting owner-occupiers. A croft is a small agricultural unit, and crofters are normally 
tenants. The impact of any new land and property tax on these groups would need to 
be carefully considered.  




Impact on free movement 
- Policy makers would need to consider the potential impact of any change to the LPT 
regime on free movement of capital, labour, goods and services. 
Impact on company balance sheets 
- Given that some companies hold development land as assets on their balance sheets, 
the potential impact of revaluations following the introduction of a form of LVT which 
negatively impacts land values would need to be carefully considered. 
Phasing and transitional arrangements 
- Phasing and transitional arrangements would need to be considered. 
Politics and ability to pay 
- A change to the LPT regime would need political support. Linked to this is the potential 
for popular resistance to a LVT based on ability to pay. 
Devolved and reserved powers 
- Scotland has a devolved government, but some powers remain vested in Westminster.   
This would need to be taken into account in any future work that may be undertaken 
to develop detailed options for LVT.  
Technical Valuation Issues 
‘Pure’ land tax or a hybrid tax 
- If the Scottish government were to introduce a form of LVT, policy makers would need 
to decide whether to introduce a ‘pure’ land tax based on unimproved value, or a 
hybrid tax with a split rate targeting land and improvements. Valuing land excluding 
improvements brings with it well-remarked but (based on experience form other 
countries) probably surmountable, technical issues. 
Existing use, current permitted use or highest and best use 
- Policy makers will need to decide whether to tax existing use, or highest and best use, 
or indeed permitted use (where this differs from existing). A tax on existing use would 
not create incentives to bring forward under-developed land. However, the valuation 
of highest and best use has technical difficulties. 
Role of the planning system and the highest and best use of land 
- Linked to the above point, the planning system would need to be prepared to play a 
role in establishing highest and best use should this be selected. This has resource and 
technical implications. 
Frequency of revaluations 
- The frequency of revaluations will be a decision based on balancing pragmatic 
considerations of administration cost, and the need to avoid dramatic jumps in tax 
liability when revaluations are carried out. 
- Policy makers would also need to consider whether a rolling programme is more 
effective and efficient. 
 
8.1.1 Strategic cross-cutting issues 
8.1.1.1 Land registration 
Should the Scottish Government introduce a form of LVT, it would ideally require a complete and up-
to-date land registry. This is because in order to levy a LVT, it would be necessary to correctly 
identify the extent of land ownership of the various plots of land being valued, and to correctly 
identify the taxable entity. Any inaccuracies in the determination of the extent of the plots of land 
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being valued could result in objections and appeals which would potentially be time-consuming and 
costly to deal with. One of the key lessons from the case studies is the importance of a good 
cadastral system to support the tax. 
Scotland does not yet have a complete register of land ownership. Further to the provisions of the 
Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2012, in May 2014 Scottish ministers asked the Keeper of the 
Registers of Scotland to register all public land by 2019 and to complete the land register by 2024. 
8.1.1.2 Relationship with other taxes 
It would be important to consider how any new form of LVT relates to existing taxation. This includes 
LPT such as council tax, non-domestic rates, land and buildings transaction tax and inheritance tax. 
The relationship with Capital Gains Tax should also be considered, as this tax can also tax land value. 
The tax base and taxation rates of existing taxes may need to be adjusted to accommodate the 
changes introduced by a LVT; alternatively some other LPTs could be abolished entirely. Policy 
makers will need to decide whether an objective for a new tax is to increase LPT revenue or remain 
revenue neutral but with a change in who bears the burden. 
Based on findings from the consultation interviews and case studies, if a LVT is seen as simply an 
additional tax it might present more issues regarding acceptability and indeed administrative cost 
than if it is a replacement tax. For example, if a LVT is introduced as an additional tax without any 
adjustments to the existing taxation regime, then this could reduce the degree of acceptability to 
taxpayers where their liability is increased over and above that which they already pay. However, if a 
LVT is introduced and presented as a tax which replaces some of the existing tax liabilities for 
landowners, then this could increase the degree to which the LVT may be accepted. However, it 
should be noted that in either scenario if the tax liability on land which is currently excluded from 
the tax base or subject to reliefs were to increase, then this may also meet with resistance.  What is 
also seen as key is that any changes are clearly communicated to offset the perception that LVT is 
simply a way of collecting more tax revenue. 
8.1.1.3 Wealth tax or service tax 
A key justification from economic theory for a LVT is that it taxes wealth stored in the value of land, 
and is therefore a mechanism for the redistribution of that wealth. It was not originally theorised as 
a ‘consumption’ or ‘services’ tax.  However, as we have seen from the case studies, LVT is sometimes 
used to collect tax revenue from the users of local services and infrastructure in order to fund them 
(i.e. a service tax).  
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This is an important consideration because, in the interests of transparency, taxpayers should be 
able to understand why they are being taxed. If the objective of a LVT in Scotland is to tax wealth, 
then this should be communicated and justified. Similarly, if the objective is to collect revenue to 
fund local services, then this should also be communicated so that tax payers understand what they 
are getting in return. This might be easy to identify in built up urban areas where landowners are 
significant beneficiaries of local services and infrastructure. However, landowners in rural locations 
are not such heavy users of public services and infrastructure and might therefore question both the 
principle of a service tax and the level of the tax rate.  
8.1.1.4 Tax administration 
Linked to the question of whether a LVT in Scotland would be a wealth tax or a service tax are 
questions relating to the administration of such a tax. Policy makers would need to decide whether 
the following functions should be carried out by local government or a national government 
department or agency: 
 valuation of land (including whether self-assessment should be permitted); 
 setting of taxation rates; 
 collection of tax revenue; 
 spending of tax revenue; 
 appeals and objections arbitration. 
These are all technical policy administration decisions, and political decisions. 
8.1.1.5 Tax rates 
The amount of tax collected will depend on the tax rate, alongside land values and the tax base. The 
tax rates would need to be set taking in to account the relationship between the new tax and the 
existing taxation regime in Scotland, and whether the new tax is additional or a replacement, in part 
or whole, for the existing base. 
Policy makers would need to decide whether there should be a single tax rate for all taxable land, or 
whether there should be different tax rates for different types of land (either by use and/or 
location). Following on from the discussion of tax administration, if it is decided that tax rates should 
be set at the discretion of the local authorities in Scotland, then it should be understood that this 
may introduce a degree of tax competition between local authorities. 
8.1.1.6 Tax base, exemptions, reliefs and thresholds 
Economic theory suggests that the tax base for a land value tax should be all land. However, as we 
have seen from the case studies, there are often exemptions, notably for certain heritage or/and 
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charity assets. Currently in Scotland, there are a range of exemptions of liability for non-domestic 
rates including agricultural land and buildings. In addition, there is a range of reliefs available to 
some types of land such as charity land and property. 
The decision would have to be made as to whether to bring all land in to the tax base for a LVT, or to 
continue to allow some exemptions (and reliefs). This decision would have to be made in relation to 
other considerations e.g. whether the tax is a wealth tax or a service tax, the political risk associated 
with bringing previously excluded land and property in to the tax base, and the interaction with 
other taxes etc. It should be noted that if the tax base were increased to include agricultural land, 
but a charitable exemption were to continue, there could be an incentive for owners to place their 
land in charitable trusts. 
In addition, the threshold value which triggers a tax liability for various types of property would need 
to be considered, as well as whether it would be taxed at progressive rates. 
8.1.1.7 Taxable entity 
Policy makers would need to decide who the taxable entity should be, the landowner or the 
occupier? Economic theory suggests that it should be the landowner, and it would be by taxing the 
owners that the SLC’s objectives with regard to land reform may be more likely to be realised.  
There is always the risk that landowners would pass on their new tax liability to the occupiers of 
their land indirectly by increasing the rent. This would only be possible in markets where there is 
strong demand for land and an inelasticity of supply. In such markets, there may therefore be the 
unintended consequence that tenants end up paying the landowner’s tax liability, with the 
underlying land value being little affected. However, if the LVT were to be a replacement tax and the 
tax base is widened to include some parcels currently exempt, the overall occupation costs might 
still be neutral or reduced if the landowner passed on the cost. 
However, in markets where there is an ample supply of land compared with tenant demand (such as 
in more rural locations) landowners may not be able to pass on their new tax liability to tenants as 
easily. Rents may therefore be little affected, with the landowner’s tax liability being reflected in 
lower land values over time. 
8.1.1.8 Vacant and derelict land 
Economic theory suggests that a LVT would encourage the development of vacant and derelict land 
because of the increased tax liability, creating an incentive to sell the land or develop it. However, 
this would only work in cases where land can be viably developed.  Land in poor market areas with 
little development pressure or land in need of remediation may not have sufficient value on which to 
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levy a LVT. If a tax were to be imposed on such land it could further decrease the likelihood of the 
land coming forward for development. What such land may need is subsidy, not taxation.  However, 
a LVT could be effective in cases where there is land banking by owners or developers who have 
obtained options to develop. 
8.1.1.9 Community and crofting land 
Scotland has community landowners, crofter owner-occupiers and tenant crofters. The impact of 
any new LVT on these groups would need to be carefully considered. For example, it would be 
important not to dis-incentivise potential community landowners from acquiring land or to increase 
the tax liability of existing community landowners to the extent that their operations become 
unviable. Of course, over the longer term, any increased tax liability for land would be reflected in 
lower land values so it may be a case of designing appropriate phasing and transitional 
arrangements. 
8.1.1.10 Potential impact on free movement of capital, labour, goods and services 
Given Scotland’s membership of the economic union of the United Kingdom, it would be essential 
for policy makers to carefully consider any potential impact of a change in the LPT regime on the 
free movement of capital, labour, goods and services. In particular, it would be important for policy 
makers to consider the potential impact on inward investment. 
8.1.1.11 Impact on company balance sheets 
Given that some companies hold development land as assets on their balance sheets, the potential 
impact of revaluations following the introduction of a form of LVT which negatively impacts land 
values would need to be carefully considered. 
8.1.1.12 Phasing and transitional arrangements 
Policy makers would need to consider whether there should be phasing and transitional 
arrangements to a new taxation regime in order to moderate the impact on winners and 
(particularly) losers over a period of time. The case studies and interviews pointed to divergence of 
practice and views on this point. 
8.1.1.13 Politics and ability to pay 
Any change to the taxation system would require sufficient support in the Scottish Parliament and 
would also need to be sufficiently justifiable to the taxpayer so as to avoid any significant political 
fallout for the party (or parties) in power. These political considerations could potentially limit the 
Scottish Government’s appetite for radical change.  
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Furthermore, the ‘asset rich / cash poor’ problem whereby landowners who are wealthy in terms of 
land assets, but do not generate an income from that land and are therefore not able to easily meet 
the annual costs of a land tax (e.g. ‘poor widows’) means that the introduction of such a tax could 
meet significant popular resistance. However, it should be remembered that the current council tax 
regime already taxes land (and property) and that this burden falls on asset rich and cash poor 
households. It would therefore be a question of what at rate the tax is set and the resultant liabilities 
in comparison with those under the present taxation regime, together with any reliefs, but bearing 
in mind that any relief system will place extra burden elsewhere. 
8.1.1.14 Devolved and reserved powers 
Although it is not within the remit of this research project to advise on the constitutional 
arrangements under which any reform to land and property taxation in Scotland may be achieved, it 
is important to note that this must be a significant consideration for policy makers.  
8.1.2 Technical valuation cross-cutting issues 
8.1.2.1 ‘Pure’ land tax or a hybrid tax 
The valuation of land is a well-remarked challenge in relation to a LVT. A key decision that would 
need to be made is whether the tax should be a ‘pure’ land tax or a ‘hybrid’ land tax. A ‘pure’ land 
tax, in accordance with economic theory, would tax the unimproved value of land only, whereas a 
‘hybrid’ land tax would tax land as well as improvements either at a single composite tax rate (as is 
currently the case with council tax and non-domestic rates), or at a split rate whereby the 
unimproved land and improvements are taxed at different rates.  
A ‘pure’ land tax and a ‘split rate’ tax both come with the technical challenge of valuing the 
unimproved value of the land which is difficult to do because, with the exception of undeveloped 
land, land and improvements are not traded separately thereby rendering comparable land 
transaction evidence scarce particularly in built up areas.  Furthermore, it may not be possible to 
identify the original unimproved state of land where the land has been subject to improvements 
over many years, such that they have merged with the land (such as levelling and planting). This may 
be a particular issue in rural Scotland, parts of which have been managed for many centuries. 
The Queensland case study demonstrates how this issue has been addressed in parts of Australia, 
where the land is valued not in its ‘pure’ unimproved state (‘prairie state’), but including 
improvements which have merged with the land over time. Furthermore, one way in which the issue 
of separating out the value of land and improvements would be to tax changes in property value, on 
the assumption that such changes will be primarily driven by shifts in underlying land value, rather 
than shifts in the value of the improvements. 
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A decision would also have to be made as to whether to tax land based on its annual rental value (as 
with non-domestic rates) or its capital value (as with council tax). In practice data availability may 
drive this decision. An annual rental figure has been argued to take out the distortions caused by 
economic swings in investment markets and is thus often preferred. It should be remembered that 
when the council tax was introduced there was very little open market residential lettings data but a 
lot of evidence of capital transactions values.  With the changes to overarching residential letting 
legislation combined with market changes, there is now much greater evidence of residential rental 
values, albeit that they are not held centrally, unlike capital transaction values which are lodged with 
the land registry. 
8.1.2.2 Existing use or highest and best use 
Another key technical valuation decision would be on what basis the land should be valued. For 
example, should it be based on the value of the land in its existing use, or should it be the value of 
the land in its highest and best use (HABU)? Determining the value of land in its existing use would 
be a pragmatic solution as it would be easier to determine existing use than HABU, but this would 
not have the effect of creating any incentive to develop or sell land which is currently not developed 
to its potential. Valuing land based on its existing use only would therefore render any associated 
land tax as being primarily a revenue raising tax, rather than a land reform tax.  
However, if land is to be valued based on its HABU then this brings with it technical difficulties 
associated with determining what the HABU of land actually is. These are discussed in section 
5.3.2.3. Although these valuation issues are not insurmountable, they are very difficult to address in 
a way which offers sufficient transparency or accountability. They are therefore open to challenge 
and appeal.  
8.1.2.3 Role of the planning system and the highest and best use of land 
Following on from the above discussion is the role of the land use planning.  The planning system is 
the mechanism by which the existing use of land is formally classified, and by which the HABU of 
land could reasonably be determined. This would be through existing land designations and use 
classes, as well as through changes to designations and use classes through plan making and the 
grant of new planning permissions for changes of use and more intensive use. There would need to 
be systems set up for valuers to be made aware of both the existing planning context and any 
possible changes to the planning consent for land being valued. 
There also arises the question of the timing of planning events and the timing of valuations and tax 
liabilities. Take, for example, a large plot of greenfield or brownfield land which is being promoted 
for residential development through the planning system.  It may have to pass through various 
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stages from promotion, to allocation in planning policy, planning permission in principle, matters 
specified in conditions / full planning permission, and discharge of planning conditions. Policy 
makers would need to carefully consider at what stage the new tax liability for ‘residential land’ 
would fall on the landowner. 
Should it be while the land is being promoted through the development plan?  In which case the 
land would need to be valued including a proportion of ‘hope value’. However, there would be no 
guarantee that the promotion of the land would be successful, so the landowner may have been 
unjustifiably taxed at a higher rate should the promotion of the land fail. 
Should it be once the land has been allocated in the development plan as residential land? Or when 
the land has planning permission in principle? In these instances, the potential for the land to be 
developed to its HABU is much clearer. However, it could still be some time before the land is 
actually developed. This could be because much needed local infrastructure needs to come forward 
first, or because the market is experiencing a downturn, or because of the unpredictable and 
discretionary nature of the development management system. In the meantime, the landowner 
would be paying a land tax based on a HABU which the landowner is unable to deliver due to 
circumstances beyond their control. This could affect the viability of such developments, thereby 
harming the potential for the land to be developed. On the other hand, it could incentivise the 
landowner to sell plots of land to smaller developers. This might create a more diverse supply of 
housing, but it also might harm the place-making objectives which the planning system seeks to 
achieve through comprehensive development of larger sites. 
Should the tax liability be triggered when the land has full planning permission? In this situation, the 
development would be likely to be commenced within a few years of the grant of the permission. 
However, if the liability is only triggered once planning permission for a new or more intense use is 
granted, then this risks confounding the objective of using a land tax to incentivise the development 
of under-utilised land to its HABU because the liability is only triggered when the land is in the 
process of being developed to its HABU anyway. 
That said, triggering the tax liability at the grant of in principle or full planning permission may have 
the potential to target land speculators who use the planning system to increase the value of land 
without serious intentions to develop as the tax may act as an incentive to dispose of the land, or 
complete the development more quickly. However, in the short term, in the context of residential 
land the developer (who may be different to the original landowner) would need to balance this tax 
liability against the risk of creating an oversupply of housing in the local area, thereby reducing 
house prices and harming viability (having already paid for the land). Although good for the local 
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community, developers would be unlikely to countenance creating such an oversupply unless the 
land tax liability is very high, in which case there would in any case be a very real risk that 
developments would be rendered unviable. This would be a short-term risk, until the effects of the 
land tax are reflected in lower land values, thereby allowing developers to pay less for land at the 
outset in order to cover their later tax liability. In order to avoid this outcome, there would need to 
be transitional arrangements. 
All this would be likely to increase the workload of planning authorities. These issues demonstrate 
the difficulties associated with the interaction of the planning system and the valuation and taxation 
of land based on its HABU. If the liability comes too early then it potentially unjustly penalises 
landowners who may not get planning permission, or may not get planning permission for a very 
long time. If the liability comes too late, then much of the incentive to develop under-utilised land 
may be removed. These difficulties may be partly why an event-based land value capture 
mechanism has been preferred in the past. Nonetheless with sufficient resources, including a 
commitment to professional education and training, the valuation and planning issues related to LVT 
can be addressed. 
8.1.2.4 Frequency of revaluations 
Finally, there is the question of how frequently any revaluations of land should be carried out. 
Should they be annual, thereby removing the risk of significant jumps in tax liability in developed 
areas with volatile land values? Should they be less frequent, thereby reducing the significant 
administrative burden and cost that would come with frequent revaluations? Or perhaps there could 
be differential revaluations, with land in more developed areas revalued more frequently than land 
in more rural areas with more stable land values? In Denmark for example they operate a system 
whereby domestic properties are revalued one year and non-domestic the next.  More regular 
revaluations has been found to reduce the number of appeals. 
Also, if it is decided that one of the planning events detailed above should trigger a new tax liability, 
should the valuation and calculation of liability be conducted at the same time as the planning event, 
or should it be conducted during the next mass round of revaluations? If the former, then this would 
ensure that tax liabilities are levied immediately with no ‘tax holiday’ until the next round of 
valuations. On the other hand, the frequency and number of planning events may create significant 
amounts of work for valuers in between the regular revaluation rounds, with all the associated 
administrative costs, which would not be justifiable if frequent revaluations take place. A 
compromise is to have, say, five yearly revaluations with an indexation of values on an annual basis, 
taken from aggregated transaction data. 
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It should be pointed out the issue of frequency of valuations is not an LVT-specific issue; it relates to 
all recurrent property taxes. Failure to keep the valuations current will lead to the tax becoming 
discredited, as has been argued to be the case with council tax and, in the past, with business rates.  
8.2 Policy options for further analysis 
The above cross-cutting issues will shape any policy options which the SLC or the Scottish 
Government choose to explore. With this in mind, four broad policy options are proposed for the 
SLC to consider. These cover a spectrum of degrees of intervention, and a range of priorities from 
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Table 6: Draft policy options 
Policy option 
Factors 
A. Basis of 
value 
B. Basis of 
assessment 




























































































1. Extend existing LPTs 
 Extend Business Rates tax base to include: 
- All agricultural land and buildings 
- Forestry enterprises 






















Reform Council Tax: 
- Create additional bands 
- Revalue 
- Introduce regular revaluations 




 Reform BR: 
- More regular revaluations 
- Remove relief on empty premises (after initial discount period) 
- Extend the valuation roll 
- Extend tax base as per option 1 
         
3. Introduce a LVT alongside existing LPTs 
 New supplementary LVT on: 
- Rural land 
- Vacant, under-used and derelict land 
- Non-residential land 
- Residential land 
         
 Reform Business Rates          
 Reform Council Tax          
4. Introduce a single LVT that replaces existing LPTs 
 Abolish Council Tax and Business Rates and replace with LVT on 
all land 
         
Investigation of Potential Land Value Tax Policy Options for Scotland – Final Report 
87 
 
8.2.1 Option 1: Extend existing LPTs 
Option 1 targets rural properties which are currently excluded from the non-domestic rates tax base, 
potentially including land which is part of larger estates. The land would be taxed based on its 
annual rental value based on existing use, including improvements, with the liability falling on the 
occupier in the first instance. Currently excluded rural properties brought in to the tax base would be 
valued and taxed based on both the combined rental value of the land and the business properties 
built on that land. In instances where there are no properties, the land would still be taxed based on 
its annual rental value. This option could be delivered through adjustments to the existing taxation 
system for non-domestic rates. 
Currently excluded land uses which could be brought in to the tax base include: 
 agricultural land and buildings; 
 fish farms; 
 oil and gas pipelines; and 
 overseas armed forces premises in the UK. 
The main objective for this option would be to bring more land which is part of large estates in to 
the tax base, and also to incentivise the development and cultivation of such land by increasing the 
tax liability of holding land, given that the liability for non-domestic rates falls on the landowner 
where the land is vacant/unoccupied. However, in instances where the currently excluded land is 
occupied, the liability would fall on the occupier.  
This option could therefore potentially create new tax liabilities for: 
 some business occupiers and owner-occupiers; 
 some owners of non-domestic land where the property is vacant/unoccupied. 
This option has the following potential benefits: 
 It could bring agricultural land in to the tax base. This could have the effect of increasing the 
land tax liability of the owners of large estates where the land is unoccupied. This is aligned 
with the SLC’s objective of ensuring that responsibilities in relation to land are met. 
 By bringing more rural land in to the tax base, this option could potentially incentivise rural 
landowners to enhance the productivity of currently under-utilised land by either developing 
it more productively, or letting it to a tenant who will develop it more productively (and take 
on the tax liability), or by selling it to a developer where the land is developable. This is 
aligned with the SLC’s objective of encouraging a more diverse pattern of land ownership 
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that spreads the benefits of land more inclusively. However, in order for this to be achieved, 
the tax rate would have to be set at a sufficiently high level, which could impact on more 
marginal rural agricultural businesses if the tax rate is uniform. 
 It would not require significant changes to the existing taxation regime but would require an 
adjustment to the existing exemptions. The new additions to the tax base would then have 
to be valued and the appropriate tax rate set. By extending the base, if revenue neutrality is 
desired, it could potentially lower the tax rate for those properties currently in scope.  
This option has the following potential risks: 
 Given that the taxable entity would be the occupier in the first instance, this option would 
not specifically target the owners of land where the land is occupied by a party which is 
different to the landowner. 
 By bringing more rural premises in to the tax base under the existing system, the new tax 
liability would affect not just wealthy owners of large estates which are un-tenanted, but 
also less wealthy rural landowner-occupiers and tenants. The thresholds and tax rates would 
therefore have to be carefully considered so as not to harm rural businesses. This would be a 
challenge considering the objective of seeking to incentivise a more intense use of land and 
more diverse pattern of land ownership by increasing holding costs through taxation. This 
option might therefore require careful targeted use of phasing of the new tax or time-
limited reliefs. 
 There would be political risk associated with this option given that the tax liability of some 
larger rural landowners and occupiers, as well as smaller and more marginal agricultural 
businesses, may be increased. 
 This option would have only limited potential to achieve the SLC’s objectives in relation to 
encouraging a more diverse pattern of land ownership and to bring vacant and derelict land 
in to productive use so as to improve land supply for housing. This is primarily because the 
valuation of land would be based on its existing use under the current non-domestic rates 
regime, and not on its highest and best use. Furthermore, residential land would not be 
covered by this option. 
8.2.2 Option 2: Reform existing LPTs 
Option 2 builds on option 1 but is primarily aimed at making the existing LPT system more 
progressive through reforming existing council tax and non-domestic rating.  
Council tax could be reformed in some or all of the following ways: 
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 Conduct a revaluation for all residential property in Scotland so that the council tax system is 
based on up-to-date valuations and can therefore capture the wealth increase since 1991 
and reflect any redistribution of residential property values across the country. 
 Implement regular revaluations of all residential property in Scotland, so that the council tax 
system keeps pace with changes in the value of residential property and associated wealth 
increases. 
 Reform the council tax banding so that the bands are more nuanced, and capture variation 
in property value (and wealth) across different parts of a local area, including the 
introduction of more bands at the top end so as to more fairly tax high value properties as a 
proportion of value. The current bandings do not equitably reflect the distribution of 
dwellings across the value range.  The top end of the distribution is now more stretched 
than it was in 1991. 
 Introduce a shift from ‘banded’ capital values to individual capital values. However, this 
would require more expenditure on valuation to ensure accuracy and could lead to a greater 
number of appeals. 
 Review the existing reliefs and exemptions available for council tax to ensure that they 
remain equitable whilst recognising that the larger the number and types of reliefs, the 
further away the tax is from promoting change in ownership and encouraging more 
beneficial and intensive use. 
Non-domestic rates could be reformed in some or all of the following ways: 
 Implement more regular revaluations of non-domestic property in Scotland, so that the 
business rates system keeps pace with changes in the value of non-domestic property. 
 Revise relief provisions for empty/unoccupied properties, potentially reducing the initial 
discount period and removing any relief following the expiry of this period. 
 Extend the valuation roll to include agricultural land and forest land. 
 Extend the tax base to bring in some currently excluded land and property, including large 
agricultural premises as per option 1.  
The main objective for this option is to make the existing LPT regime in Scotland more progressive. 
This option could potentially create new tax liabilities for: 
 some residential occupiers and owner-occupiers; 
 some business occupiers and owner-occupiers; 
 some owners of vacant residential property; and 
 some owners of non-domestic land where the property is vacant/unoccupied. 
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This option has the following potential benefits: 
 It could bring agricultural land in to the tax base. This could have the effect of increasing the 
land tax liability of the owners of large estates where the land is unoccupied. This is aligned 
with the SLC’s objective of ensuring that responsibilities in relation to land are met. 
 By bringing more rural land in to the tax base, this option could potentially incentivise rural 
landowners to enhance the productivity of currently under-utilised land by either using it 
more productively, or letting it to a tenant who will use it more productively (and take on 
the tax liability), or by selling it to a developer where the land is developable. This is aligned 
with the SLC’s objective of encouraging a more diverse pattern of land ownership that 
spreads the benefits of land more inclusively. However, in order for this to be achieved, the 
tax rate would have to be set at a sufficiently high level, which could impact on more 
marginal rural agricultural businesses if the tax rate is uniform. 
 This option would bring vacant and derelict rural land currently excluded from the non-
domestic rates system in to the tax base. Further it would, through the valuation process, 
allow greater transparency as to what land would be viable to develop and what would not 
due to lack of effective demand or adverse characteristics of the land itself.   
 By reforming council tax to be more equitable, the existing LPT regime would be made more 
progressive. In the case of owner-occupiers, this is aligned with the SLC’s objectives of 
ensuring that responsibilities in relation to land are met. 
 This option would not require significant changes to the existing taxation regime in 
comparison with options 3 and 4. It would require an adjustment to the existing exemptions 
and reliefs. The new additions to the tax base would then have to be valued and the 
appropriate tax rate set. By extending the base, if revenue neutrality is desired, it could 
potentially lower the tax rate for those properties currently in scope.  
This option has the following potential risks: 
 Given that the taxable entity would be the domestic and non-domestic occupier in the first 
instance, this option would not specifically target the owners of land where the land is 
occupied by a party which is different to the landowner. 
 By bringing more rural premises in to the tax base under the existing system, the new tax 
liability would affect not just wealthy owners of large estates which are un-tenanted, but 
also less wealthy rural landowner-occupiers and tenants. The thresholds and tax rates would 
therefore have to be carefully considered so as not to harm rural businesses. This would be a 
challenge considering the objective of seeking to incentivise a more productive use of land 
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and more diverse pattern of land ownership by increasing holding costs through taxation. 
This option might therefore require careful targeted use of phasing of the new tax or time-
limited reliefs. 
 There would be political risk associated with this option given that the tax liability of some 
larger rural landowners and occupiers, as well as smaller and more marginal agricultural 
businesses may be increased. 
 Reforming business rates so as to remove a degree of relief on vacant/unoccupied property 
would also be an unpopular move with Scotland’s business community. This could also 
create a significant political barrier to implementation. 
 By reforming council tax to update the valuations and create a more progressive banding 
system, this option would create a potentially significant numbers of ‘losers’ i.e. those living 
in properties which are currently undervalued, or those living in high value properties where 
their wealth is not sufficiently captured by the existing banding system. This would 
potentially create a significant political barrier to implementation, unless sensitive phasing 
provisions were introduced. One further option might be to roll up residential LVT liabilities 
for asset rich / cash poor individuals so that they are payable upon death. 
 This option would have only limited potential to achieve the SLC’s objectives in relation to 
encouraging a more diverse pattern of land ownership and to bring vacant and derelict land 
in to more productive use such as (but not restricted to) housing. This is primarily because 
the valuation of land would be based on its existing use under the current non-domestic 
rates regime, and not on its highest and best use.  
8.2.3 Option 3: Introduce a LVT alongside existing LPTs 
The main objective of this option is to introduce a form of LVT which seeks to achieve many of the 
objectives of a single LVT, but without requiring a total replacement of the existing LPT system. All 
rural land (including land currently exempt from non-domestic rates), non-residential land and 
residential land including vacant, under-used and derelict land would be taxed based on the capital 
value in its unimproved state assuming highest and best use with the liability falling on the 
landowner only. This would, in effect, allow for full or partial reform of existing property taxes but 
adding in to the tax base assets not currently included.  It would see the introduction of a LVT, with 
the theoretical incentive for landowners to develop or sell under-utilised land where the highest and 
best use value is higher than the existing use value. In terms of the meaning of ‘highest and best 
use’, taking into account the discussion at section 5.3.2.3, it is suggested that it should be defined as 
‘most profitable permissible development’. 
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Occupiers of business premises would still be taxed as under the existing or reformed non-domestic 
rates system, but based on the rateable value of the buildings only (i.e. net of the underlying 
unimproved land value), with the liability falling on the landowner where the buildings are 
vacant/unoccupied. This would in effect represent a split-rate taxation system for non-domestic land 
and premises, with the owners of non-domestic land taxed based on the unimproved value of the 
land, and the occupiers of the land taxed based on the value of the improvements only.  
Similar to the above, occupiers of residential property would still be taxed as under the existing 
council tax system, but based on the capital value of the buildings only (i.e. net of the underlying 
unimproved land value), with the liability falling on the landowner where the buildings are 
vacant/unoccupied. This would also in effect represent a split-rate taxation system for residential 
land and premises. 
The taxation rate for owners of vacant and derelict land (whether residential or non-residential) 
could be set at a higher rate than for developed / occupied land so as to act as an additional 
incentive to bring the land forward for more beneficial use. This is something that currently happens 
in South Africa, where there are a variety of tax multipliers for vacant land in various cities, ranging 
from 4 to 6.5 times the tax for occupied residential property. If introduced in Scotland, this may 
require the adoption of reliefs or exemptions where land is vacant and derelict for viability rather 
than land speculation reasons. 
The rationale for these adjustments to the non-domestic rates and council tax regimes while 
introducing a LVT is that the service tax function of non-domestic rates and council tax is retained, 
while the underlying LVT is a wealth tax. It would this give greater transparency regarding the 
purpose of tax. 
This option could potentially create new tax liabilities for the following groups: 
 residential occupiers and owner-occupiers; 
 residential landowners; 
 business occupiers and owner-occupiers;  
 owners of non-domestic land; and 
 owners of vacant and derelict land. 
This option has the following potential benefits: 
 It could bring more agricultural land in to the tax base. This could have the potential effect of 
increasing the land tax liability of the owners of large estates where the land is 
vacant/unoccupied. This is aligned with the SLC’s objectives of ensuring that responsibilities 
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in relation to land are met, and also potentially the objective of reducing the concentration 
of land ownership should landowners seek to sell-off parcels of land as a result of the new 
tax liability.  
 By bringing more rural land in to the tax base, this option could potentially incentivise rural 
landowners to enhance the productivity of currently under-utilised land by either developing 
it more productively or by selling it to a developer where the land is developable. The 
incentive to do this would be increased where the value of the land in its highest and best 
use is higher than the value in its existing use. This is aligned with the SLC’s objective of 
encouraging a more diverse pattern of land ownership that spreads the benefits of land 
more inclusively. However, in order for this to be achieved, the tax rate would have to be set 
at a sufficiently high level, which could impact on more marginal rural agricultural businesses 
if the tax rate is uniform. 
 By creating a new tax liability for the owners of vacant and derelict land based on its highest 
and best use (excluding any improvements), this option could potentially incentivise the 
owners of such land to enhance its productivity by either developing it or selling it to a 
developer.   
 As all non-domestic vacant land would have to be valued under this option, it has the benefit 
of clearly identifying land parcels with no or negative value which requires grants or 
incentives to bring them back into beneficial use. This is aligned with the SLC’s objectives of 
increasing the economic, social and cultural value of Scotland’s land, and of stimulating a 
more active approach to developing land in the public interest. 
 By creating a new tax liability for the owners of non-domestic land based on its highest and 
best use (excluding any improvements), this option may have the theoretical effect of 
incentivising the more effective development of such land in cases where it is under-utilised. 
This is aligned with the SLC’s objectives of increasing the economic, social and cultural value 
of Scotland’s land, and of stimulating a more active approach to developing land in the 
public interest. 
 By taxing the owners of residential land based on its highest and best use (excluding 
improvements), this could potentially incentivise the development of such land where it is 
not currently developed to its potential. As the majority of residential landowners are 
owner-occupiers of homes which can reasonably be considered to represent the highest and 
best use of residential land, this tax would primarily affect the owners of residential 
development land (depending on the tax rates). This is aligned with the SLC’s objectives of 
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increasing the economic, social and cultural value of Scotland’s land, and of stimulating a 
more active approach to developing land in the public interest and for housing. 
 By taxing domestic and non-domestic occupiers only on the basis of the value of the 
improvements net of the underlying value of the land, this option could potentially retain a 
service tax function. 
This option has the following potential risks: 
 Despite the suggestions of economic theory, there is little conclusive evidence from the 
secondary research that this option would be effective in helping the SLC meet its strategic 
objectives, although it would almost certainly provide a stimulus to development where 
development value exists.  
 By bringing some rural land in to the tax base under the existing system, the new tax liability 
would affect not just wealthy owners of large estates, but also less wealthy rural 
landowners. The thresholds and tax rates would therefore have to be carefully considered so 
as not to harm rural businesses. 
 There is a risk that landowners would pass on any new tax liability to tenants though higher 
rents in markets where there is a high demand for land and buildings and inelasticity of 
supply. 
 Defining ‘vacant and derelict’ land will undoubtedly be a challenge. At what point does land 
become not just vacant but also derelict? Any such definition risks being challenged by 
speculating landowners causing administrative difficulties and delays. 
 Some vacant and derelict land may be vacant for ‘good reason’ e.g. its development is 
unviable due to adverse market conditions or contamination. This option would therefore 
not encourage the development of such land, but would act as a further barrier, unless there 
is a mechanism in place for reliefs where it can be demonstrated that development is 
unviable. However, should there be a minimal or negative land value, the tax liability would 
be zero. This is an important point, because it means that the owners of land with a very low 
(or negative) land value would not have their tax liability increased on the introduction of a 
LVT unless and until their land is deemed (through any periodic revaluation process) to be 
viable for development to a more productive use, thereby increasing the land value and 
triggering a tax liability. 
 There would be increased political risk associated with this option. This is because such a 
change to the taxation system may be strongly resisted not just by larger landowners and 
owner-occupiers of residential property, but by the owners of non-domestic property. For 
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the latter group, this option could present a very significant change compared with the 
current system, because under the current system the owners of non-domestic land are only 
liable for land and property tax if the land is vacant / un-tenanted (empty rates relief 
notwithstanding).  
 This option would effectively bring all land in to the tax base, and would target the owners 
of land. Any such change may have an effect on the attractiveness of Scotland for investors. 
It would be crucial that if such a change were to be considered, that policy makers design 
the tax so as to not unduly dis-incentivise inward investment. 
8.2.4 Option 4: Introduce a single LVT that replaces existing LPTs 
Option 4 represents the most radical intervention as it would replace all existing LPTs with a single 
land value tax on all land. The tax would be based on the capital value of the land in its highest and 
best use excluding improvements with the landowner as the taxable entity. This would mean that 
the tenants of domestic and non-domestic properties would not pay land and property tax. 
Therefore, a proportion of the revenue generated by this option would have to be retained by or 
provided to local authorities in order to fund local services and infrastructure. In terms of the 
meaning of ‘highest and best use’, taking into account the discussion at section 5.3.2.3, it is 
suggested that it should be defined as ‘most profitable permissible development’. 
The main objective for this option would be to bring all land in to the tax base for LVT based on 
highest and best use as a form of wealth and service tax, while removing any land and property tax 
liability for tenants. 
This option has the same potential benefits as for option 3 with the addition of the following: 
 Simplicity of the tax base with only one tax chargeable and the replacement of two taxes 
with only one universal land tax.  This could have administrative advantages and give 
transparency. 
 It leaves the option open in the future for the possible introduction of a local property 
services tax so that it becomes clear as to a differentiation between taxing wealth and 
contributions towards the cost of provision of community services. 
This option has the same risks as for option 3, with the addition of the following: 
 Despite the suggestions of economic theory, there is little firm evidence that this option 
would have the desired affects in relation to the SLC’s objectives, although it is likely that it 
would yield some results in terms of stimulating development.  However such stimulation 
could be achieved without the very significant change that such a radical option presents.  It 
Investigation of Potential Land Value Tax Policy Options for Scotland – Final Report 
96 
 
might be deemed to be politically risky given the limited evidence that it would deliver fully 
on the desired outcomes.  
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Table 7: Alignment of the above policy options with selected Scottish Land Commission objectives  
 Productivity Diversity Accountability Encourage Development of Vacant 
and Derelict Land 
Stimulate More Active 
Approach to Developing Land 




Could potentially increase 
productivity of some rural 
land by incentivising it 
being brought in to more 
productive use through 
increasing the tax liability 
of occupation (and 
ownership where the land 
is vacant / unoccupied). 
Could potentially enhance 
diversity of land ownership 
and occupation of some rural 
land through increasing the 
tax liability of occupation 
(and ownership where the 
land is vacant / unoccupied). 
Could potentially enhance 
accountability of land 
ownership and occupation 
by extending the tax base 
to cover currently excluded 
land.  
Limited potential to achieve this 
objective. 




Could potentially increase 
productivity of some land 
by incentivising it being 
brought in to more 
productive use through 
increasing the tax liability 
of occupation (and 
ownership where the land 
is vacant / unoccupied). 
Could potentially enhance 
diversity of land ownership 
and occupation of some land 
through increasing the tax 
liability of occupation (and 
ownership where the land is 
vacant / unoccupied). 
Could potentially enhance 
accountability of land 
ownership and occupation 
by extending the tax base 
to cover currently excluded 
land, and by more 
progressively and efficiently 
taxing wealth tied up in 
land and property.  
Limited potential to achieve this 
objective. 






Could potentially increase 
productivity of some land 
by incentivising it being 
brought in to more 
productive use through 
increasing the holding costs 
for landowners where the 
existing use is less valuable 
than the HABU. 
Could potentially enhance 
diversity of land ownership 
through increasing the 
holding costs for landowners 
where the existing use is less 
valuable than the HABU, thus 
in theory prompting some 
landowners to sell land to 
avoid the tax liability. 
Could potentially enhance 
accountability of land 
ownership by extending the 
tax base to cover currently 
excluded land, and by more 
progressively and efficiently 
taxing wealth tied up in 
land. 
Could potentially encourage the 
development of vacant and derelict 
land by incentivising it being 
brought in to more productive use 
through increasing the holding 
costs for landowners where the 
existing use is less valuable than 
the HABU. This would only work 
where the land has development 
value. 
Could potentially encourage 
more land to come forward for 
housing, where such land is 
being held speculatively by 
increasing the holding costs of 
owning such land. 
4. Introduce 
a single LVT 
that replaces 
existing LPTs 
As above. As above. As above. As above. As above. 
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8.3 Further variants 
In order to keep the number and complexity of the proposed options manageable, further 
permutations have not been discussed. However, it would of course be possible to ‘mix and match’ 
elements of the various options to produce further variants, including: 
 Reform of the existing non-domestic rates reliefs as part of option 1. 
 Reform the council tax and non-domestic rates systems so that the primary taxable entity is 
the owner, rather than the occupier. This could, for example, be included as a variant of 
option 2. 
 Include a form of LVT specifically targeting owners of un-developed residential property, 
based on capital value of the unimproved land in its highest and best use. This could, for 
example, be included as a variant of option 2. 
 Include a form of LVT specifically targeting owners of vacant and derelict land with 
development value, based on capital value of the unimproved land in its highest and best 
use. This could, for example, be included as a variant of option 2. 
Accordingly, policy makers could view the various elements of the options as a ‘policy toolbox’ with 
which various options could be developed. It should also be noted that, following the 
recommendations of Mirrlees et al (2011)18, there may be potential to use the taxation system in 
ways other than introducing a LVT to help deliver the SLC’s objectives. For example Mirrlees et al 
(2011) suggested the introduction of a wealth tax on supernormal returns to savings, which in the 
context of house sales could contribute to stabilising house prices and, therefore, residential land 
values. 
8.4 Conclusion 
The research detailed in this report comprising a literature review, stakeholder interviews, case 
studies and expert panel discussions collectively point to a strong case for land and property tax 
reform in Scotland.  The literature has pointed to a strong theoretical case for an introduction of 
LVT. It is argued that a LVT would support the objectives of moving land into its most beneficial use 
and of imposing a tax burden that is widely spread and based progressively on wealth.   
Despite this, with the possible exception of the Namibia case, it has not been possible to find 
conclusive evidence regarding the potential of a LVT to deliver the SLC’s objectives in Scotland. This 
may in part be due to the nature of the research which included a desk-top review of a small number 
of case studies. It may be the case that outcomes related to some of the SLC’s objectives are being 
                                                          
18 Summarised on page 27 of this report. 
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met in some of the selected case study jurisdictions, or indeed in other countries, but primary 
research would be required to determine this. 
Nevertheless, although extremely attractive in theory, the findings from discussions and 
international case studies point to a number of constraints and barriers to a full implementation. The 
Research Team has therefore developed, and tested against expert opinion a range of options for 
consideration, depending on the political will for change and the resources that could be made 
available to both research and develop detailed proposals. A key consideration would be a detailed 
analysis of the interplay with other taxes on land and property and the extent of continued reliefs 
and exemptions. 
At the simplest level, a reform of business rates to widen the tax base would create some incentive 
to bring land forward; further reform of council tax would overcome the regressive nature of the tax 
(as set out in options 1 and 2). Both these actions have the potential to deliver some change and 
lead to increased social equity. But they come with expense and political risks and would not fully 
address the SLC’s objectives. However, adjustments to the existing business rates and council tax 
systems would be possible from technical planning and valuation viewpoints. 
A more radical option would be to introduce an additional tax on land, rather than extend the 
business rate scope.  This could be combined with creating a split between land and property within 
the existing tax takes, thus making it explicit what is geared towards a tax on wealth and what a tax 
on community services (option 3).  Although presenting a range of technical valuation and planning 
issues, this option could be viewed as a ‘halfway house’ towards an LVT.  The fourth option would be 
to do away with existing property taxes and replace them with an extended LVT.  However we 
question whether the fundamental prerequisites, such as robust and complete ownership records 
and sufficient valuation resource exist to make this a feasible option at the present time.  
Given that no option could provide a complete solution to the SLC’s objectives and that no option 
has been developed in sufficient detail so as to form a basis for recommendation for 
implementation, the suggested options are put forward as a policy ‘toolbox’ which the SLC can use 
to consider its next steps.  
In summary, whatever the SLC and the Scottish Government choose to do, there is ample 
opportunity to reform Scotland’s existing system of LPT in order to introduce a more progressive and 
equitable system which has the potential to deliver land reform objectives. However, the key would 
be to work proactively to secure the necessary political and popular support. 
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Appendix I: Relevant policy and legislative events in Scotland 2014 - 
2018 
Ownership Body Event and Date Summary 
Land Reform Review 
Group 
The Land of Scotland and 
the Common Good  - Final 
Report of the Land Reform 
Review Group (2014) 
Made recommendations for land reform in 
Scotland, including further research into the 
potential for Land Value Taxation. 
Scottish Government A Consultation on the 
future of Land Reform in 
Scotland (2014-2015) 
Consulted on measures for further land reform, 
including on a range of potential provisions for 
the Land Reform Bill.  
Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on 
Compulsory Purchase 
no.159 (2014) 
Invited views as to what the law on compulsory 
purchase in Scotland should be, and how it 
should be set out. 
The Commission on Local 
Tax Reform - established 
jointly by the Scottish 
Government and 
the Convention of 
Scottish Local Authorities 
Just Change – A New 
Approach to Local Taxation 
2015 
Recommended the abolition of the present 
council tax system in Scotland and expressed a 
belief that a system of land value tax is 
promising, but gaining a full understanding 
would require further analysis. 
Scottish Government Community Empowerment 
(Scotland) Act 2015 
Amended the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 
to extend the community right to buy to all of 
Scotland and introduced powers to make 
provision for community bodies to purchase 
neglected, abandoned or detrimental land where 
the owner is not willing to sell that land, among 
other provisions. 
Scottish Law Commission Report on the consultation 
responses to Discussion 
Paper on Compulsory 
Purchase (2016) 
Summarised the responses to the public 
consultation on the Discussion Paper. 
Scottish Parliament Land Reform (Scotland) Act 
2016 
Established the Scottish Land Commission, 
requires the Scottish government to publish a 
statement of land rights and responsibilities 
every five years, and introduced the community 
right to buy land to further sustainable 
development through a forced sale, among other 
provisions. 
Crawford Beveridge, 
Petra Biberbach and John 
Hamilton on behalf of 
Scottish Ministers 
Empowering planning to 
deliver great places - An 
independent review of the 
Scottish planning system 
(2016) 
The report recommended that mechanisms for 
planning authorities to take action to assemble 
land and provide infrastructure upfront should 
be established as soon as possible. The report 
expressed support for a LVT. 
Scottish Government Review of Planning Scottish 
Government Response 
(2016) 
Set out the government’s response to the review 
of the Scottish planning system, including a 
pledge to consult on a White Paper on planning 
reform, to inform a Planning Bill to be brought 
forward in 2017. 
Scottish Government and 
external consultants 
Research Project to Identify 
and Assess the Options for 
the Introduction of an 
Infrastructure Charging 
Mechanism in Scotland 
(Stage 1 & Stage 2) (2016) 
Published in December 2016, this report focuses 
on the options for an infrastructure charging 
mechanism to be applied through the planning 
system in Scotland. Further research was then 
commissioned. 
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Ownership Body Event and Date Summary 
Scottish Government Places, People and 
Planning – A consultation 
on the future of the 
Scottish planning system 
(2017) 
Included consultations on the introduction of an 
infrastructure levy, and on the improvements to 
section 75 planning obligations. 
Scottish Land 
Commission 
Making More of Scotland’s 
Land Our Strategic Plan 
2018 to 2021 (2017) 
Sets out the SLC’s strategic plan, focusing on four 
core areas of work: land for housing and 
development, land ownership, land use decision 
making and agricultural holdings. 
Scottish Government Scottish Land Rights and 
Responsibilities Statement 
(2017) 
The statement seeks to inform policy and 
practice around land issues in Scotland. It is 
underpinned by six principles, including that the 
overall framework of land rights, responsibilities 
and public policies should promote, fulfil and 
respect relevant human rights in relation to land, 
contribute to public interest and wellbeing, and 
balance public and private interests. 
Scottish Government Council Tax reform 2017 Changes to council tax were introduced to 
protect household incomes and make local 
taxation fairer. 
Kenneth Barclay, on 
behalf of the Scottish 
Government 
Report of the Barclay 
Review of Non-Domestic 
Rates 2017 
The report makes 30 recommendations 
regarding the non-domestic rates system in 
Scotland to better support business growth, long 
term 
investment and reflect changing 
marketplaces. The report concluded that there 
was ‘very limited support’ for the introduction of 
a LVT, but expressed report for further research. 
Scottish Government Programme for 
Government 2017/2018 
Confirms planning, climate change and Crown 
Estate bills will be introduced. 
Scottish Government Planning (Scotland) Bill 
2017 
Seeks to introduce a range of measures including 
provisions in relation to the system of 
development plans; the opportunities for 
community engagement in planning; the 
effective performance of planning 
authorities‘ functions; and a new way to fund 
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Appendix II: Land value capture or betterment taxes 
Background 
Betterment refers to an increase in land value.  Taxing betterment is justified in circumstances 
where the land value increase is not the result of the landowner, in other words it is 'unearned'.  For 
example the government can increase land values through planning and regulation, infrastructure 
provision, environmental improvement and improving service delivery and image of locality.  In such 
cases, it is argued, at least some of the betterment should be captured for the community, known as 
‘land value capture’ (LVC). 
Both LVT and LVC are assessed on the basis of land value but LVT is levied on a regular, usually 
annual, basis whereas LVC is triggered by events, usually the granting of development rights. 
Both kinds of planning (development regulation and forward planning) affect land values. 
Development regulation (land use controls, building controls) restricts the amount of land for each 
use and that will mean differential land values (Evans, 1983).  Forward planning (deciding where a 
new train route should go, a new bypass or a new town) will provide location advantages to affected 
land.  In societies where governments fund the provision of infrastructure, services and amenities 
the case for LVC is strong since, it is argued, the landowner benefits as a direct result of this publicly 
funded investment. 
LVC is often levied as a proportion of the uplift in value that is realisable when planning permission is 
granted, and valuations are required to determine the size of the uplift. This is usually the increase 
from the existing use value of the land to the market value of the land with planning consent for the 
development. In some cases, estimation of existing use value is straightforward – agricultural land 
for example. In other cases it is not so easy – urban land may be capable of being used in different 
ways, subject to planning, and the highest and best existing use would need to be determined. 
Estimation of market value is usually undertaken in one of two ways: by comparison with sale prices 
of similar sites, where such comparables exist; or by estimating the ‘residual’ value of the land 
having estimated the development cost and value of the completed development.  Clearly, the first 
method is easier, however, development sites are often different in many respects and comparison 
is not possible.  This means that the residual method is often relied upon, but the method suffers 
from several problems, both in terms of the model itself and in relation to inputs into the model. 
National land value capture 
During the 20th century, the UK was a laboratory for national land value capture instruments. A 100% 
development charge (tax) was introduced as part of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 but it 
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failed because landowners opted to hold rather than sell. It was repealed in 1953. A ‘betterment 
levy’ was introduced in 1967 at a rate of 40% on ‘projects of material development’ (sales, lettings, 
development activity and the receipt of compensation for planning and compulsory purchase 
decisions). This was more like capital gains tax than a development tax as it was not payable on grant 
of planning permission. It was abolished in 1971. The Finance Act 1974 introduced another higher 
rate capital gains tax called a ‘development gains tax’ but this was replaced in 1976 when the Labour 
Government introduced a Development Land Tax at 80% of the land value uplift. The rate was 
reduced to 60% in 1979 before being abolished altogether in 1985. Finally, Barker’s Planning Gain 
Supplement (a tax on the ‘windfall gain’ enjoyed by landowners when planning permission is granted 
for residential development) was passed into law in 2007 but repealed two years later before 
implementation following lobbying from landowners, developers and local government. 
These attempts at national LVC failed for a mixture of political and practical reasons: political 
uncertainty resulting from ‘ping-pong’ government was undoubtedly a significant factor; the taxes 
were often introduced following a boom but implemented after or as markets collapsed; and the 
complexity and potential for avoidance also took its toll. No betterment tax seems capable of 
successfully capturing the full unearned land value from all landowners because the tax is event-
based, relying on the action of a landowner to apply for planning permission for development.  Even 
Denmark only taxes 50% of the land value uplift when farmland is rezoned as urban land. 
Landowners can opt to wait, and in a rising and perhaps uncertain market, this option has value, 
particularly if the development land tax policy is perceived as a transient one. Needless to say, 
landowners who don’t seek planning consent earn implicit land value gain regardless of whether it is 
realised or not.  In addition, anticipation of public investment in a locality can lead to land banking. 
During the period of hoarding, because there is no private investment, the property economic value 
remains unchanged. Yet the land value increases due to forthcoming public investment. There is, 
therefore an overall loss if economic efficiency as the land is withdrawn from productive use and is 
held solely for the purpose of speculation. 
Local land value capture 
Local LVC instruments often take the form of impact fees, planning gain, infrastructure levies, and so 
on. These are administered locally, charged at the point at which the gain is realised and are well 
suited to hypothecation. 
The UK has now given up with national attempts to tax betterment. Instead England and Wales have 
local land value capture instruments: 'Section 106' Planning Obligations and Community 
Infrastructure Levies. Scotland also has Planning Obligations (known as ‘Section 75 agreements’, in 
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reference to the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997). Scotland has no Community 
Infrastructure Levy at present, but powers to introduce one are included in the Planning (Scotland) 
Bill 2017.  
As well as posing the same valuation challenges as national policies, there can be significant 
transaction costs associated with local LVC instruments and they are unable to redistribute revenue 
between high and low value areas. It is questionable whether local level LVC adequately captures 
land value uplifts that result from public investment. Furthermore, they might be regarded as a 
piecemeal solution unable to handle major projects without specific regulation. 
For some, planning obligations are necessary to mitigate the ‘burden’ on the community created by 
new development – more traffic or additional school places for example. For many, they are a way 
of securing benefits for the wider community from unearned uplifts in land values created by 
planning permission; benefits such as social housing and new infrastructure. For others, they are a 
burden; yet another regulatory cost on enterprise holding back the growth of the economy, 
restricting the supply of new housing and preventing job creation. In reality, there is probably an 
element of truth in all of these characterisations. 
In summary, although now once more under some active consideration, LVC is still perceived as 
problematic and likely to stall development; LVT on the other hand, in theory at least, would not. 
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Appendix III: Basic principles of land economy 
Land economy – some key concepts 
There are some basic principles of land economy which underpin the rationale and justification for 
land value taxation. Some key concepts are summarised below. 
The inelasticity of supply of land 
There are three factors of production: land, labour and capital. Of these, only land has no cost of 
production and is in fixed supply. In the language of economics, the supply of land is inelastic which 
means that the supply of land cannot increase in response to changes in the level of demand.  
Although the total supply of land can be considered to be perfectly inelastic, meaning that its supply 
cannot change at all, the relative supply of land for various uses can change: the planning system can 
allocate different uses to parcels of land and therefore adjust the supply of land for a particular use 
and thus create shifts in relative supply. This point notwithstanding, land supply is considered to be 
highly constrained and relatively inelastic. 
Sources of land value 
The value of land arises from its limited supply and is considered to be a residual deriving from the 
use or uses to which the land is put after paying for the costs of various factors of production 
(Ricardo, 1817). Land is not therefore generally in demand for its own sake, but it is in demand as a 
factor that is used in the production of goods and services. As a result, the demand for land is 
considered to be ‘derived demand’. 
The use to which land can be put depends in large part on its location. Land cannot be moved. This 
characteristic in combination with the limited supply means that the value of land is intimately 
linked to the physical, social and economic characteristics of its location. 
Where land is not put into productive use, the value of the land will be based on the best alternative 
use to which the land could be put. Therefore, even land which does not currently benefit from an 
income generating use can be valued by reference to a theoretical alternative income generating use 
to which the land could reasonably be put. 
Under these conditions, the value of land refers to an income stream generated by land as a factor 
of production (either currently or in its best alternative use). This is called ‘economic rent’. This 
rental income can be ‘capitalised’ over a period of time to produce a ‘capital value’, which is the 
basis upon which an exchange price will be considered. 




Whereas ‘rent’ colloquially refers to the periodic payments made by an occupier of land or property 
to the owner of that land or property for the right to occupy it, the term ‘economic rent’ has a 
specific meaning within classical economics: it is any payment accruing to a factor of production over 
and above the payment that is necessary to keep it in production. Economic rent is therefore a 
surplus payment deriving from the limited supply of a factor of production.  
If the supply of a factor of production is relatively elastic such as labour (i.e. the supply could 
respond relatively easily to increased demand, such as in the case of the supply of retail workers), 
the payment required to keep it in production would be relatively close to the necessary payment. 
This is because any surplus payment required as demand for new retail workers increased would be 
short lived in theory, as more labour could be relatively easily employed to meet the increased 
demand, thereby keeping the cost of labour relatively stable. 
However, because land is in limited supply (inelastic) and is spatially fixed (monopoly position), any 
surplus payment required to keep it in production in the context of increasing demand would endure 
over the longer term.  Indeed, in economic terms, all of the value of land is considered to be 
economic rent because the land has no cost of production (it is a gift of nature) and, therefore, its 
value is a surplus derived from its limited supply and fixed location.  This economic rent can be taxed 
without any distortive effects on the economy (McCluskey and Franzsen, 2005). 
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Appendix IV: Summary of land value tax and land and property tax 
around the world 
Albania Tax on agricultural land based on area, category, zone and land quality and a tax on urban 
buildings based on area. No revaluation since 1994. 
Armenia Tax on agricultural land based on cadastral income and on non-agricultural based on cadastral 
value, and a tax on buildings and units in buildings plus other structures, based on cadastral 
rental value. 
Australia Australian Capital Territory: state land tax (not on commercial property).  Land value or land 
and improvements may be taxed, while exemptions are wide and varied.  Local government tax 
based on three-year average land values. 
 
Northern Territory: no state land tax, only local government taxes based on land values, three-
year revaluations. 
 
New South Wales: state land tax.  Usually annual revaluations.  Local government tax is also 
based on land values (three-year revaluations) plus standard charges. 
 
Western Australia: state land tax plus local government taxes (based on land value for rural 
land and gross rental value for urban land) plus other charges. 
 
Victoria: state land tax plus local government taxes based on capital value of land and 
improvements. 
 
Queensland: state land tax plus local government taxes based on land value. 
 
Tasmania: state land tax plus local government taxes based on annual rental value, although 
some municipalities moving to capital value. 
 
South Australia: state land tax plus local government taxes based on land value or capital value 
(Adelaide is based on annual rental value).   
Austria Uniform property tax based on capital value, supplemented by a local property taxes with 
different rates depending on land use.  The last revaluation was in the 1980s. 
Belarus Land tax on agricultural and forest land and land of transport facilities, based on area, use, 
stage of development, zone and population.  Property tax on certain buildings and 
improvements to land, based on insurance value for natural persons and balance sheet value 
for legal persons. 
Belgium Property tax based on cadastral or actual rental value, supplemented by local property taxes 
for which regional governments set the rate but rental values are determined by central 
government.  These values are based on notional 1975 values adjusted for inflation. 
Brazil State level tax on rural land and municipal level taxes on urban property based on capital value 
of improved land. 
Bulgaria Property tax based on normative value if owned by natural persons and balance sheet value if 
owned by legal persons.  
Cambodia Property tax based on assessed market values of land and buildings is being piloted in a 
number of urban areas. 
Canada Many provinces levy a property tax based on current land value.  A number of provinces have 
annual reassessments where market activity warrants while others have longer periods 
between valuation periods.  Local and provincial authorities administer the taxes and tax rates. 
Chile National property tax on urban and rural property.  Non-agricultural land is assigned a value 
based on the zone in which the land is located. 
China A residential property tax was introduced in 2011 with pilots in Shanghai and Chongqing. 
Croatia Tax on country cottages and rest centres, based on age and size.  A property tax, based on 
value, was introduced in 2013. 
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Cyprus Property tax based on capital value.  
Czech 
Republic 
Tax on agricultural and forest land and developed land, based on area and regulated price, plus 
a tax on buildings and other structures, based on area and a locally determined coefficient that 
varies with the population of the city.  Tax rates differ depending on land use. 
Denmark Municipal land taxes based on value, plus a state property tax on owner-occupied dwellings 
and summerhouses, based on value.  There are also municipal service taxes on commercial 
buildings, based on building value.  Properties are revalued every two years. 
Estonia State level land tax based on capital value, with differential rates depending on land use. 
Finland Property tax based on capital value with different rates for dwellings and other uses.  
Agriculture and forest land is exempt. 
France Property tax, housing tax and a tax on business buildings and equipment, all based on annual 
cadastral rental value. To compensate for the lack of revaluations, coefficients are used to 
update values but they are at less than current market levels. 
Georgia Land tax based on area, with differential rates for agricultural and non-agricultural land.  A tax 
on buildings and units of buildings and structures on land of natural persons, based on 
insurance value, and a tax on property of enterprises, based on balance sheet value. 
Germany Tax on land & buildings and agricultural machinery and livestock, based on fiscal values, which 
are usually lower than market values. Taxation varies by region and municipality both in terms 
of the valuation date used to generate the notional value and the tax rates.  There are different 
rates for agricultural/forest land and other property.  Urban land values are based on average 
prices per m2 and farmland is valued on the basis of soil classifications. 
Greece Municipal property taxes are based on the area of the property and the land it occupies.  
Adopted in late 2011 a new square-meter tax at varying rates is collected with electricity bills. 
Hong Kong Property tax calculated as a percentage of rateable value but with a very low tax rate 
unchanged for years, now giving rebates. 
Hungary Land tax and a building tax, both based on area and value.  Tourist tax on holiday houses based 
on area and a communal tax per property based on a flat rate.  
Iceland Property tax based on capital value, with different rates depending on property type.  
Properties are revalued annually. 
India State-level and urban level property taxes.  These taxes have evolved from annual rental values 
to area-based and capital value based assessments. 
Ireland Residential property tax based on capital value bands, plus a commercial property tax based on 
annual rental value.  
Italy Communal tax on property based on cadastral annual value. Local government business tax on 
occupiers of business property, based on occupied areas of buildings, with differential rates 
based on business activity and area.  Tax on residential properties reintroduced. 
Japan Property tax where the ‘standard tax rate’ is set in law and local governments are expected to 
adopt this rate in setting local taxes. 
Kazakhstan Agricultural and urban land taxes based on area, property tax based on book value for 
businesses and area for persons.  Agricultural land tax differentials are based on soil type and 
area type, other land differentials are based on plot area and regional factors. 
Kosovo Property tax based on capital value with use-type differentials. 
Latvia A residential property tax on buildings complements the existing land tax.  Unused land is taxed 
at twice the rate applied to developed land.  There are use-type differentials.  Revaluations are 
every five-years. 
Lithuania Tax on agricultural land and an enterprise real estate tax, both based on tax value.  There are 
separate taxes on land and buildings at the moment but the aim is to introduce a unified tax 
based on market values, with different rates for various land use types. 
Luxembourg Property tax based on capital value, with different rates depending on land use. 
Macedonia Property tax based on capital value, with different rates depending on land use. 
Mexico Property tax based on market value  
Moldova Land tax for rural areas based on area and a building tax for rural areas based on balance sheet 
value.  Property tax for urban areas based on capital values, with local differentials based on 
owner type and property type. 
Montenegro Property tax based on capital value, with different rates depending on land use. 
Namibia Central government land tax on the value of agricultural land, and municipal urban property 




Netherlands Municipal property taxes based on capital values.  For residential properties the tax is in two 
parts: for the occupier and for the owner.  There are four-yearly rolling revaluations. 
New 
Zealand 
Local governments can choose the basis for their land and property tax.  Use of land value as a 
basis peaked in the 1980s since when they have been switching to property value. 
Norway Local governments have discretion around taxing residential, industrial, and commercial 
property. 
Poland Agricultural and forest land taxes based on area.  Urban property tax on buildings, based on 
area. Differential rates for property types.  Agricultural and forest buildings are exempt. 
Portugal Municipal property taxes with different rates for urban and rural property. 
Romania Urban land tax based on area.  Tax on buildings based on balance sheet or insurance value.  
Different rates for different towns and cities and zones within them.  Agricultural rates are 
lower and depend on use. 
Russia Land tax based on agricultural cadastral value.  Property tax on inventory value of buildings 
owned by persons and balance sheet value of property owned by enterprises. 
Serbia Property tax based on book values for businesses and useable area and average sales price for 
persons.  Agricultural and forest land is valued at five times its cadastral income. 
Singapore Property tax based on annual rental value.  
Slovakia Land tax and a building tax, with differential rates for building type, city size and location in 
city, and for land use category. 
Slovenia Municipal charge for use of building land, based on area. Property tax on buildings and parts of 
buildings, based on normative value.  Differential rates based on land use. 
South Africa National property tax based on capital values.  
South Korea Property tax where land and buildings are taxed at different rates. 
Spain Rural land tax and urban land tax, both include value of improvements. 
Sweden Property tax on dwellings and industrial buildings based on fixed charges and capped at roughly 
75% of market value. New housing is exempt for the first five years and taxed at half the 
regular rate for the next five years.  There are different rates depending on land use.  Separate 
values of land and buildings are determined for single-family houses.  For other types of 
property total value and land value are estimated, and building value is the difference. 
Switzerland Land tax, which includes value of improvements. 
Taiwan Land value tax, reassessed every three years, plus a land value increment tax, which acts like a 
capital gains tax. To discourage speculation there is a variation on how much is charged 
depending on how long property has been held.  In 2011 a vacant land tax was re-instated with 
the explicit intent to discourage land speculation and hoarding; local governments have the 
discretion to set the vacant land tax rate between two to five times the standard land tax rate. 
Turkey Municipal property tax.  Buildings are assessed using depreciated construction costs, urban 
land by area and street, and rural land by type. There are different rates for land and buildings. 
Ukraine Land tax based on capital value of land or area, and a tax on buildings based on area.  If land 
has an estimated market value then the tax is one percent of the estimated value. All other 
land is taxed based on land area. 
UK Property tax based on the annual rental value of non-domestic accommodation and the capital 
value of domestic accommodation.  
US Most states have property taxes, which vary by state and by county.  Hardly any have land 
taxes. 
Vietnam Area-based tax on non-agricultural land (excluding housing) 
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Appendix V: Queensland state land tax rates as at 2018 
Rates for individuals 
Total Taxable Value Rate of Tax 
$0–$599,999 $0 
$600,000–$999,999 $500 plus 1 cent for each $1 more than $600,000 
$1,000,000–$2,999,999 $4,500 plus 1.65 cents for each $1 more than $1,000,000 
$3,000,000–$4,999,999 $37,500 plus 1.25 cents for each $1 more than $3,000,000 
$5,000,000 and over $62,500 plus 1.75 cents for each $1 more than $5,000,000 
 
Rates for companies, trustees and absentees 
Total Taxable Value Rate of Tax 
$0–$349,999 $0 
$350,000–$2,249,999 $1,450 plus 1.7 cents for each $1 more than $350,000 
$2,250,000–$4,999,999 $33,750 plus 1.5 cents for each $1 more than $2,250,000 
$5,000,000 and over $75,000 plus 2.0 cents for each $1 more than $5,000,000 
 
All currency AUS dollars. 
  




Ad valorem tax A tax which is levied as a proportion of the value of the good(s) 
being taxed. An example of this kind of tax is VAT. 
Basis of assessment The basis on which a valuation is conducted. In the context of the 
use of this term in this report, bases of assessment include rental 
value and capital value. 
Basis of value The fundamental measurement assumptions of a valuation. In the 
context of the use of the term in this report, bases of value include 
existing use value and highest and best use value. 
Benefit tax Tax related to the cost of providing public services. See service tax. 
Business rates A recurrent tax levied on non-domestic property. See non-domestic 
rates. 
Cadastral value The value of a property for tax purposes. 
Capital value The likely price an asset would sell for on a specified date. See 
market value. 
Comparison method A valuation method whereby an asset is valued based on the 
analysis of comparable transactions in the market. 
Council tax   A recurrent tax levied on domestic property.  
Development value The value which could potentially be realised if a plot of land was to 
be developed to a more valuable use than the existing use. 
Economic rent Any payment accruing to a factor of production over and above the 
payment that is necessary to keep it in production. 
Event-based tax A tax which is levied upon the occurrence of a specific event. An 
example of this is the Scottish Land and Buildings Transfer Tax. See 
land and property tax and recurrent tax. 
Existing use value The value of a plot of land in its existing use. See development value 
and highest and best use. 
Highest and best use The use of a plot of land or a property which would produce the 
highest value. This could be different to the existing use. However, 
should the highest and best use be assumed to be different to the 
existing use, the assumptions regarding any potential for a change 
of use to the highest and best use would need to be based on 
reasonable assumptions, taking in to account the constraints of the 
land use planning system. See development value, existing use value 
and hope value. 
Hope value The value that purchasers of land pay in excess of the value for the 
permitted use.  It reflects – in financial terms – speculation that 
there might be a change of permitted use that would increase the 
value of a plot of land.   
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Land and property tax  Tax which is levied on land and/or property. 
Land value tax A recurrent tax on landowners usually based on unimproved land 
value, usually levied as a percentage of the unimproved capital 
value of the site. 
Market rental value The amount that would be paid on the open market to rent a 
property on the basis of a notional lease. See rental value. 
Market value The likely price for which an asset would sell on a specified date. See 
capital value. 
Non-domestic rates A recurrent tax levied on non-domestic property. See business rates. 
Rateable value The value of a property arrived at by professional assessors which is 
used to determine the rates payable.  In Scotland, the rateable value 
is established by the Scottish Assessors and the rates are payable on 
non-domestic property only. See non-domestic rates and Scottish 
Assessors. 
Recurrent tax A tax which is payable periodically e.g. monthly or annually. An 
example of this in relation to land and property taxation is non-
domestic rates. See land and property tax and event-based tax. 
Rental value The amount that would be paid on the open market to rent a 
property on notional lease terms. See market rental value. 
Residual land value The value of a plot of development land which has been arrived at 
using the residual method and which represents the value of land 
which has (re)development value. 
Residual method A method of valuing development land whereby build costs and 
other adjustments are subtracted from the total value of the 
planned development to arrive at a residual land value. 
Scottish Assessors Independent public officials who establish the rateable value of 
property listed on a local valuation roll. 
Service tax   Tax related to the cost of providing public services. 
Tax base The total value of assets which are taxable. If a type of asset (such as 
agricultural land) is excluded from the tax base, it means that it is 
not taxable. 
Taxable entity The individual or business which is liable for a tax. In the context of 
land and property tax, the taxable entity could be the owner and/or 
the occupier of land and/or buildings. 
Tax rate The rate at which a tax is set. In the context of land and property 
tax, it may be expressed as a percentage of the value of the asset. 
See ad valorem tax. 
Unimproved land In economic theory relating to land value tax, unimproved land is 
that which has been subject to no improvements whatsoever e.g. 
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‘prairie’ or ‘wild’ land. In practice, however, legal definitions of 
unimproved land may vary. Some definitions may, for example, 
include land which has been subject to improvements which have 
merged with the land over time (e.g. levelling and drainage). 
Valuation The estimation of the value of an asset on a specified date; normally 
undertaken by a qualified professional. 
Valuation roll A public document which contains a list of all properties that 
generate a land and property tax liability for the taxable entity. 
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